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The debt capital markets for leveraged borrowers are ripe with information asymmetry, lender 
specialization, and borrower segmentation.  In this dissertation, I explore how these factors manifest 
themselves and the economic consequences thereof.  Essay 1 shows that adverse selection and moral 
hazard concerns are inherent in underwriting syndicates that differ in size and number of lead 
underwriters. Using a nested double selection probit model of syndicate choice, I examine the 
matching of issuers and underwriters and find that matches of issuer quality and underwriter 
reputation are positive assortative. Further, switching regressions show that yield spreads reflect 
uncertainty about the intrinsic values of debt issued. Yield spreads are 150 basis points higher when 
poor issuer and issue quality require multiple lead underwriters, but weak lead underwriter reputation 
constrains the size of the syndicate needed for information production and distribution.  Essay 2 
shows that borrowers care who are their lenders. The matches between borrowers and lenders are 
endogenously determined and negative assortative. Creditworthy but opaque firms will choose to 
borrow from specialized lenders (QIBs), who are more adept at assessing issuer quality, maintaining 
confidentiality of private disclosures, and monitoring.  In Essay 3, I investigate the default and 
bankruptcy hazards of covenant-lite and fully covenanted leveraged loans over the period 1999 to 
Q3:2016. I show how lender specialization and borrower segmentation in the leveraged loan market 
is impounded in the pricing of loans characterized by low probability but high loss events. Non-bank 
lenders rely on screening of speculative grade rated borrowers and secondary market trading of loans 
to control potential agency conflicts with borrowers. Traditional monitoring is more important for 
bank lenders. The default rates of covenant-lite loans are lower than on fully covenanted loans, but 
recovery rates implied by higher yield spreads are substantially lower. In loan pricing, lenders give 
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I. Introduction to Essays in Leveraged Capital Markets
The debt capital markets for leveraged borrowers are ripe with information asymmetry, 
lender specialization, and borrower segmentation.  In this dissertation, I explore how these factors 
manifest themselves and the economic consequences thereof.  Essay 1 shows that adverse selection 
and moral hazard concerns are inherent in underwriting syndicates that differ in size and number of 
lead underwriters. Using a nested double selection probit model of syndicate choice, I examine the 
matching of issuers and underwriters and find that matches of issuer quality and underwriter 
reputation are positive assortative. Further, switching regressions show that yield spreads reflect 
uncertainty about the intrinsic values of debt issued. Yield spreads are 150 basis points higher when 
poor issuer and issue quality require multiple lead underwriters, but weak lead underwriter reputation 
constrains the size of the syndicate needed for information production and distribution.   
Essay 2 shows that borrowers care who are their lenders. The matches between borrowers 
and lenders are endogenously determined and negative assortative. Creditworthy but opaque firms 
will choose to borrow from specialized lenders (QIBs), who are more adept at assessing issuer quality, 
maintaining confidentiality of private disclosures, and monitoring.   
In Essay 3, I investigate the default and bankruptcy hazards of covenant-lite and fully 
covenanted leveraged loans over the period 1999 to Q3:2016. I show how lender specialization and 
borrower segmentation in the leveraged loan market is impounded in the pricing of loans characterized 
by low probability but high loss events. Non-bank lenders rely on screening of speculative grade rated 
borrowers and secondary market trading of loans to control potential agency conflicts with borrowers. 
Traditional monitoring is more important for bank lenders. The default rates of covenant-lite loans 
are lower than on fully covenanted loans, but recovery rates implied by higher yield spreads are 




I. Essay 1 – Assortative Matches in Debt Syndicates
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 I. Introduction 
 Underwriting syndicates are critical to the success of corporate debt issuances. Because the 
ability and effort of syndicate members are latent and unobservable, adverse selection and moral 
hazard concerns are ever-present in underwriting syndicates. In forming a syndicate, the left lead 
underwriter seeks to: spread effort and diversify risk among members of the lead underwriting group; 
induce coordination and effort by providing incentives in shared fees; and deter shirking by 
monitoring.1 The rents to collective reputation, moral hazard, and threat of exclusion will constrain 
the number and reputations of lead banks in a syndicate (Tirole, 1996).  
 Securities are information sensitive when the opacity of issuers impedes the ability of investors 
to discriminate between more and less creditworthy issuers. The resulting price uncertainty, together 
with issue volume, will affect not only the size but also the composition of the syndicate; that is, the 
number of lead as well as non-lead underwriters who come together to market the issue. The scale 
and scope of activities related to information collection and dissemination, as well as those related to 
the distribution and secondary market support of securities, create high barriers to entry for 
underwriting services that are beyond the capacities of individual underwriters. Issuers, in an effort to 
maximize bond offer prices, will motivate syndicate underwriting effort by sharing their gains with the 
syndicate. In syndicates, “form follows function” (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). 
 In contrast to existing literature, this study views syndicate formation to be endogenously 
determined. Specifically, the many-to-many matches of disparate issuers and underwriters map into a 
limited set of mutually exclusive syndicates defined by total size and number of lead underwriters. In 
this context, syndicate form are composite (summary) statistics that encapsulate the matches of issuers 
and underwriters but do not directly involve the individual specific attributes of issuers and 
underwriters.2  
                                                 
 1Left lead refers to the lead bank in a joint-led underwriting syndicate. The term stems from the position of bank names 
in deal documentation – such as a prospectus – with the most important bank listed first in the upper left-hand corner of 
the prospectus cover. Throughout the paper, “left lead” and “lead” are used interchangeably.  
 2Syndicate forms are the value functions in the Fox (2007) semi-parametric “scoring” approach to modeling many-to-
many matches. Value functions represent the structural preferences of agents for matches that involve the observable 
characteristics of matched pairs and interactions of agent attributes. In a maximum scoring model, inequalities are used to 
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 It is well-established that issuers and underwriters have reasons to self-select. When investors 
are uninformed about issuers, certification by underwriters who are willing to put their reputations at 
risk, avoids the cross-subsidization of less creditworthy borrowers by more creditworthy borrowers. 
Less creditworthy borrowers have reduced incentives to incur higher costs to engage more reputable 
underwriters to divulge lower probabilities of debt repayment.  
 Furthermore, investors may not be symmetrically informed about the issuer. The costs of 
acquiring information give institutional investors, e.g. pension funds, insurance companies, asset 
managers, and other qualified institutional buyers who are frequent repeat purchasers, an 
informational advantage over retail investors. Soliciting indications of interest through a price and 
share allotment auction addresses the “winners curse” problem that deters participation by 
unsophisticated and relatively uninformed retail investors. Lender specialization in debt markets may 
also play an important role in how syndicates are formed. 
 Yet, little is known about the determinants and economic impact of syndicate form. What factors 
influence the match between issuers and underwriters in alternative syndicate structures? Are the 
associations between issuers and underwriters in syndicates endogenously determined? Can 
differences in syndicate structure explain at-issue yield spreads? How are yield spreads affected when 
matches differ from observed? Do syndicates affect potential transfers of wealth between new 
bondholders and existing shareholders?  
 This paper uses a sample of 4,547 high yield bonds issued in the United States from January 
2005 through December 2015 to examine these questions. Compared to investment grade corporate 
bonds, the relative illiquidity of speculative grade bonds heightens the agency problems inherent in 
syndicates. Issuers of high yield bonds, which include financially-sponsored, first-time, and unlisted 
firms, will self-select into syndicates with varying degrees of information disclosure and participation 
by diverse investor clienteles.  
 This study is the first to use a nested bivariate (double selection) probit model of syndicate 
                                                 
describe how agents choose to match. 
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choice to describe how multiple lead arrangers with differing characteristics match with distinct issuers 
and issue features. Syndicate structure is defined by first establishing whether or not the underwriting 
syndicate has a single lead bank (sole led) or multiple lead banks (joint led). The total size of the 
syndicate then allows us to ascribe a “lead percentage” to each deal, which is the ratio of the number 
of lead banks to total syndicate size.3 Lastly, sorting observations into “above” and “below” median 
lead percentage groups captures the impact of syndicate size and number of lead underwriters on the 
collective underwriting effort required for a successful offering.4   
 I document that matches of issuers and lead underwriters are positive assortative. In sole led 
syndicates, issuers are highest in quality and lead underwriters are most reputable. Issuers are lowest 
in quality, and lead underwriters are least reputable, in joint above median led syndicates. In sole led 
syndicates, issuers are better rated and more established older firms. In joint above median syndicates, 
issuers are more likely to be unlisted, first-time, and worse rated.  
 Lead underwriters in sole led syndicates are more likely to be investment banks, but more likely 
to be commercial banks in joint led syndicates. Further, in sole led syndicates, lead underwriters 
underwrite fewer high yield debt deals, but fee income from underwriting high yield debt represents a 
higher percentage of total fee income for lead arrangers. Findings substantiate that less reputable 
underwriters, who are less sensitive to issuer quality, will have a higher probability of matching with 
an issuer in active markets. When reputation acquisition is costly, growth in issuance volume prompts 
less reputable underwriters to reduce price. Reputable underwriters, who do not compete on price, 
will underwrite fewer high yield debt issues but charge a premium for their services.  
 Issues are highest in quality in joint below median led syndicates. In sole led syndicates, issue 
ratings are lower, maturities are shorter, secondary market liquidity is impaired because issue sizes are 
too small for inclusion in the Lehman Brothers/Barclay High Yield Bond Index, and senior 
                                                 
 3For example, a sole led syndicate of size eight will have a 12.5% lead percentage; a joint led syndicate of size eight with 
three lead banks will have a 37.5% lead percentage. In the sample, the median lead percentage is 54% and the minimum 
syndicate size is two. 
 4Given the median lead percentage of the sample and minimum syndicate size, all sole led syndicates are below median 
lead percentage. But joint led syndicates can either be above or below median lead percentage.   
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securitization is necessitated. In joint above median led syndicates, issues are less likely to be 
investment/speculative split-rated, and issues are smaller in size.  
 Using switching regressions to control for self-selection, and taking market conditions, issuer 
and issue characteristics as well as use of proceeds into account, I find that syndicate structure affects 
yield spreads. Information asymmetry between issuers and investors is highest in joint above median 
led syndicates. Latent information on syndicate choices captured in Inverse Mills Ratios represent 5% 
to 7% of average yield spreads. 
 Debt issued through joint above median led syndicates have the highest yield spreads, averaging 
501 bps. In contrast, debt issued through sole and joint below median led syndicates have much lower 
yield spreads, averaging 332 bps and 351 bps, respectively. In concentrated syndicates, more intense 
and specialized due diligence is required when issuers are opaque and information spillovers are 
limited.5 Compared to joint above median led syndicates, marginal yield spreads in sole and joint below 
median led syndicates are higher by an average 66 bps for first-time issuers, and marginally higher by 
an average 78 bps for unlisted issuers. Further, indicated yield guidance from the solicitation of 
institutional investors result in significantly higher marginal yield spreads of 54 bps and 38 bps 
respectively, only in sole and joint below median led syndicates. In joint above median led syndicates, 
it appears institutional investors find it more advantageous to withhold disclosures of private 
information. 
 My results also show that seasoning and listing result in significant reductions in yield spreads. 
Seasoning lowers marginal yield spreads by an average 45 bps in joint above median led syndicates. In 
addition, when issuers are also unlisted, seasoning lowers marginal yield spreads by 72 bps in joint 
above median led syndicates, and by an average 44 bps in sole and joint below median led syndicates. 
Listing lowers marginal yield spreads by 49 bps in joint above median led syndicates, and by an average 
108 bps in sole and joint below median led syndicates. Moreover, when issuers are also listed, 
                                                 
 5Because of the potential adverse consequences on investment decisions, issue pricing accuracy is important. Information 
produced to ascertain valuation is not useful in pricing issuances by similar firms in the same industry. Concentrated 
syndicates are typical in syndicated bank loans. 
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seasoning lowers marginal yield spreads by 68 bps in sole led syndicates. 
 The decision to retain or switch the lead underwriter affects yield spreads only when issues by 
joint led syndicates are traded. Contrasted against sole led syndicates, joint led syndicates have less 
reputable underwriters. Moreover, the reductions in marginal yield spreads from retain or switch are 
greater for unlisted firms. Findings are consistent with two views on the issuer-underwriter 
relationship. Firm specific information obtained by lead arrangers in the certification process has 
private value which degrades over time (James, 1992). When matching is positive assortative, the joint 
returns to issuer quality and underwriter ability are complementary. Issuers whose quality improves 
(declines) will “up” (“down”) switch to higher (lower) underwriter quality in subsequent issuances 
(Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt, 2005). 
 Offer yield spreads appear unrelated to post-offer market trading. Weighted average yield 
spreads on traded and non-traded debt issuances are not significantly different. Higher offer yield 
spreads do not foster post-offer market trading but rather compensate investors for illiquidity. Average 
yield spreads on debt issuances by joint below median led syndicates are nearly 307 bps lower when 
the issues are traded. Finding is consistent with higher liquidity associated with larger issue sizes in 
joint below median led syndicates.  
 In syndicate falsification tests, I use switching regressions to estimate hypothetical yield spreads 
when issuers counterfactually elect into syndicates that differ from observed syndicates which are the 
result of self-selection by issuers acting in their best interests. Estimated (fitted) yield spreads take co-
variates as well as actual and hypothetical IMRs into account. Issuers in joint above median led 
syndicates who are the least creditworthy will incur lower average yield spreads when they can elect 
either into sole or joint below median led syndicates with more reputable lead underwriters. But this 
option may be not be a realistic possibility. For issuers in sole led syndicates who are the most 
creditworthy, average yield spreads will be lower when they elect into joint below median led 
syndicates with lower but still reputable lead underwriters, but higher yield spreads when they elect 
into joint above median led syndicates with the least reputable lead underwriters. Finally, for issuers 
in joint below median syndicates, average yield spreads will be higher when they elect either into sole 
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led syndicates with the most reputable lead underwriters or into joint above median led syndicates 
with the least reputable underwriters.  
 Lastly, this paper relates to the literature on the role of syndicates in securities offerings. In this 
literature, several studies find widespread evidence that suggests elements of syndicate form may 
influence the security offering process. In their analysis of over 1,600 equity IPOs issued from 1997 
to 2002, Corwin and Schultz (2005) find strong evidence of information production by syndicate 
members, and conclude that issuers may benefit from larger syndicates. Underpricing is inversely 
related to syndicate size. Additionally, larger underwriting syndicates result in increased analyst 
coverage and number of market makers.  
 The entry of commercial banks into debt underwriting following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act stimulated the growth of joint-led underwriting syndicates. The dual roles of commercial banks 
as lenders and underwriters can enhance information efficiency, but create potential conflicts of 
interest, particularly when debt proceeds are used to refinance existing bank debt.6 Shivdasani and 
Song (2011) find that the entry of commercial banks lowered the incentives to screen and certify issuer 
quality, particularly in industries where commercial banks have significant market shares.  
 In Fang (2005), switching regressions are used to address the endogeneity of the match between 
issuers and high/low reputation underwriters. She finds lower yields and higher gross fees on issues 
underwritten by high reputation lead managers. Yasuda (2005) employs a nested multinomial logit 
model, where issuers first decide between commercial or investment banks as lead arrangers, and 
second, choose a specific commercial or investment bank. She finds that past service as lead manager 
has the strongest impact on underwriter choices by issuers. Further, gross fees are significantly lower 
for issues underwritten by commercial banks with relationships to issuers particularly for speculative 
issues and first-time issuers.  
                                                 
 6Puri (1996) finds that investors were willing to pay a higher price for securities underwritten by commercial banks, 
particularly for junior securities that are more information sensitive prior to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Similarly, 
Grande, Puri, Saunders and Walter (1997) find that commercial banks tend to underwrite smaller issues by riskier firms 
and earn lower spreads on high yield debt issues when there was a prior lending relationship. Spreads for bonds issued to 
refinance existing debt and underwritten by commercial banks and investment banks are not statistically different.  
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 Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) show that issuer-underwriter matches will be positive 
assortative – “birds of the same feather, flock together”. When reputable underwriters market bonds 
with lower yields but charge higher fees to do so, the positive assortative matching of higher quality 
issuers with more reputable underwriters may not be exclusive to equity underwriting. Although debt 
and equity are fundamentally different securities, the roles that underwriters play in the offering 
processes for each security type are similar. In each case, underwriters are engaged to help maximize 
proceeds received by the issuing firms. But secondary market liquidity for bonds is relatively poor. In 
contrast to equities, bonds are traded in over-the-counter dealer markets rather than organized 
exchanges, and some issues may not trade at all. This secondary market liquidity risk may help explain 
the underpricing of corporate debt found in Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel (1997), Helwege and 
Kleinman (1998), and Cai, Helwege and Warga (2007).   
 II. Data  
 Data is collected from Capital IQ, S&P Global Market Intelligence, Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, and the Electronic Data Gather, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system of the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). From Capital IQ I include high yield bond issues marketed in the 
U.S. between 2005 and 2015. I exclude all offers of pay-in-kind (PIK) and floating rate notes. The 
total number of issues is a sample of 4,547, of which 1,050 are not traded. I compile bond transaction 
data from Capital IQ, which maintains primary market information on high yield bonds dating back to 
2005. Issuer and underwriter financial information are also acquired from Capital IQ.  In cases where 
information is incomplete, I hand-collect the missing details used in this study from S&P Global 
Market Intelligence, which publishes Leveraged Commentary & Data (LCD) News.7  Other criteria 
used to identify my  sample of high yield bonds include: (i) bond is issued domestically; (ii) offering is 
                                                 
7LCD News is a newswire service that reports news related to high yield debt transactions. Transaction details, such as 
syndicate members, issue pricing and ratings, and use of proceeds are often reported in the press releases. Several prior 
studies obtain transaction data from SDC Platinum. I cannot, however, reliably reconcile information for bonds drawn 
from SDC Platinum to hand-collected information from SEC filings, Capital IQ, or LCD News. Moreover, several of the 
variables on which I rely in this study are not available in the SDC Platinum database. Accordingly, I limit the sample to 
high yield bonds issued between 2005 and 2015.   
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cash-pay (excludes pay-in-kind (PIK) notes); and (iii) coupon is fixed.  
  [Insert Figures 1 and 2 here.] 
 Figures 1 and 2 graph issues underwritten annually across syndicates by number of issues and 
by dollar volume, respectively. The share of sole led deals, which averaged 18.8% over the sample 
period, declined from 43.7% to 7.7%. The increased share of joint led deals is almost evenly split 
between joint above and below median led percentage syndicates. Joint led share was 54% at the 
beginning of the sample period, of which 27.1% were joint above median led deals. By the end of the 
sample period, joint led deals represented just over 92% of the market, and joint above median led 
deals comprised 46.5% of joint led deals. The incidence of commercial bank as lead arrangers also 
rose from 43.7% to 55.1% over the sample period.  
  <Insert Table 1 here.> 
 The list of lead arrangers and number of deals underwritten by each lead arranger are reported 
in Table 1. Note that the top 10 and 17 lead arrangers respectively, represent 95% and 99% of all high 
yield debt issues underwritten. Moreover, only 4 of the top 10 lead arrangers are U.S. commercial bank 
holding companies – Bank of America, JP Morgan, Citi, and Wells Fargo; the remaining 6, are 
investment banks. Further, the percentage of deals by the top 10 lead arrangers that are sole led 
syndicates range from 11% to 25%, with an exception for Jeffries LLC. Only 8 (7) of the 37 lead 
arrangers are in 100% sole (joint) led syndicates. But the number of deals involved in these cases, 11 
for sole and 23 for joint led, represent less than 1% of the total number of deals in the sample. 
 Offer yield spreads are computed as offer yield minus the yield on a Treasury bond of the same 
maturity. Underpricing is the gain on break (GOB) measured when the bond first trades, and is 
computed as the percentage change between offer price 
,i tp  and first trade price ,i t np   that occurs n  
days post offer expressed in basis points (bps). Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007) compute issue 
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In this study, the Bank of America Merrill Lynch US High Yield Master II Index is used as the high yield 
bond index.  For coupon bonds, there are a number of combinations of coupon and price consistent 
with a given yield to maturity and term. To correct for cross-sectional differences in issue coupons, I 
use issue coupon and maturity to compute the prices of pure discount bonds, 
*
,i tp  and 
*
,i t np  , which 
correspond to an issue’s yield to maturity at offer and trade dates. Pure discount bond prices depend 
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 Syndicate choices by issuers convey information to investors about the issuing firm and lead 
arrangers in the syndicate. Syndicates create moral hazard and collective reputation limits the 
incentives of its members. Although multiple underwriters were unknown prior to 1995, by 2000, one-
third of all bond issues were by underwritten by joint led syndicates. Over this period, Shivdasani and 
Song (2011) find that issuers were more likely to engage in financial misconduct in industries with 
higher levels of commercial bank underwriting. Further, the frequency of fraudulent lawsuits and 
earnings restatements for issuers in joint led syndicates were more likely; but yields were not 
significantly higher for joint than sole led syndicates. 
 In the high yield debt market, informational asymmetries play a major role. The quality of issuers 
and lead underwriters is uncertain, particularly for unlisted and first-time issuers. Identifying 
exclusionary variables which proxy for underwriting risk and effort that influence an issuer’s syndicate 
choice is critical in understanding the impact of syndicate form on offer yields and underpricing.   
 Underwriter Quality:  I use the quality of the lead arranger on sole and joint led syndicates to proxy 
for underwriting risk and effort that influences the decision of issuers to self-select into sole or joint 
led syndicates. Lending relationships with potential issuers may impart an informational advantage to 
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commercial banks over investment banks but the use of proceeds or tie-in services create potential 
conflicts of interests with investors.8 Puri (1996) and Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999) find that yields 
are no worse on issues underwritten by commercial than investment banks; Yasuda (2005), that 
commercial banks charged lower underwriting fees to firms with whom they had relationships. I use 
the indicator variable, Commercial Bank, to capture potential informational advantages of underwriter 
types.  
 Certification by prestigious left lead arrangers can assure primary market investors about the 
quality of the issue. When reputation acquisition is costly, Chemmanur and Fulgheiri (1994) show that 
in equilibrium, reputable investment banks will underwrite fewer risky issues, obtain higher issue 
prices, and receive greater compensation. No. of HY Bonds Underwritten is the number of issues 
underwritten by the lead arranger in the calendar year of the issue. More (less) reputable investment 
banks with higher percentages of fee income from underwriting have more (less) to lose from eroding 
their reputations for short-term gains (DeLong, 1991). The percentage of total fee income contributed 
by underwriting high yield debt in the calendar year of the issue, HY Underwritten ($)/Total Underwritten 
($), reflects the importance of the high yield market to the lead arranger. The brand equity of the lead 
arranger can be inferred from its Age – the total number of years the underwriter has been in business 
at date of issue. Lastly, limitations on the distribution capacities of underwriters will require joint 
syndicates when issues are substantial in size. Joint syndicates will involve a higher No. of Lead 
Underwriters when rents to collective reputation are high (Tirole, 1996).  
 Issuer Quality:  Parent Rating, Unlisted, 1st Time Issuer, and Age are used to proxy for issuer quality. 
Parent Rating is the S&P or Moody’s long-term issuer credit rating expressed on a numerical scale where 
AAA/Aaa = 1. Unlisted and 1st Time Issuer are indicator variables. Age is computed based on the year 
the issuing firm was founded as reported in the Capital IQ database.  
                                                 
 8Drucker and Puri (2005) point out that Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 prohibits 
a bank from explicitly extending credit or varying the terms of credit on the condition that a customer purchase another 
product or service from the bank or its affiliates. The Federal Reserve states, however, this law does “not prohibit a bank 
from granting credit or providing any other product to a customer based solely on a desire or a hope (but not a requirement) 
that the customer will obtain additional products from the bank or its affiliates in the future.” Clients are free to use “their 
own bargaining power” to seek a bundle of banking services. 
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 Issue Characteristics:  Bond Rating is the S&P or Moody’s issue credit rating expressed on a numerical 
scale where AAA/Aaa = 1 and averaged when the issue is dual rated. For dual rated bond issues, 
IG/HY Split-Rated is an indicator variable. Meets Index Liquidity Constraint is an indicator variable that 
takes on a value of 1 when bond issue at issue date is large enough for inclusion in Lehman 
Brothers/Barclays High Yield Bond Index, and 0 otherwise. Term is the maturity of the bond in years. 
Senior Secured is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 when the bond issue is collateralized, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 As shown in Figure 3, issue sizes are significantly smaller in sole than joint led syndicates. In 
Figure 4, syndicate size is largest for joint below median led syndicates. Over the sample period, sole 
and joint led syndicates average 2.6 and 8.7 underwriters, respectively. Joint below median led 
syndicates average 10.7 underwriters compared to 7.2 underwriters for joint above median led 
syndicates. Further, crisis year 2008 excepted, average issue size is positively correlated with syndicate 
size. 
  [Insert Figures 3 and 4 here.] 
 Note in Figure 5, the number of lead underwriters is significantly smaller in joint above than 
joint below median led syndicates. Moreover, from Figure 6, sole led syndicates are the most 
concentrated syndicates with the smallest size and lowest median lead percentage. Joint above 
syndicates, which have the largest median lead percentage, have the smallest number of members and 
lead underwriters. Over the sample period, the average number of lead underwriters is higher in joint 
below than joint above median led syndicates; 5.4 and 4.6 respectively. The median lead percentage 
for sole led syndicates is 50%, compared to 53.8% and 57.1% for joint below and joint above median 
led syndicates, respectively.  
  [Insert Figures 5 and 6 here.] 
  Finally, Figure 7 shows underwriter reputation is highest for sole led syndicates. In Figure 8, 
lowest for joint above median led syndicates. Compared to joint led syndicates, lead arrangers in sole 
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led syndicates underwrite far fewer bonds per year and are also less likely to be commercial banks.  
Over the sample period, lead arrangers in sole led syndicates underwrite an average 146 high yield 
bonds per year and are commercial banks 37.1% of the time.  In contrast, lead arrangers in joint above 
and joint below median syndicates underwrite an average 224 and 211 high yield bonds annually, and 
are commercial banks 59.9% and 54.3% of the time, respectively.   
  [Insert Figures 7 and 8 here.] 
 Yield spreads average 535 bps, and coupon adjusted gains on break indicate some underpricing. 
The unconditional yield spreads and post offer gains reported in the table, however, take neither the 
differences in underwriter, issuer, and issue characteristics nor endogeneity of syndicate choice into 
account. Further, as will become evident in subsequent discussion, the effect of price guidance on 
offer yield spreads is significant in sole and joint below median led syndicate issuances but insignificant 
in joint above median led syndicate issuances. Moreover, the effect of price guidance is largest in sole 
led syndicate issuances when the issue is not traded.  
 Weighted least squares regressions are used to examine differences in lead underwriter, issuer 
and issue characteristics across syndicates. In two separately estimated regressions, Sole Led and Joint 
Above Median Lead are dummy variables that proxy for syndicate form. Using Fama and French (1997) 
17 industries, industry demeaned proceeds are used to account for considerable cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in issue size. Weights are computed based on the entire sample of issuances and 
subsample of joint led syndicate issuances respectively. Results on dummy variable coefficients for the 
regressions are reported in the last two columns of Table 2. 
    [Insert Table 2 here.] 
 Commercial banks, are 17.9% more likely to be left lead underwriters on joint led syndicates; 
and investment banks, as lead underwriters on sole led syndicates. Contrasted against joint led 
syndicates, lead arrangers on sole led syndicates underwrite 49.6 fewer high yield bonds annually, the 
percentage of high yield debt to total underwriting revenue is 2.7% higher, and are in the business 
longer. There are no significant differences, however, in the likelihood of commercial banks as lead 
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underwriters, and percentage of total fee income from underwriting high yield debt between joint 
below and joint above median led syndicates. In subsequent probit regressions, I will show the number 
of high debt issues underwritten and number of years in business do not predict the choice between 
joint below and above median led syndicates.  
 Issuer quality is best for sole led syndicates and worst for joint above median led syndicates. 
Assessed against joint led syndicates, issuers in: (i) sole led syndicates are higher rated and older; and 
(ii) joint above median led syndicates are lower rated and more likely to be unlisted and first-time 
issuers. Better quality issuers tend to self-select with lead underwriters in sole led syndicates; and worse 
quality issuers, self-select with lead underwriters in joint above median led syndicates.  
 Issue quality is worst in sole led syndicates, and relatively poor in joint above median led 
syndicates. In comparison to joint led syndicates, issues in: (i) sole led syndicates are lower rated, 
shorter in term, more likely to be senior secured, smaller in size and illiquid; and (ii) joint above median 
led syndicates are less likely to be investment/speculative split-rated, smaller in size and illiquid. Issue 
quality is highest for joint below median syndicates. 
 Overall, univariate results show that bonds issued by sole led, joint above and below median led 
syndicates, differ across underwriter, issuer, and issue dimensions. Judgments about how underwriter, 
issuer, and issue attributes can affect syndicate choice are better addressed in a nested (double 
selection) bivariate probit model.9  
 III. Syndicate Form 
 As shown in Figure 9, I describe the self-selection of issuers and underwriters into syndicates as 
a nested bivariate (double selection) model.  
  [Insert Figure 9 here.] 
                                                 
9To avoid an erroneous elimination of covariates, we avoid a purely exploratory approach to the specification of the 
double selection model. Tabachnick, Fidell and Osterlind (2001) show that doing so can lead to a flawed interpretation of 
the results. Instead, we follow the model-building approach recommended by Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) that uses 
correlation and other measures of association to decide on the choices for covariates in the double selection model.   
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Because two is the minimum number of underwriters in a syndicate, 50% is the maximum percentage 
of lead banks in sole led syndicate deals. When the median lead percentage exceeds 50%, above median 
lead percentage is possible only when the syndicate is joint led. In this   sample, the median lead 
percentage is 54.5%.  
 The participation equations that characterize self-selection are nested probit functions.  
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In (2), *
1 0I   (
*
1 0I  ) is the index function that embodies the issuer’s decision to self-select into sole 
or joint led syndicate, and when self-selection is into a joint led syndicate, *
2 0I   ( 2 0I  ), reflects 
syndicate size, whether the joint led syndicate is above or below median lead percentage. In (3), the 
observable and latent factors that influence syndicate choices are reflected in 2( , )1x x  and 1 2( , )   
respectively. Observable factors are variables that affect the choice of issuers to self-select into sole or 
joint led, and if joint, into joint above or below median lead percentage syndicates. Latent factors are 
unknown motives that influence the syndicate choices of issuers, which can be correlated with each 
other as well as with outcomes. For identification, an important subset of observable factors should 
be exclusionary variables that affect the syndicate choices by issuers but do not affect the outcomes 
from their syndicate choices (Greene, 2003).   
 The log likelihood function for the bivariate probit is: 
 
     
        
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2
ln 1 ln
log
1 ln , 1 1 ln ,
i i i i
i
i i i i i i i i
I I
L
I I I I
        
  




x γ x γ
x γ x γ x γ x γ
 (4) 
where 1,2, ,i N  denote issue observations. Defining 1 12 1i iq I   and 2 22 1i iq I  , the general 
form of the bivariate log likelihood function is: 
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  *1 1 2 2 2log ln , ;i i i i iiL q q    1x γ x γ   (5) 
where *
1 2 12i i iq q  . When 12 0  , the bivariate probit functions can be estimated independently as 
univariate probit functions. In (4),  1i 1x γ  and  1i  1x γ  are the likelihoods of sole and joint led 
syndicates, respectively. Given the syndicate is joint led,  2 2 1|i i   1x γ x γ
   1 2 2 1,i i i     1 1x γ x γ x γ  is the likelihood that the syndicate is joint above median lead percentage; 
and  2 2 1|i i    1x γ x γ    1 2 2 1,i i i      1 1x γ x γ x γ , that the syndicate is joint below median lead 
percentage. 
 Bivariate probit regression results are presented in Table 3 for four alternative model 
specifications.10 In the first probit regression, the dependent variable Sole Led is 1 when the issuance 
is through a sole led syndicate, and 0, if joint led. In the second probit regression, the issuance is 
through a joint led syndicate and the dependent variable Joint Above Median Lead % is 1 when the ratio 
of lead arrangers to number of underwriters in the syndicate is greater than the sample median.11 The 
initial assignment of variables to bivariate probit regressions of sole vs. joint led syndicates, and joint 
above vs. below median led syndicates, are based on the univariate analyses in Table 2. Standard errors 
are clustered on (Fama and French 17) industries in all model specifications.  
  [Insert Table 3 here.] 
 Results are consistent across all models and Model 4 appears to be the best specification. Lead 
arrangers in sole led syndicates are the most reputable. Compared to joint led syndicates, lead arrangers 
in sole led syndicates are more established financial institutions who specialize in high yield bond 
underwriting, but underwrite fewer deals, and are less likely to be commercial banks. Contrasted 
against joint led syndicates, lead arrangers in joint above led syndicates are fewer in number, and least 
reputable.   
                                                 
10Special attention should be given to sample sizes. Aldrich and Nelson (1984) recommend minimum sample sizes of at 
least 50 observations for probit regressions. Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) suggest that the sample size of the smallest 
response group be at least as large as 10(p+1), where p is the number of predictors in the model. Either way, the sole led 
sample size of 856 more than meets the minimum recommendations. 
11In estimating this probit regression, the sample is restricted to issuances which involve joint led syndicates.   
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 The likelihood of sole led syndicates is higher for issuing firms that are older and have better 
issuer credit ratings. Further, issues in sole led syndicates are lower rated, shorter term, more likely to 
be senior secured, smaller in size and more illiquid. Sole led syndicates have the best quality issuers 
but worst quality issues. Lowest quality issuances underwritten by the most reputable lead arrangers 
in sole led syndicates substantiates the important certification role that lead arrangers play in the 
issuance process. A more concentrated syndicate is necessary when higher underwriting risk requires 
more intense and specialized due diligence as well as when pricing accuracy is critical.  
 Joint led syndicates are generally associated with larger issue sizes. Joint above median led 
syndicates are more likely when: (i) issuing firms are of poorer quality – lower rated, unlisted and first-
time issuers; and (ii) issues are of lower quality – lower rated, unlikely to be investment/speculative 
split-rated, smaller in size, and more illiquid. Joint above median led syndicates not only have the worst 
quality issuing firms and issues, but also the least reputable lead underwriters. For uninformed 
investors, the “winners curse” risk is considerable in joint above median led syndicate issuances. 
Institutional investors may find it more advantageous to withhold participation in price discovery 
associated with disclosures of private information to lead underwriters.  
 As expected, the correlations between sole vs. joint led, as well as joint above vs. joint below 
median led percentages, are always negative and significant. Tjur (2009) R2 indicates excellent model 
fit; similarly with McFadden (1973) R2, which does not have an upper bound of 1.12 Following Herron 
(1999), reported percent correctly predicted (PCP) and expected percent correctly predicted (ePCP) 
statistics for the bivariate (double selection) probit model confirm the likelihood of misclassification 
is low.13 
 Following Menard (2002), I compute standardized regression coefficients for Model 4 to assess 
economic significance. When x is continuous, variables are standardized to be mean 0 and variance 1. 
Results are reported in the last two columns of Table 3. 
                                                 
12For a discussion on the interpretation of McFadden’s pseudo-R2 measure, see McFadden (1977). 
13See Herron (1999) for theory behind the ePCP measure. 
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 Standardized coefficients confirm the earlier conclusions. There is a positive assortative match 
of high (low) quality issuing firms with more (less) reputable lead underwriters. A sole led syndicate is 
more likely when the lead underwriter is more reputable, and a joint above median syndicate is more 
likely when the underwriter is less reputable. The likelihood the syndicate is sole led is: (i) lower by 
17.9% when the lead underwriter is a commercial bank; and (ii) higher by 11.9% and 124.1%, 
respectively, when the lead arranger underwrites fewer issues and the contribution of high yield debt 
to total fee income is higher. The likelihood that the syndicate is joint above median is higher by 138% 
when the number of lead underwriters are fewer.   
 Relative to joint led syndicates, the likelihood of a sole led syndicate is higher by 44.8% and 4.2% 
respectively, when the issuing firm is higher rated and older. In contrast, the likelihood of joint above 
median led syndicate is higher by 86% when the issuing firm is lower rated, and 20.1% and 29% 
respectively, when the issuing firm is unlisted or first-time issuer. 
 Lastly, issue quality is worse for sole and joint above median led syndicates. Contrasted with 
joint led syndicates, the likelihood that issuances are undertaken through sole led syndicates are higher: 
(i) by 5%, 19%, and 15.5% respectively, when the issue is lower rated, senior secured, and shorter in 
term; and (ii) 88.3% when the issue is smaller in size and illiquid. Similarly, the likelihood that issuances 
are undertaken through joint above median led syndicates are higher: (i) by 9.7% and 64.8% 
respectively, when the issue is lower rated and not investment/speculative split-rated; and (ii) 20%, 
when the issue is smaller in size and illiquid. 
 IV.  Pricing Impact of Syndicate Form  
 Lead arranger, issuer, and issue characteristics influence syndicate choices, but do these choices 
explain at-issue yield spreads? Fundamentally, does the endogeneity of syndicate choice affect yield 
spreads when lead arrangers certify issue quality, and the match of issuers and lead arrangers is positive 
assortative.  
 To examine the possibility that syndicate choice can impact at-issue yield spreads, I estimate 
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ordinary least squares (OLS) switching regressions of issuer yield spreads 𝑦 on a vector 𝒁 of issuer 
and issue characteristics.  
 𝑦 = 𝒁′𝜷 + 𝜆𝑗𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑗 + 𝜂  (6) 
In (6), 𝜂 are i.i.d. random noise terms, and 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑗 are issuer-specific Heckit correction terms (Inverse 
Mills Ratios) that account for the endogeneity of syndicate choices. The Inverse Mills Ratios associated 
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 Table 4 presents the baseline offer yield spread regression results.15 Model 1 has an Unlisted issuer 
indicator variable. Model 2 replaces Unlisted with a Listed issuer indicator variable. The intercepts, 
which reflect average yield spreads associated with syndicate type, are all positive and statistically 
significant in both models. Latent information on syndicate choice reflected in Inverse Mills Ratios 
are statistically significant in sole and joint above median led syndicates. Offer yield spreads are 
influenced by the self-selection of issuers and lead underwriters into syndicates.  
  [Insert Table 4 here.] 
                                                 
14Derivations can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
15In untabulated results, the introduction of a Crisis dummy variable defined as the last quarter period between 9/15/2008 
and 12/31/2008 was considered but discarded because there were only 8 observations in total; of which 4 were in sole 
led, 1 in joint above median, and 3 in joint below median syndicates.  
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 In Model 1 (2), the average yield spread on joint above median led syndicates of 508 (551) bps 
is significantly higher by 177 (107) and 156 (134) bps compared to sole and joint below median led 
syndicates, respectively. Indicated Yield has no significant impact on yield spreads in joint above led 
syndicates, but results in significantly higher yield spreads of 54 (51) and 38 (39) bps in sole and joint 
below median led syndicates. Findings are consistent with “winner’s curse”. Joint above median led 
syndicates involve the worst quality issuers and issues as well as least reputable lead underwriters. 
When lead underwriter certification is weak, it is in the interests of institutional investors to withhold 
disclosure of private information. 
 In Model 1 (2), marginal yield spreads are higher for first-time issuers across syndicates. 104 (98) 
bps, 110 (117) bps, and 41 (49) bps in sole, joint below median, and joint above median led syndicates 
respectively. Moreover, observe from Model 1 that marginal yield spreads for unlisted issuers in sole 
and joint below median led syndicates are also higher by 98 bps and 58 bps; and by 42 bps (=83-41) 
in joint above median lead syndicates when unlisted issuers are also first-time issuers. Symmetrically, 
in Model 2, marginal yield spreads are lower, by -119 bps, -62 bps, and -53 bps respectively, for listed 
issuers in sole, joint below median, and joint above median led syndicates. The diminished marginal 
effect of first-time and unlisted issuers on yield spreads in joint above median led syndicates in both 
models are consistent with lower costs of certification when lead underwriters are least reputable. 
 Scale economies associated with distribution are significant in sole and joint above median led 
syndicates that entail smaller issue sizes, but insignificant in joint below median led syndicates that 
involve larger issue sizes. The marginal effect of issue size on yield spreads are, however, small in 
magnitude. A 10% increase in issue size reduces yield spreads by an average 6 bps in sole and joint 
above median led syndicates.    
 Finally, the marginal impact on yield spreads from the use of proceeds reflect potential conflicts 
of interest. Yield spreads are generally higher when proceeds from debt issues are used to finance 
acquisitions or reduce equity, and lower when proceeds are used to refinance existing debt. On the 
margin, agency conflicts are insignificant in joint above median lead syndicates where lead underwriter 
certification is weakest. 
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 In the preceding analysis observed syndicates are the result of self-selection by issuers acting in 
their best interests. In a falsification test, I use the switching regressions in Table 4 to estimate 
hypothetical yield spreads when issuers counterfactually elect into syndicates different from those 
observed. Estimated (fitted) yield spreads take co-variates as well as actual and hypothetical IMRs into 
account. Results are reported in Table 5. 
  [Insert Table 5 here.] 
 Issuers in joint above median led syndicates will incur lower yield spreads when they elect instead 
either into sole or joint below median led syndicates. This finding substantiates that less creditworthy 
issuers will be better off engaging more reputable lead underwriters. Bear in mind, however, that the 
option to match with more reputable lead underwriters may not be realistic for low creditworthy 
issuers.   
 In contrast, issuers in sole led syndicates are the most creditworthy. In this case, yield spreads 
will be lower when issuers in sole led syndicates elect into joint below median led syndicates with lower 
but still reputable lead underwriters. But higher average yield spreads, when they elect into joint above 
median led syndicates with the least reputable lead underwriters.  
 Finally, issuers in joint below median syndicates will incur higher average yield spreads when 
they elect either into sole led syndicates with the most reputable lead underwriters or into joint above 
median led syndicates with the least reputable underwriters.  
 The influence of seasoning on yield spreads are reported in Table 6. Model 1 has an Unlisted 
issuer indicator variable. Model 2 replaces Unlisted with a Listed issuer indicator variable.  
  [Insert Table 6 here.] 
 I substantiate the findings of Drucker and Puri (2005) and Yasuda (2005) on seasoned issues. 
When lead underwriter certification is weaker, seasoning plays a more important role. In joint above 
median led syndicates, issuers are worst quality and lead underwriters are least reputable. Seasoning 
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lowers marginal yield spreads by an average 45 bps in joint above median led syndicates. In addition, 
when issuers are also unlisted, seasoning lowers marginal yield spreads by 72 bps in joint above median 
led syndicates, and by an average 44 bps in sole and joint below median led syndicates. Listing lowers 
marginal yield spreads by 49 bps in joint above median led syndicates, and by an average 108 bps in 
sole and joint below median led syndicates. Moreover, when issuers are also listed, seasoning lowers 
marginal yield spreads by 68 bps in sole led syndicates. 
 As expected, marginal yield spreads are 87 bps to 135 bps higher for Unlisted issuers, and 
marginal yield spread is highest in sole led syndicates with the highest quality issuers and most 
reputable lead underwriters. The average yield spread of 625 bps (=87+538) is highest for Unlisted 
issuers in joint above median led syndicates. Symmetrically, marginal yield spreads are 46 bps to 72 
bps lower for Listed issuers, and marginal yield spread is lowest in sole lead syndicates. The average 
yield spread of 545 bps (=591-46) is highest for Listed issuers in joint above median led syndicates.   
 Again, as in Table 4, Indicated Yield has no impact on yield spreads in joint above led syndicates, 
but a 66 bps and 41 bps increase in sole and joint below median led syndicates, respectively. Through 
“price talk”, lead arrangers are successful in extracting the reservation prices of informed investors 
that mitigates the “winners curse” faced by uninformed investors in sole and joint below median led 
syndicates. 
 Likewise, as in Table 4, scale economies associated with distribution are significant in sole and 
joint above median led syndicates that entail smaller issue sizes, but insignificant in joint below median 
led syndicates that involve larger issue sizes. The marginal effect of issue size on yield spreads are small 
in magnitude. Yield spreads are generally higher when proceeds from debt issues are used to finance 
acquisitions or reduce equity; and lower, to refinance existing debt. Agency conflicts appear to be 
more acute in sole and joint above median led syndicates where lead underwriter certification is 
strongest and weakest.  
 Analyses thus far assumes yield spreads on non-traded and traded debt issuances are similar. But 
offer price may be materially affected by an investor’s expectation that the security will be traded. It is 
 
25 
unclear from prior studies to what extent issue pricing represents a compensation for illiquidity or an 
incentive to motivate post-offer trading.    
 Note from Table 1 that nearly 77% of the bonds in the sample are traded. Debt issued through 
sole led syndicates trade 62% of the time, and 80% of the time, for debt issued through joint led 
syndicates. In untabulated results, I show the composition of lead arrangers, issuers, and issues differ 
between non-traded and traded debt issuances. Syndicate size is smaller and lead arrangers are fewer 
in number in non-traded debt issuances by joint led syndicates. On non-traded debt issuances: (i) price 
guidance is less likely; (ii) lead arrangers underwrite fewer high yield debt issues and newer in the 
business; (iii) issuing firms are higher rated, and more likely to be unlisted; (iv) issue sizes are smaller 
and more illiquid.   
 Yield spread switching regressions for non-traded and traded debt issues are reported in Table 
7. Switched Lead UW and Repeat Lead UW indicate whether the lead underwriter in the current issue 
was different from or the same as in the prior issue. Latent information on syndicate choice reflected 
in Inverse Mills Ratios are statistically significant in both models. 
  [Insert Table 7 here.]   
 The decision to switch or retain the lead underwriter affects marginal yield spreads only when 
issues by joint led syndicates are traded.16 Contrasted against sole led syndicates, joint led syndicates 
have less reputable underwriters. Moreover, the marginal reductions in yield spreads from retain or 
switch are greater for unlisted firms. Findings are consistent with two views on the issuer-underwriter 
relationship. Firm specific information obtained by lead arrangers in the certification process has 
private value which degrades over time (James, 1992). When matching is positive assortative, the joint 
returns to issuer quality and underwriter ability are complementary. Issuers whose quality improves 
(declines) will “up” (“down”) switch to higher (lower) underwriter quality in subsequent issuances 
(Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt, 2005).  
                                                 
16Overall, 75% of switches are changes either in investment or commercial bank lead underwriter; only 25% are changes 
from commercial to investment bank or vice-versa. Similarly, for switches by first-time and seasoned issuers, 82% and 
74% are changes either in investment or commercial bank lead underwriter respectively.    
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 Offer yield spreads appear unrelated to post-offer market trading. Weighted average yield 
spreads on traded and non-traded debt issuances are not significantly different. Higher offer yield 
spreads do not foster post-offer market trading but rather compensate investors for illiquidity. Average 
yield spreads on debt issuances by joint below median led syndicates are nearly 307 bps lower when 
the issues are traded. Finding is consistent with higher liquidity associated with larger issue sizes in 
joint below median led syndicates. 
 Additionally, coefficients on Ln of Proceeds-SIC demeaned are negative and statistically significant 
with the exception of joint below median led syndicates. Recall however that 80% of debt issuances 
by joint led syndicates are traded. The insignificant coefficient on non-traded bond issuances by joint 
below median led syndicates stems from reduced sample size. Further, the reduction in marginal yield 
spreads from larger issue size, which is lower for traded than non-traded issues, suggests underpricing. 
The underpricing is too small, however, to stimulate post-issue trading. 
 As in prior results, yield spreads are generally higher when proceeds from debt issues are used 
to finance acquisitions or reduce equity; and lower, to refinance existing debt. Agency conflicts appear 
more acute when issues are not traded. Compared to traded issues, marginal yield spreads for non-
traded issues in sole and joint above median led syndicates are 58 bps and 64 bps higher when proceeds 
are used in acquisitions. Marginal yield spreads for non-traded issues in sole led syndicates are also 62 
bps lower when proceeds are used to refinance. 
  [Insert Table 8 here.] 
 Results of syndicate falsification tests for traded and not-traded issues reported in Table 8 should 
be interpreted with caution. For sole led syndicates, the decision to retain or switch underwriters has 
no significant impact on yield spreads but result in notably lower yield spreads in joint led syndicates 
particularly when the issuer is unlisted. As a result, regardless of whether or not issues are traded, yield 
spreads will appear lower for issuers in sole led syndicates that elect instead into joint below or above 
median led syndicates. But for issuers in joint below and above median led syndicates, electing into 
alternative syndicate structures will more likely increase than reduce average yield spreads.  
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  Table 9 reports regressions of underpricing on syndicate type. Overall, I find the high yield debt 
market to be largely information efficient. On average, underpricing is statistically insignificant across 
syndicates. For first-time issuers, underpricing is marginally higher by 33 bps in sole led syndicates, 
and 10 bps in joint below median led syndicates. For unlisted firms, underpricing is marginally higher 
by 12 bps in joint below median led syndicates, and by 23 bps for unlisted and first-time issuers in 
joint above median led syndicates.  
  [Insert Table 9 here.] 
 In the sample of 4,547 high yield debt issues, 3,346 are by publicly traded firms, and the 
remaining by private firms. Moreover, 1,119 unique firms are issuers of the 3,346 high yield debt issues 
by publicly traded firms. 570 of the 1,119 firms had the requisite CRSP data for estimating cumulative 
abnormal returns. 92 of which were by sole led syndicates, while 282 and 196 were by joint above and 
below median syndicates, respectively.  
 To examine potential wealth transfers, I employ the Fama and French (1993) three factor model 
plus a Carhart (1997) momentum factor to describe returns on publicly traded equity shares of high 
yield debt issuers in the  sample. Using daily returns,  
 1 2 3 4it i i mt i t i t i t itR R SMB HML UMD             (10) 
is estimated over the year -244 to -3 days prior to debt issue date, where itR  is the return on equity 
shares of firm i , mtR  is the return on the value-weighted CRSP index, tSMB  is the return on portfolios 
of small minus big capitalization stocks, tHML  is the return on portfolios of high minus low book-to-
market stocks, and tUMD  is the return on portfolios of stocks with highest and lowest one year prior 
returns. Daily abnormal returns itAR  are computed over different windows  ,n n   days centered 
on the debt issue date *t  as: 
   
 * * 1 * 2 * 3 * 4 *it it i i mt i t i t i tAR R R SMB HML UMD                       
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 Table 10 reports the results for 5- and 7-day event windows surrounding debt issuances by 
syndicate type for subsamples of firms with and without publicly traded shares. Overall, I find little 
evidence of significant changes in shareholder wealth around high yield debt issuances, regardless of 
syndicate form. Results are consistent with the findings of Eckbo (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986). 
  [Insert Table 10 here.] 
 V.  Conclusion 
  Using a sample of 4,547 high yield debt issues over the period 2005 to 2015, this study examines 
the impact that syndicate form has on the pricing of initial and seasoned public offerings of high yield 
debt as well as its concomitant effect on shareholder wealth. Utilizing a nested bivariate (double 
selection) probit model that characterizes syndicate form, I document a positive assortative matching 
of high (low) quality issuers with more (less) reputable lead underwriters. The matches between issuers 
and lead arrangers in underwriting syndicates involve self-selection.   
 In sole led syndicates, issuers are older established firms and higher credit rated, but issue ratings 
are lower, maturities are shorter, secondary market liquidity is impaired, and senior securitization 
is needed. When higher underwriting risk requires intensive and specialized due diligence and pricing 
accuracy is important, a more concentrated syndicate is necessary, and certification by reputable lead 
underwriters is essential. I find that in contrast to joint led syndicates, lead underwriters in sole led 
syndicates are more likely to be investment banks, underwrite fewer high yield debt issues, and a higher 
percentage of total fee income stems from underwriting high yield debt.  
 Further, when moral hazard is more severe and rents from collective reputation are low, 
syndicate size is smaller and the number of lead underwriters are fewer. Joint above median syndicates 
have the least reputable lead underwriters. In joint above median led syndicates, issuing firms are lower 
rated, and more likely to be unlisted and first-time issuers. Additionally, issues are lower rated, less 
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likely to be investment/speculative split-rated, and smaller in size with poorer secondary market 
liquidity. Issue quality is highest for joint below median led syndicates. 
 Second, I find that syndicates have a significant impact on at-issue yield spreads of high yield 
debt. Debt issuances in joint above median led syndicates have the highest average yield spreads. As 
expected, marginal yield spreads are higher for first-time and unlisted issuers across all syndicates. For 
uninformed investors, the risk of “winners curse” is considerable in joint above median led syndicate 
issuances. The solicitation of reservation prices from informed investors has a significant effect on 
marginal yield spreads of debt issued by sole led and joint below median led syndicates, 
but an insignificant effect on the marginal yield spreads of debt issued by joint above median led 
syndicates. Institutional investors seem to find it more advantageous to withhold participation in price 
discovery associated with disclosures of private information when the quality of the issuer and 
reputation of lead underwriter are poor.  
 Third, I find that seasoned issues have significantly lower average yields. The reduction in yields 
is highest in debt issuances by joint above median led syndicates where lead underwriters are least 
reputable, issuers are worst quality, and the resulting certification process is less robust. The retention 
or change in lead underwriters reduces marginal yield spreads only when debt issues by joint led 
syndicates are traded. Weighted average yield spreads on traded and non-traded debt issuances are not 
significantly different. It appears higher offer yield spreads are meant to compensate investors for 
illiquidity rather than to stimulate post-offer market trading. Informed investors are better rewarded 
when debt issues offered are expected to be illiquid.    
 Lastly, I find little evidence of underpricing. Debt issuances in sole led syndicates by first-time 
issuers are weakly underpriced, as are debt issuances by first-time and unlisted issuers in joint above 
median led syndicates. There are, however, no significant cross-sectional differences in underpricing 
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Table 1 – Lead Underwriters.  Sample consists of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield debt issued 
domestically between 2005 and 2015. Table reports all of the left lead underwriters and their rates of 
participation. IB is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the lead underwriter is an investment bank, 
and 0, otherwise. † Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch on September 14, 2008; JP Morgan 
acquired Bear Stearns on March 16, 2009. As such, IB represents the percent of Bank of America and 














1 Bank of America Merrill Lynch † 947 20.83 20.83 12.14 5.81% 
2 JP Morgan † 829 18.23 39.06 13.87 3.02% 
3 Credit Suisse 488 10.73 49.79 20.90 1 
4 Citi 413 9.08 58.87 17.43 0 
5 Deutsche Bank 345 7.59 66.46 16.23 1 
6 Goldman Sachs & Company 321 7.06 73.52 24.61 1 
7 Barclays 298 6.55 80.07 11.07 1 
8 Morgan Stanley 251 5.52 85.59 17.13 1 
9 Jefferies LLC 214 4.71 90.30 68.69 1 
10 Wells Fargo & Company 182 4.00 94.30 12.09 0 
11 UBS 77 1.69 96.00 28.57 1 
12 RBC Capital Markets 67 1.47 97.47 14.93 0 
13 RBS 24 0.53 98.00 25.00 0 
14 SunTrust Banks 15 0.33 98.33 13.33 0 
15 BNP Paribas SA 14 0.31 98.64 0.00 1 
16 Imperial Credit Industries 
Incorporated 
11 0.24 98.88 63.64 1 
17 BMO Capital Markets 9 0.20 99.08 11.11 0 
18 Global Hunter Securities 5 0.11 99.19 20.00 1 
19 Societe Generale 5 0.11 99.30 80.00 1 
20 Gleacher & Company 4 0.09 99.38 75.00 1 
21 Stifel/KBW 3 0.07 99.45 33.33 1 
22 CIBC World Markets Incorporated 3 0.07 99.52 66.67 0 
23 Imperial Bank 3 0.07 99.58 100.00 1 
24 Credit Agricole CIB 2 0.04 99.63 0.00 1 
25 HSBC Holdings PLC 2 0.04 99.67 0.00 1 
26 Key Banc Capital Markets 
Incorporated 
2 0.04 99.71 0.00 0 
27 Pareto Investments 2 0.04 99.76 50.00 1 
28 Macquarie Group 2 0.04 99.80 100.00 1 
29 Bank of New York 1 0.02 99.82 0.00 0 
30 Nomura Bank 1 0.02 99.85 0.00 1 
31 Portigon AG 1 0.02 99.87 0.00 1 
32 Calyon 1 0.02 99.89 100.00 1 
33 Citadel Investment Group LLC 1 0.02 99.91 100.00 1 
34 Cyan Capital Management 1 0.02 99.93 100.00 1 
35 GMP Capital Corporation 1 0.02 99.96 100.00 1 
36 Lazard 1 0.02 99.98 100.00 1 
37 TD Securities Incorporated 1 0.02 100.00 100.00 1 
 Total 4,547     
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Table 2 – Summary Statistics.  Sample consists of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield debt issued 
domestically between 2005 and 2015. No. of HY Bonds Underwritten is the number of issues underwritten 
by lead arranger in the calendar year of the issue. HY Underwritten ($)/Total Underwritten ($) is the 
percentage of total fee income contributed by underwriting high yield debt. Underwriter Age is total 
number of years lead underwriter has been in business at issue date. Parent Rating is S&P or Moody’s 
long-term issuer rating in numerical scale where AAA/Aaa = 1. Unlisted and First-time issuers are 
indicator variables. Age is computed from the year issuing firm was founded as reported in the Capital 
IQ database. Bond Rating is S&P or Moody’s issue rating in numerical scale where AAA/Aaa = 1 and 
averaged when issue is dual rated. IG/HY Split-Rated indicates issue is split-rated. Meets Liquidity 
Constraint is 1 when debt issue is large enough for inclusion in Lehman Brothers/Barclays High Yield 
Bond Index, and 0 otherwise. Term is the maturity of the issue in years. Senior Secured is 1 when the 
issue is collateralized, and 0 otherwise. Yield Spread is offer yield minus yield on a Treasury bond of the 
same maturity. Coupon-Adjusted Gain on Break converts yields at issue and first trade into discount bond 
price equivalents, computes the discount price difference between issue and first trade, and adjusts for 
the change in BAML HY Index over the days between issue and first trade. To examine differences 
in underwriter, issuer, issue characteristics as well as yield spreads and underpricing, weighted least 
squares regressions are estimated over the entire a sample of issuances and subsample of joint led 
syndicate issuances, respectively, where Sole Led and Joint Above Median Lead are dummy variables that 
proxy for syndicate form. Using Fama and French (1997) 17 industries, weights in the regressions 
employ industry demeaned proceeds to control for issue size. Coefficients are reported in the last two 
columns. † indicates not meaningful; issue liquidity is correlated with proceeds.  
 

















Number of Observations 4,547 856 3,691 2,099 1,592   
SYNDICATE FORM        
Total No. of Underwriters 7.643 2.605 8.704 7.185 10.708   
Number of Lead Arrangers 3.958 1.000 4.644 4.092 5.371   
ISSUE PRICING        
Yield Spread 535.263 614.825 516.811 559.386 460.677   
Coupon-Adjusted Gain on Break (bps) 66.919 77.482 65.029 70.346 57.947   
Indicated Yield 0.796 0.646 0.831 0.830 0.832   
Traded 0.769 0.620 0.804 0.806 0.800   
LEAD UNDERWRITER        
Underwriter is Commercial Bank 0.530 0.369 0.567 0.543 0.599 -0.179*** -0.032 
No. of HY Bonds Underwritten 203.510 146.026 216.527 211.022 223.750 -49.611*** -13.286*** 
HY Underwritten($)/Total 
Underwritten($) 0.257 0.326 0.241 0.252 0.227 0.027*** 0.003 
Ln(Underwriter Age) 4.796 4.329 4.905 4.872 4.949 -0.166*** -0.043* 
ISSUER        
Parent Rating 12.458 11.127 12.767 13.188 12.213 -1.314*** 0.362*** 
Unlisted 0.264 0.356 0.243 0.292 0.178 0.089*** 0.053*** 
1st Time 0.156 0.151 0.157 0.195 0.107 0.008 0.033** 
Ln(Age) 2.892 2.832 2.906 2.872 2.952 -0.102* 0.095 
ISSUE        
Bond Rating 14.372 14.771 14.283 14.579 13.893 0.038 0.292*** 
IG/HY Split-Rated 0.040 0.036 0.041 0.020 0.069 0.014 -0.038*** 
Meets Index Liquidity Constraint 0.917 0.748 0.956 0.941 0.977 † † 
Ln(Term) 2.019 1.922 2.042 2.015 2.077 -0.056*** -0.011 




Table 3 – Bivariate Probit Regressions.  Sample consists of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield debt issued domestically between 2005 
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( , )   are observable and latent factors that affect syndicate choice. To make the 
impact on likelihood comparable to indicator variables, continuous variables in Model 4 are standardized to mean 0 and variance 1. 
Standardized coefficients are reported in last two columns of the table. p-values are in parentheses.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.01. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Standardized 
Coefficients 




















LEAD UNDERWRITER               
Underwriter is Commercial Bank -0.166**  -0.178**  -0.179**  -0.179**  -0.179**  
 (0.036)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  
No. of HY Bonds Underwritten -0.002***  -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.119***  
 (0.001)  (0.005) (0.151) (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009)  
HY Underwritten($)/Total Underwritten($) 1.230***  1.242***  1.239***  1.241***  1.241***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Ln(Underwriter Age) 0.050  0.028  0.030 0.015 0.031  0.028  
 (0.139)  (0.459)  (0.432) (0.749) (0.419)  (0.419)  
Number of Lead Arrangers      -0.764***   -0.765***   -0.758***  -1.380*** 
      (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
ISSUER                   
Parent Rating -0.024*** 0.031** -0.022*** 0.042** -0.023*** 0.043** -0.023*** 0.044** -0.448*** 0.860** 
 (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.020) 
Unlisted 0.099 0.202*** 0.108 0.199*** 0.107 0.196*** 0.107 0.201*** 0.107 0.201*** 
 (0.243) (0.002) (0.187) (0.000) (0.190) (0.000) (0.188) (0.000) (0.188) (0.000) 
1st Time   0.287***   0.288***   0.285***   0.290***  0.290*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Ln(Age) 0.026*  0.030*  0.029**  0.029**  0.042**  
 (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.041)  (0.041)  
ISSUE                   
Bond Rating 0.028** 0.028 0.026** 0.051 0.026** 0.052 0.026** 0.050 0.050** 0.097 
 (0.015) (0.163) (0.042) (0.170) (0.038) (0.153) (0.037) (0.148) (0.037) (0.148) 
IG/HY Split-Rated   -0.522***   -0.644***   -0.653***   -0.648***  -0.648*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
    
 





Table 3 – Bivariate Probit Regressions (cont.). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) Standardized 
Coefficients

































Meets Index Liquidity Constraint -0.861*** -0.156* -0.882*** -0.262** -0.882*** -0.220** -0.883*** -0.200** -0.883*** -0.200**
(0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.042) (0.000) (0.042)
Ln(Term) -0.536*** -0.089 -0.546*** 0.063 -0.544*** 0.066 -0.540*** -0.155***
(0.000) (0.361) (0.000) (0.660) (0.000) (0.633) (0.000) (0.000) 
Senior Secured 0.197** 0.066 0.182** 0.153 0.182** 0.152 0.190** 0.190** 
Constant 1.034*** -0.872* 1.130*** 1.761** 1.127*** 1.447** 1.113*** 1.642*** 0.422*** -0.091
(0.001) (0.090) (0.001) (0.028) (0.000) (0.032) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.640) 
𝜌12 -0.751*** -0.077 -0.174*** -0.184
(0.000) (0.104) (0.000) (0.109) 
Model Adjusted Standard Error 0.179 0.568 0.179 0.568 0.179 0.562 0.179 0.562 
Wald χ2 2,129.882 6,250.514 14,417.050 1.013e+12 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -3,975.073 -3,419.288 -3,425.068 -3,430.718
Tjur R2 (2009) 0.300 0.566 0.566 0.564
McFadden R2 (1974) 0.211 0.478 0.678 1.000 
Percent Correctly Predicted (PCP) 84.13% 64.28% 84.13% 79.98% 84.13% 79.77% 84.13% 80.06% 






Table 4 – Offer Yield Spread Regressions.  This table reports how syndicate form impacts yield 
spreads on a sample of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield bonds issued domestically from 2005 and 
2015 when the endogeneity of syndicate choice is considered. The dependent variable is the at-issue 
yield spread to maturity (STM). Controls for market conditions as well as issuer and issue 
characteristics are included. 5-1 Term Premium is the difference in term premiums on the 5-year 
Treasury and 1-Year Treasury. SLOOS is the net % of domestic banks tightening standards for C&I 
Loans to large and middle-market firms at issue date. CFSI Liquidity is the Cleveland Financial Stress 
Index Liquidity Factor which quantifies changes in the differences in bid- ask prices on the 3-month T-
Bills at issue date. 1st Time issuer is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if the observation represents 
the first bond offering from the issuer since January 1, 1991, and 0 otherwise. ‡ indicates coefficient 
multiplied by 102. All variables are computed at issue date. Standard errors are clustered on industry 
(Fama-French 17 industries). p-values are in parentheses.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.01. 
 
  (1)   (2)  
Dependent Variable:   















Issuer and Issue Characteristics       
Indicated Yield 53.705*** 38.285*** 8.180 51.423*** 39.238*** 11.576 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.634) (0.009) (0.002) (0.513) 
1st Time 104.360*** 110.204**
* 
41.124*** 98.240*** 117.439*** 49.485*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Unlisted 97.911*** 58.365*** 12.037    
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.276)    
Unlisted and 1st Time 16.720 19.256 83.329***    
 (0.261) (0.362) (0.000)    
Listed    -118.878*** -61.978*** -53.589*** 
    (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Listed and 1st Time    35.791* -10.976 22.895*** 
    (0.073) (0.291) (0.004) 
Ln of Proceeds-SIC demeaned ‡  -71.538*** -11.212 -51.609*** -71.498*** -12.091 -52.722*** 
 (0.000) (0.248) (0.000) (0.000) (0.215) (0.000) 
Use of Proceeds       
Acquisition – General Corp Purpose -7.235 0.067 24.015 -8.756 0.008 22.069 
 (0.788) (0.996) (0.142) (0.746) (1.000) (0.152) 
Recapitalization – General Corp Purpose 108.712* 34.365* 14.561 109.611* 35.707* 20.576 
 (0.075) (0.093) (0.581) (0.074) (0.083) (0.471) 
Refinancing – General Corp Purpose -41.734** -3.113 -12.937 -42.157** -3.853 -12.725 
 (0.026) (0.785) (0.282) (0.024) (0.740) (0.300) 
Market Conditions       
Term Premium 30 day pct change - bps 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.133) (0.161) (0.385) (0.145) (0.149) (0.407) 
SLOOS-economic outlook 17.655*** 12.873*** 13.002*** 17.543*** 12.928*** 13.067*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VIX 30 day pct change - bps 0.018 0.005 -0.001 0.018 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.248) (0.748) (0.871) (0.275) (0.772) (0.887) 
CFSI Liquidity 30 day pct change - bps 0.004 0.015 0.170 0.005 0.016 0.172 
 (0.869) (0.660) (0.192) (0.820) (0.630) (0.187) 
IMR-Sole Led 1.897**   2.026**   
 (0.042)   (0.032)   
IMR-Joint Below  -2.289   -2.328  
  (0.125)   (0.122)  
IMR-Joint Above   -30.034***   -30.024*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 331.147*** 352.030**
* 
508.013*** 444.183*** 417.032*** 551.106**
*  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Model Diagnostics          
Observations 856 1,592 2,099 856 1,592 2,099 
McFadden R2 (1974) 0.247 0.232 0.278 0.249 0.232 0.270 
Mean Variance Inflation Factor 1.250 1.170 1.160 1.220 1.150 1.130 
Model Adjusted Standard Error 28.615 19.364 21.764 29.203 19.178 21.687 




Table 5 – Falsification Test.  Using the switching regressions in Table 4, this table reports summary 
statistics on average yield spreads from observed (actual) and hypothetical (counterfactual) syndicate 
choices by issuers. Actual and hypothetical yield spreads take co-variates as well as actual and 
hypothetical IMRs into account.  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Actual Hypothetical Actual Hypothetical 







Average Yield Spread 597.59 515.69 609.00 597.59 514.76 607.41 
Standard Deviation 144.16 99.63 116.77 144.60 98.89 114.43 
No. of Observations   856   856 856   856   856   856 
Standard Error 4.93 3.41 3.99 4.94 3.38 3.91 
Difference in Yield Spread  -81.90 11.41  -82.83 9.81 
t-statistic  -13.67 1.80  -13.83 1.56 







Average Yield Spread 460.45 495.61 595.34 460.45 490.71 594.59 
Standard Deviation 95.82 139.89 170.71 95.70 141.58 170.72 
No. of Observations 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,592 1,592 
Standard Error 2.40 3.51 4.28 2.40 3.55 4.28 
Difference in Yield Spread  35.15 134.88  30.26 134.14 
t-statistic  8.27 27.49  7.06 27.35 







Average Yield Spread 557.35 551.10 480.86 557.35 547.89 480.57 
Standard Deviation 118.71 140.36 92.43 117.31 141.91 91.71 
No. of Observations 2,099 2,099 2,099 2,099 2,099 2,099 
Standard Error 2.59 3.06 2.02 2.56 3.10 2.00 
Difference in Yield Spread  -6.24 -76.49  -9.46 -76.78 







Table 6 – Seasoned Offer Yield Spread Regressions.  This table examines how seasoning impacts 
yield spreads on a sample of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield debt issued domestically from 2005 
and 2015 taking the endogeneity of syndicate choice into account. The dependent variable is at-issue 
yield spread to maturity (STM). Controls for market conditions as well as issuer and issue 
characteristics are included. Term Premium is the difference in term premiums on the 5-year Treasury 
and 1-Year Treasury. SLOOS is the net % of domestic banks tightening standards for C&I Loans to 
large and middle-market firms at issue date. CFSI Liquidity is the Cleveland Financial Stress Index 
Liquidity Factor which quantifies changes in the differences in bid- ask prices on the 3-month T-Bills 
at issue date. ‡ indicates coefficient multiplied by 102. All variables are computed at issue date. Standard 
errors are clustered on industry (Fama-French 17 industries). p-values are in parentheses. *p<0.10, 
**p<0.05, and ***p<0.01. 
 
  (1)   (2)  
Dependent Variable:   















Issuer and Issue Characteristics       
Indicated Yield 66.206*** 41.333*** 4.903 66.633*** 41.648*** 6.654 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.769) (0.002) (0.002) (0.692) 
Seasoned -0.008 -15.239* -35.919*** 18.749 -18.949 -55.241*** 
 (1.000) (0.062) (0.001) (0.222) (0.152) (0.001) 
Unlisted 135.810*** 106.813*** 86.719***    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Unlisted and Seasoned -41.138* -47.070** -71.551***    
 (0.055) (0.049) (0.000)    
Listed    -71.512*** -69.814*** -45.805*** 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) 
Listed and Seasoned    -67.969*** -6.908 3.757 
    (0.002) (0.670) (0.721) 
Ln of Proceeds-SIC demeaned ‡ -70.809*** -10.196 -50.009*** -71.377*** -10.389 -50.620*** 
 (0.000) (0.243) (0.000) (0.000) (0.235) (0.000) 
Use of Proceeds       
Acquisition – General Corp Purpose 6.949 13.663 27.509* 5.314 14.695 25.602* 
 (0.780) (0.392) (0.073) (0.842) (0.361) (0.078) 
Recapitalization – General Corp Purpose 105.752* 25.376 10.623 107.818* 25.513 14.351 
 (0.086) (0.204) (0.691) (0.086) (0.202) (0.616) 
Refinancing – General Corp Purpose -49.153** -7.381 -14.318 -48.638** -8.419 -14.013 
 (0.014) (0.525) (0.241) (0.018) (0.474) (0.262) 
Market Conditions       
Term Premium 30 day pct change - bps 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.140) (0.161) (0.415) (0.138) (0.163) (0.438) 
SLOOS-economic outlook 17.366*** 12.520*** 12.666*** 17.295*** 12.519*** 12.568*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VIX 30 day pct change - bps 0.015 0.003 -0.001 0.012 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.410) (0.823) (0.933) (0.499) (0.793) (0.978) 
CFSI Liquidity 30 day pct change - bps 0.001 0.004 0.171 0.005 0.010 0.172 
 (0.982) (0.885) (0.189) (0.800) (0.748) (0.186) 
IMR-Sole Led 1.746*   1.754*   
 (0.066)   (0.057)   
IMR-Joint Below  -2.458   -2.472  
  (0.108)   (0.103)  
IMR-Joint Above   -30.734***   -30.871*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 356.194*** 375.702*** 538.445*** 474.482*** 451.928*** 591.197*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Model Diagnostics          
Observations 856 1,592 2,099 856 1,592 2,099 
McFadden R2 (1974) 0.233 0.208 0.278 0.237 0.206 0.272 
Mean Variance Inflation Factor 1.290 1.280 1.210 1.310 1.280 1.250 
Model Adjusted Standard Error 28.470 19.718 21.544 29.453 19.697 21.657 




Table 7 – Trading and Switch/Retain Underwriter Offer Yield Spread Regressions.  This table examines how the endogeneity of 
syndicate choice impacts yield spreads of a sample of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield debt issued domestically from 2005 and 2015. The 
dependent variable is the at-issue yield spread to maturity (STM). Controls for market conditions as well as issuer and issue characteristics 
are included. Term Premium is the difference in term premiums on the 5-year Treasury and 1-Year Treasury. SLOOS is the net % of domestic 
banks tightening standards for C&I Loans to large and middle-market firms at issue date. CFSI Liquidity is the Cleveland Financial Stress Index 
Liquidity Factor quantifies changes in the differences in bid- ask prices on the 3-month T-Bills at issue date. ‡ indicates coefficient multiplied 
by 102. All models include Switched Lead UW and Retained Lead UW dummy variables, where Switched/Retained equal 1 if the observation 
represents a bond where the issuer used a different/same lead underwriter for the offering, and 0 otherwise.  All variables are computed at 
issue date.  Standard errors are clustered on industry (Fama-French 17 industries). p-values are in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, and 
***p<0.01. 
 Overall Sample Traded Sample Non-Traded Sample 
Dependent Variable: 






















Issuer and Issue Characteristics          
Indicated Yield 66.365*** 42.194*** 5.945 45.726 32.554** 11.219 98.991*** 26.700* -33.619* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.717) (0.125) (0.030) (0.676) (0.001) (0.051) (0.087) 
Unlisted 133.435*** 111.069*** 76.336*** 129.358*** 116.835*** 57.968*** 137.565*** 89.777 151.256*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.178) (0.000) 
Switched Lead UW 27.745 -16.555** -27.372*** 0.423 -23.785** -29.721** 65.125 3.206 -20.683 
 (0.604) (0.026) (0.002) (0.995) (0.014) (0.017) (0.135) (0.876) (0.499) 
Retained Lead UW -8.435 -6.111 -31.510*** -35.963 -12.089* -35.166*** 34.772 -15.279 -28.511 
 (0.638) (0.406) (0.000) (0.112) (0.074) (0.005) (0.161) (0.620) (0.267) 
Unlisted and Switched Lead UW -21.188 -51.191* -58.820*** -26.681 -60.175*** -69.574*** -46.768 -25.300 -16.302 
          
Unlisted and Retained Lead UW -51.250** -53.940 -61.196** -57.654* -55.711* -54.211** -45.802 -5.881 -90.450* 
 (0.047) (0.112) (0.019) (0.091) (0.090) (0.039) (0.394) (0.919) (0.083) 
Ln of Proceeds-SIC demeaned ‡ -70.541*** -9.743 -49.594*** -54.000*** -16.742** -45.972*** -101.738*** 1.481 -65.283*** 
 (0.000) (0.259) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.897) (0.000) 
Use of Proceeds          
Acquisition – General Corp Purpose 6.426 12.107 25.602* -25.393 9.743 19.694 57.989* 33.077 63.599*** 
 (0.789) (0.439) (0.086) (0.275) (0.546) (0.218) (0.071) (0.325) (0.000) 
Recapitalization – General Corp Purpose 107.697* 26.181 11.403 141.570** 33.579 14.174 44.810 18.713 10.940 
 (0.070) (0.186) (0.685) (0.021) (0.177) (0.587) (0.481) (0.685) (0.821) 
Refinancing – General Corp Purpose -52.671** -6.603 -13.902 -40.585 -6.931 -15.925 -62.124*** -16.343 -4.538 
 (0.015) (0.562) (0.266) (0.177) (0.569) (0.310) (0.002) (0.422) (0.681) 
Market Conditions          
Term Premium 30 day pct change - bps 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002* 0.009* 0.001 -0.004 
 (0.106) (0.154) (0.434) (0.406) (0.196) (0.081) (0.060) (0.823) (0.268) 
SLOOS-economic outlook 17.181*** 12.519*** 12.653*** 17.363*** 12.507*** 13.194*** 15.944*** 5.631* 10.532*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 







         
 Table 7 – Trading and Switch/Retain Underwriter Offer Yield Spread Regressions (cont.). 
 


























Spread to Maturity 
Sole Sole 
  
VIX 30 day pct change - bps 0.015 0.003 -0.001 0.019 0.016 -0.001 -0.012 -0.055** -0.004 
 
 
 (0.410) (0.831) (0.920) (0.310) (0.358) (0.905) (0.607) (0.021) (0.796) 
CFSI Liquidity 30 day pct change - bps 0.001 0.006 0.171 -0.113 0.028 0.172 0.012 -0.277*** 0.091 
 (0.976) (0.853) (0.189) (0.684) (0.355) (0.191) (0.434) (0.000) (0.245) 
IMR-Sole Led 1.685*   -0.067   2.532   
 (0.075)   (0.923)   (0.364)   
IMR-Joint Below  -2.403   -1.812   -3.678*  
  (0.117)   (0.241)   (0.075)  
IMR-Joint Above   -30.926***   -36.115***   -19.907*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.002) 
Constant 354.748*** 374.414*** 537.630*** 402.168*** 339.244*** 554.145*** 407.015*** 646.131*** 497.469*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Model Diagnostics          
Observations 856 1,592 2,099 531 1,274 1,692 325 318 407 
McFadden R2 (1974) 0.234 0.210 0.276 0.246 0.226 0.278 0.215 0.159 0.351 
Mean Variance Inflation Factor 1.310 1.250 1.210 1.350 1.290 1.210 1.360 1.280 1.290 
Model Adjusted Standard Error 34.897 20.418 22.115 47.491 20.481 24.020 49.548 44.714 36.193 







Table 8 – Falsification Test on Traded and Non-Traded Samples.  Using the switching 
regressions in Table 4, this table reports summary statistics on average yield spreads from observed 
(actual) and hypothetical (counterfactual) syndicate choices by issuers. Actual and hypothetical yield 
spreads take co-variates as well as actual and hypothetical IMRs into account.  
 
 Traded Sample Non-Traded Sample 
 Actual Hypothetical Actual Hypothetical 







Average Yield Spread 606.89 543.65 588.35 581.25 455.49 511.18 
Standard Deviation 146.77 143.82 141.55 151.43 134.11 139.25 
No. of Observations 531 531 531 325 325 325 
Standard Error 6.37 6.24 6.14 8.40 7.44 7.72 
Difference in Yield Spread  -63.24 -18.53  -125.77 -70.07 
t-statistic  -7.09 -2.09  -11.21 -6.14 







Average Yield Spread 470.64 529.33 491.04 419.42 482.14 435.07 
Standard Deviation 97.51 101.86 91.54 95.22 155.42 98.86 
No. of Observations 1,274 1,274 1,274 318 318 318 
Standard Error 4.28 3.91 2.00 5.34 8.72 5.54 
Difference in Yield Spread  58.69 20.40  62.72 15.65 
t-statistic  10.12 4.32  6.14 2.03 







Average Yield Spread 561.04 609.97 622.52 541.72 627.84 535.93 
Standard Deviation 119.01 108.91 201.11 137.69 144.50 143.22 
No. of Observations 1,692 1,692 1,692 407 407 407 
Standard Error 3.10 3.38 3.55 6.82 7.16 7.10 
Difference in Yield Spread  48.92 61.48  86.12 -5.79 








Table 9 – Underpricing Regressions.  This table examines the impact of syndicate choice 
endogeneity on underpricing of a sample of 4,547 traded cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield debt issued 
domestically from 2005 and 2015. The dependent variable is the at-issue yield spread to maturity 
(STM). Controls for market conditions as well as issuer and issue characteristics are included. Term 
Premium is the difference in term premiums on the 5-year Treasury and 1-Year Treasury. SLOOS is 
the net % of domestic banks tightening standards for C&I Loans to large and middle-market firms at 
issue date. CFSI Liquidity is the Cleveland Financial Stress Index Liquidity Factor quantifies changes in the 
differences in bid- ask prices on the 3-month T-Bills at issue date. ‡ indicates coefficient multiplied by 
102. All variables are computed at issue date.  Standard errors are clustered on industry (Fama-French 
17 industries). p-values are in parentheses.*p<0.10, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.01. 
 
 
 (1)   (2)  
Dependent Variable: 















Issuer and Issue Characteristics       
Indicated Yield 10.152 8.638 16.939 10.640 8.196 15.807 
 (0.353) (0.103) (0.175) (0.350) (0.113) (0.201) 
1st Time 34.121** 9.502** 1.139 32.792*** 3.420 -2.530 
 (0.021) (0.050) (0.744) (0.008) (0.589) (0.496) 
Unlisted -7.159 12.199** -8.905***    
 (0.722) (0.024) (0.003)    
Unlisted and 1st Time  20.250 11.645 22.763***    
 (0.283) (0.482) (0.000)    
Listed    -6.788 -19.961*** -7.120*** 
    (0.549) (0.000) (0.004) 
Listed and 1st Time    17.105 19.225** 23.062*** 
    (0.244) (0.032) (0.000) 
Ln of Proceeds-SIC demeaned ‡ 4.821 5.936* 1.019 4.633 6.203* 1.195 
 (0.427) (0.069) (0.641) (0.456) (0.061) (0.598) 
Use of Proceeds       
Acquisition – General Corp Purpose -1.005 3.370 5.776** -1.357 3.702 5.548** 
 (0.883) (0.426) (0.030) (0.852) (0.318) (0.028) 
Recapitalization – General Corp Purpose 26.268* -3.686 -0.903 26.930* -4.229 0.380 
 (0.059) (0.639) (0.893) (0.062) (0.571) (0.956) 
Refinancing – General Corp Purpose 6.892 -5.679** 7.238** 7.053 -5.774** 7.133** 
 (0.500) (0.021) (0.034) (0.521) (0.017) (0.032) 
Market Conditions  
  
   





0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.302) 
(0.001) (0.000) 
(0.245) (0.001) (0.000) 





6.738*** 6.741*** 7.868*** 
 (0.000) 
(0.000) (0.000) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VIX 30 day pct change - bps 0.011 
0.003 0.004 
0.010 0.004 0.004 
 (0.262) 
(0.531) (0.139) 
(0.295) (0.326) (0.129) 
CFSI Liquidity 30 day pct change - bps 0.053 
0.013 0.013* 
0.054 0.017* 0.014** 
 (0.676) 
(0.163) (0.055) 
(0.680) (0.073) (0.038) 
IMR-Sole Led -0.277 
 
 -0.274   
 (0.480)   (0.519)   
IMR-Joint Below  -1.912*** 
 
 -1.815***  
  (0.000) 
 
 (0.000)  
IMR-Joint Above  
 
-3.715***   -3.657*** 
  
 
(0.007)   (0.003) 
Constant -15.482 7.015 8.493 -7.107 19.100 11.822 
 (0.755) (0.789) (0.497) (0.899) (0.464) (0.381) 
Model Diagnostics       
Observations 531 1,274 1,692 531 1,274 1,692 
McFadden R2 (1974) 0.221 0.340 0.311 0.222 0.345 0.315 
Mean Variance Inflation Factor 1.280 1.190 1.160 1.240 1.170 1.130 
Model Adjusted Standard Error 15.841 6.606 6.630 16.082 6.023 6.532 




Table 10 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns.  On a sample of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield 
bonds issued domestically between 2005 and 2015m 3,346 were issued by publicly listed firms. Listed 
firms could be identified on 1,119 issues and only 570 had the requisite CRSP data for estimating 
cumulative abnormal returns. This table reports cumulative abnormal returns on equity of these firms. 
Value-weighted returns are tabulated; results are qualitatively similar when equal-weighted returns are 
used. p-values are in parentheses.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.01. 
 
    (1)       
   All Publicly Traded Equity 
on Debt Issues 
   
   Sole Led Joint Below 
Joint 
Above       
CAR (-2, 2)   0.0065 0.0036 -0.0032      
   (0.3216) (0.2902) (0.3836)      
           
CAR (-3, 3)   0.0093 0.0047 -0.0035      
     (0.2235) (0.2380) (0.3835)       
    (2)     (3)  
   Publicly Traded Equity on 
Non-Traded Debt Issues 
  
Publicly Traded Equity on 
Traded Debt Issues 
   Sole Led Joint Below 
Joint 
Above 
  Sole Led Joint Below 
Joint 
Above 
CAR (-2, 2)   0.0175 0.0039 -0.0121   0.0042 0.0035 -0.0021 
   (0.1922) (0.5923) (0.1626)   (0.5743) (0.3348) (0.5942) 
           
CAR (-3, 3)   0.0318* 0.0101 -0.0202*   0.0045 0.0041 -0.0016 
   (0.0574) (0.3490) (0.0773)   (0.5956) (0.3342) (0.7187) 
    (4)       
  
 Publicly Traded Equity 
Non-Traded – Traded Debt 
Issues 
   
  
 
Sole Led Joint Below 
Joint 
Above      
CAR (-2, 2)   0.0133 0.0004 -0.0100      
   (0.3775) (0.9609) (0.2883)      
           
CAR (-3, 3)   0.0273 0.0060 -0.0186      











II. Essay 2 – Do Firms Care Who Their Lenders Are? The Role of QIBs in Private Debt 





 Debt securities are information sensitive when opacity impedes the ability of investors to 
discriminate between more and less creditworthy issuers. Certification by underwriters who are willing 
to put their reputations at risk moderates the cross-subsidization of less creditworthy borrowers by 
more creditworthy borrowers. Less creditworthy borrowers have reduced incentives to incur higher 
costs to engage more reputable underwriters to divulge lower probabilities of debt repayment. 
 But qualified institutional buyers are habitual repeat institutional purchasers of debt securities 
with considerable accumulated experience in judging the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. 
Moreover, because they hold and manage relatively large portfolios of similar investments, qualified 
institutional buyers (QIBs) are also likely to be well-informed about the pricing of risky debt. The 
correlations in payoffs on debt securities issued by a diverse set of firms contains valuable latent 
information about common risk factors, and exposure to correlated risks, is a strong motive to 
monitor (Phelan, 2017). For retail investors, there is less to learn from infrequent security purchases, 
and incentives to monitor are adversely affected by free-riding. Furthermore, in negotiating the terms 
of the debt contract, issuing firms are less likely to share non-public confidential information with a 
disparate group of retail investors, but more likely to do so with a small and select group of QIBs who 
sign nondisclosure agreements. Sophisticated and well-informed QIBs can substitute for information 
production by underwriters and mitigate the informational monopoly and bargaining power of 
underwriters who are also the firms’ current lenders.   
 Finally, firms may also attach value to borrowing from QIBs who have an established reputation 
for minimizing inefficient liquidation when default occurs (Chemmanur and Fulgheiri, 1994). In the 
event of default, private and court-administered negotiations can be prolonged. Avoiding delays in 
bankruptcy resolution necessitate costly state verification and creditor coordination (Cantillo and 
Wright, 2000), both of which are challenging for retail investors. QIBs who are more likely to derive 
a higher value from making the “right” decision to either reorganize or liquidate the defaulted firm 
will devote a larger amount of resources toward such evaluations. 




their lenders. Opaque but otherwise creditworthy firms may prefer to borrow from QIBs through 
144A private placements of debt rather than borrow from retail investors through public placements 
of debt. If firms care about their lenders, what are the issuer, underwriter, and issue characteristics 
that affect their choice of lenders? Do issuing firms and lenders self-select? What is the impact of self-
selection on at-issue yield spreads? Is the choice of lenders influenced by equity revaluations?   
 To address these questions, I use a sample of 4,547 high yield bond placements in the United 
States by domestic and foreign firms over the period 2005 to 2015. High yield bond issues provide a 
constructive setting for several reasons. First, informational asymmetry will be relatively high for firms 
that issue speculative grade debt compared to firms that issue investment grade debt. Second, issues 
can be publicly placed or offered privately through Rule 144A. In public placements, lenders are more 
diverse and larger in number, which intensifies free-riding in information production and monitoring. 
In contrast, private placements rely on QIBs, who as specialized lenders tend to be more focused and 
better-informed. Moreover, private security sales to QIBs that do not require pre-registration are 
expeditious, but absent registration can only be traded post-issue among QIBs. Finally, high yield 
bond covenants are markedly different from those in leveraged loans. High yield bond covenants are 
typically “incurrence-based”, which necessitate a negotiation between QIBs and issuers over the 
crafting of proscribed issuer actions. But loan covenants are typically “maintenance-based”, which 
require ongoing compliance by issuers to specific terms.  
 Using a nested double selection probit model, I find that the matches between borrowers and 
lenders are negative assortative. Firms that are non-SEC reporting, first-time issuers, and have poorer 
issuer credit ratings, are more likely to borrow from specialized lenders. Foreign firms, who are less 
familiar and more opaque than domestic firms, are also more likely to borrow from specialized lenders. 
Further, issuing firms, especially foreign firms, seem more willing to share non-public confidential 
information with specialized lenders who sign nondisclosure agreements with the firm.  
 Average yield spreads in public placements by foreign firms are 281 bps higher than public 
placements by domestic firms. But average yield spreads on 144A Non-Life debt placements by 




suggest that in high information asymmetry settings, QIBs are better than retail investors at discerning 
the creditworthiness of less familiar and more opaque foreign firms. 
 There are, however, significantly higher costs to foreign firms from non-public disclosure and 
restricted trading to QIBs. 144A Life debt placements of securities have no registration rights and are 
precluded over the life of the security from registration post-issue. Yield spreads on 144A Life debt 
placements by foreign firms are 127 bps higher than 144A Life debt placements by domestic firms. 
The higher yield compensates specialized lenders for the higher costs of certifying foreign firms and 
higher illiquidity associated with the restricted trading of unregistered securities associated with foreign 
issuers. 
 The bargaining power of lead underwriters who are also the firm’s current lenders is more 
significant when issuing firms are foreign.17 For foreign firms, yield spreads are 21 bps higher in public 
debt placements by relationship underwriters. QIBs moderate the bargaining power of relationship 
underwriters considerably in private debt placements by foreign firms. For these issues, average yield 
spreads are lower by 32 bps and 38 bps in 144A Non-Life and 144A Life debt placements, respectively.    
 Lastly, I find that yield spreads are lower (higher) when an issuing firm that is publicly traded 
experiences a positive (negative) stock return in the year prior to bond issuance. Compared to QIBs, 
retail investors tend to overreact (underreact) to “bad” (“good”) news on foreign firms, and 
conversely, on domestic firms. 
 This study advances our understanding of private and public placements of debt issues. The 
results suggest firms do care from whom they borrow when issuers and investors are asymmetrically 
informed. Creditworthy but opaque firms will look to specialized lenders who are more adept at 
assessing creditworthiness, can maintain the confidentiality of private disclosures, monitor, and 
minimize inefficient liquidation in the event of default.   
 
                                                 
17Throughout this study, we use “underwriter” and “arranger” interchangeably.  Both terms represent a financial 




   II. High Yield Debt  
 
   A.  SEC Rule 144A 
 Like other securities, high-yield bonds are sold to investors either through public or private 
offerings. If placed privately, the bonds are typically issued via Rule 144A which are exempted from 
registration requirements under the 1933 Securities Act. The exemption from registration comes from 
the combination of Section 4(2) and Rule 144A of the 1933 Securities Act. Section 4(2) exempts the 
initial sale of securities by issuers to broker-dealers acting as initial purchasers. Rule 144A allows the 
resale of securities by initial purchasers to QIBs.  
 Rule 144A was designed to attract foreign issuers to deeper and more liquid U.S. security markets 
(Fenn, 2000; Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2004). Securities sold under Rule 144A are, however, 
restricted securities and cannot be resold freely. Resales are limited to other QIBs, and trades are 
transacted in over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Rule 144A is attractive because the sale of securities 
without SEC registration speeds issuance but at the potential cost of inadequate disclosure. The 
decision whether to issue registered or restricted securities will depend on the requirements of the 
issuer, as well as the judgment of underwriters about the likelihood of achieving a successful 
placement.18   
 Rule 144A issues come in two forms. The first, herein referred to as 144A Non-Life, has 
registration rights attached. Registration rights allow security holders to force the issuer to register the 
securities with the SEC post-issue. Penalties for failure to deliver registered securities within a year 
following the exercise of registration rights are typically 25 basis points (bps) for each quarter of delay 
and capped at 100 bps. When exercised, registration rights enhance the post-issue liquidity of the 
bonds since registered securities are freely tradable with non-QIBs. Absent registration, 144A Non-
Life issues can only be traded among QIBs after a six-month minimum holding period when the 
issuing firm is a Reporting Issuer as defined by the SEC. In cases where 144A Non-Life bonds are issued 
                                                 
18Over the 2005-2015 period, 82% of high yield bonds were issued privately (through Rule 144A), and the balance, as 




by non-SEC reporting firms, the mandatory minimum holding period is one year.   
 The second form of Rule 144A issuance, herein referred to as 144A Life, do not have registration 
rights attached. In this form, issuing firms are precluded, for the life of the bond, from exchanging 
restricted securities sold at-issue for SEC-registered securities post-issue. 144A Life issues have the 
same mandatory holding period restrictions as 144A Non-Life issues. As a result of a February 15, 
2008 amendment, all securities owned by non-affiliates of the issuing firm and issued under Rule 144 
can be freely traded by QIBs after a year without any regard to whether or not the issuing firm is a 
Reporting Issuer. Further, the requirement for issuing firms to remain current in their SEC filings falls 
away after one year, which raises investor concerns about the potential loss of publicly available 
information and absence of regulatory scrutiny by the SEC.19   
 In their approach to high yield debt investments, not all QIBs are equal. Certain QIBs, e.g. 
mutual funds, place self-imposed constraints on investments in restricted securities, and limit total 
dollar amounts at 10% of portfolio values. Other QIBs, e.g. hedge funds and private equity funds, do 
not have limitations on investments in restricted securities. In this respect, QIBs that purchase Life 
and Non-Life issues differ in their willingness to screen and monitor issuing firms, and to accept 
constraints on liquidity from secondary market restrictions on trading with non-QIBs.  
 In contrast to unsophisticated retail investors in publicly placed debt, sophisticated QIB 
investors in privately place debt have greater ability to evaluate issuer quality, and potentially better 
informed when security laws allow non-public information to be shared with private investors who 
sign nondisclosure agreements with the firm. Further, the incentives for information production by 
private investors are higher when the securities being issued are more information-sensitive (Fulghieri 
and Lukin, 2001). The decision to use public or private (144A) placements to issue debt provides 
insight into issuers’ lender preferences.  
                                                 
19As of December 2015, restricted securities can be sold or transferred under exemptions provided in Section 4(a)(1½) 
and Section 4(a)(7) of the Securities Act. Although Section 4(a)(1½) is not fully detailed in the Securities Act, it has 
nonetheless been recognized by the SEC as a hybrid exemption on registration and the private resale of restricted securities. 
Section 4(a)(7) became effective immediately after the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) was signed 




   B.  Related Literature  
 Tirole (2006) suggests that when sophisticated investors assume a significant financial stake in a 
firm, favorable information about a firm’s creditworthiness is conveyed, which has spillover effects 
on other market participants. In the context of interbank loans, Rochet and Tirole (1996a), detail that 
lending by informed investors sends a positive signal regarding the quality of the issuer and the 
probability of repayment, which ultimately garners the attention of uninformed investors. 
Creditworthy borrowers have an incentive to separate themselves from less creditworthy through 
costly dissipative signals. These signals have the greatest value when information asymmetry is high 
and succeed when the cost of signaling discourages non-creditworthy borrowers from mimicking 
creditworthy ones (Tirole, 2006).   
 Certification by underwriters, who are willing to place their reputations at risk, moderates the 
cross-subsidization of less creditworthy borrowers by more creditworthy borrowers. Less 
creditworthy borrowers have reduced incentives to incur higher costs to engage more reputable 
underwriters to divulge lower probabilities of debt repayment; and conversely, for more creditworthy 
borrowers. In the literature, other signals of high-quality borrowing include the pledging of assets 
(Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Bester, 1987), and the issuance of 
short-term debt (Diamond, 1991; Diamond, 1993).     
 I argue that in the high yield debt market, firms can reduce informational asymmetry by 
borrowing from QIBs. As specialized lenders, information production and monitoring by QIBs can 
substitute for underwriter certification of issuer and issue quality.  
 For certification by QIBs to be credible, however, three conditions should be satisfied. First, 
reputational capital must be at stake. Second, incentive compatibility is met. The gains to reputational 
capital from truthful certification exceed wealth transfers from false certification. Third, it is costly for 
issuing firms to lease the reputational capital of specialized investors.   
 There are compelling reasons to believe QIBs meet these requirements. First, QIBs represent 
an important group of investors that include the majority of investment funds with more than $100 




collectively, QIBs make substantial investments in the high yield bond primary market with ongoing 
yearly investments more than a hundred billion dollars. Second, QIBs compete against each another 
for investable funds, and their investment performance is continually monitored by fund investors. 
Corporate debt underwriters rely greatly on institutional investors to build order books. In a repeated 
game it is unlikely these investors will choose one-time gains from false certification and forgo the 
expected future gains that accrue from participation in an active high yield primary market.  Moreover, 
mandatory holding periods and restrictions on secondary market trading also discourage false 
certification. Lastly, QIBs are intimately involved in credit risk assessment as well as the negotiation 
and structuring of covenants and deal terms. As specialized lenders, QIBs expect to be compensated 
for their expertise and cost of information production (Fenn, 2000; Huang and Ramírez, 2010).  
   C.  Testable Hypotheses 
 First, I envisage issuer/investor matches are endogenously determined, and I expect matches to 
be negative assortative. Opaque borrowers will match with specialized lenders to issue debt more cost 
efficiently. 
 Second, yield spreads on public placements will be higher when unsophisticated retail investors 
are unable to discriminate more from less creditworthy borrowers. As specialized lenders, QIBs in 
private placements will play an important role in resolving informational asymmetry. Moreover, QIBs 
will be especially important when the bargaining power of the underwriter is significant; that is, when 
the left lead underwriter is the issuing firm’s current lender on a syndicated loan. 
 Third, creditworthy foreign firms will have lower yield spreads by borrowing from QIBs than 
retail investors. The initial impetus for Rule 144A was to attract foreign issuers to deeper and more 
liquid U.S. securities markets. Private debt markets function differently from public debt markets 
because private lenders are better informed and have a greater ability to evaluate issuer quality (Gomes 
and Phillips, 2012). I conjecture certification by QIBs facilitates the access of foreign firms to the U.S. 





  III. Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics 
 
A. Data Sources 
 The sample dataset is assembled using Capital IQ, S&P Global Market Intelligence, FRED 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), as well as the EDGAR (Electronic Data Gather, Analysis, and 
Retrieval) system of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). From Capital IQ I compile 
all high yield bonds issued in the U.S. between 2005 and 2015. I exclude all offers of pay-in-kind (PIK) 
and floating rate notes, which yields a final sample of 4,547 bonds, of which 3,724 are issued privately. 
Capital IQ allows us to collect primary market transaction data dating back to 2005 and includes 
important issuer and underwriter financial information. In cases where information is incomplete, I 
hand-collect the missing details required from S&P Global Market Intelligence, which publishes 
Leveraged Commentary & Data (LCD) News.   
<Insert Figure 1 here.> 
 Figure 1 graphs the market composition of annual high yield debt issued by placement method, 
which proxies for investor (lender) types. The share of public debt placements, which increased 
modestly over the sample period, is considerably smaller than the combined market shares of private 
debt placements, 144A Non-Life and 144A Life, throughout the sample period. Placements of 144A 
Non-Life debt with delayed registration rights represent 94.1% of high yield debt issues at the 
beginning of the sample period, but only 32.5% by the end of the sample period. The increasing share 
of 144A Life debt placements, which had the largest overall market share by 2014, shows the 
expanding role of QIBs as specialized lenders. Figure 2 and Figure 3 graph high yield debt placements 
by public (listed) and private (unlisted) firms respectively. The active participation of QIBs in 144A 
Life placements is remarkable, especially for unlisted firms.  
<Insert Figures 2 and 3 here.> 
B. Summary Statistics 




highlights the important differences between private and public placements of high yield debt.  
<Insert Table 1 here.> 
 Two variables proxy for market timing in debt issuance decisions. Post Amendment is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 when debt is issued after the 2008 Rule 144A amendment that allowed all 
restricted securities to be freely traded by QIBs after a year without any regard to whether the issuing 
firm is SEC reporting; and 0 otherwise. Post amendment, firms seem more likely to issue 144A Life 
and less likely to issue 144A Non-Life debt placements regardless of domicile. 
 Prior Stock Return is the percentage change in stock price over the 52-week period ending with 
the bond issue date. For publicly traded issuers, prior year stock returns average 27% overall. 
Regardless of domicile, public and 144A Non-Life debt placements seem more likely when issuing 
firms experience significant positive prior year stock returns; but 144A Life debt placements are more 
likely when prior year stock returns are lower. Debt placement choice by foreign (domestic) firms also 
seems less (more) sensitive to prior year stock return.   
 I use five variables to address underwriter characteristics. Underwriter is Commercial Bank, that 
equals 1 when the lead underwriter is a commercial bank and 0 otherwise, is an indicator variable that 
proxies for the reputational quality of commercial banks relative to investment banks. Puri (1996) and 
Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999) find that yields are no worse on issues underwritten by commercial 
than investment banks; Yasuda (2005), that commercial banks charge lower underwriting fees to firms 
with whom they had relationships. Overall, commercial banks are lead underwriters in 53% of high 
yield debt placements. Private debt placements underwritten by commercial banks appear less (more) 
likely for foreign (domestic) firms. 
 Lead Underwriter is Current Lender, that equals 1 when the lead arranger on the debt placement is 
also a current lender to the issuing firm and 0 otherwise, is an indicator variable that proxies for the 
bargaining power of the lead arranger and potential for agency conflicts of interest between borrowers 
and lenders (Rajan, 1992). In the sample, the current lender is the lead arranger on 16% of high yield 




least likely in 144A Non-Life debt placements.  
 Underwriter Age, No. of HY Bonds Underwritten, and HY Underwritten /Total Underwritten proxy for 
the experience, as well as market participation in and importance of the high yield debt underwriting 
business to the lead arranger. Underwriter Age is the number of years the lead arranger has been in the 
business at the debt issue date. No. of HY Bonds Underwritten is the number of high yield debt issues 
underwritten by the lead arranger in the same calendar year as the current debt issue. HY Underwritten 
/Total Underwritten is the percentage of total fee income contributed by underwriting high yield debt 
in the calendar year of the debt issue. DeLong (1991) finds that more (less) reputable investment banks 
with higher percentages of fee income from underwriting have more (less) to lose from eroding their 
reputations for short-term gains. Lead arrangers in private debt placements, and 144A Non-Life debt 
issues in particular, are relatively younger and underwrite fewer number of issues, but generate a higher 
percentage of underwriting income from high yield debt.  
 Five variables account for differing dimensions of issuer quality. SEC-Reporting and 1st Time are 
indicator variables that proxy for public disclosure and opacity. Overall, 82% of firms that issue high 
yield debt are SEC reporting; the remaining 18% are foreign firms. Further, the incidence of foreign 
first-time issuers is notably higher than that of domestic issuers across all three placement types. 
Private debt placements also seem more likely for foreign firms that are non-SEC reporting and first-
time issuers. 
 Parent Rating is the S&P or Moody’s long-term issuer credit rating expressed in a numerical scale 
where AAA/Aaa = 1. On average, foreign firms are better rated than domestic firms regardless of 
debt placement choice. Issuers in public debt placements tend to be better rated, but they are poorer 
rated in 144A Life debt placements.  
 Firm Age is measured in years and computed based on the year the issuing firm was founded as 
reported in Capital IQ. On average, foreign firms are younger than domestic firms. In the sample, the 
youngest (oldest) firms are foreign (domestic) issuers of public debt. Foreign firms are older in private 
than public debt placements. Domestic firms are older in public than private debt placements 




debt placements, foreign and domestic firms are similar in size. In private debt placements, however, 
foreign firms tend to be several times larger than domestic firms, particularly in 144A Non-Life debt 
issues. 
 Five variables characterize issue quality. IG/HY Split-Rated is an indicator variable that equals 1 
when the issue is dual rated and credit rating agencies disagree on whether the issue is investment or 
speculative grade, and 0 otherwise. Although only 4% of all high yield debt issues are split-rated, 15.3% 
of public debt placements by foreign firms are split-rated; 11.9%, for domestic firms. Split-rated debt 
in private debt placements are notably less likely, particularly, on 144A Life debt issues.  
 Issue Rating is the S&P or Moody’s issue credit rating expressed in a numerical scale where 
AAA/Aaa = 1, and averaged, when the issue is dual rated. On average, issues in public debt 
placements are at least one notch better rated than on private debt placements. Issue Size, measured in 
millions of dollars, is the offer amount of the bond. On average, public debt placements are about $90 
million larger than private debt placements. Issue Maturity, measured in years, is the term life of the 
debt issuance. Debt maturity in public debt placements tends to be longer, but shorter in private debt 
placements, particularly on 144A Life issues. Senior Secured is an indicator variable that takes on a value 
of 1 when the debt issue is collateralized, and 0 otherwise. Although 11% of high yield debt issues are 
senior secured, only 1% and 2% of public debt placements are senior secured by foreign and domestic 
firms, respectively. Senior secured seem most likely in private debt placements, particularly, 144A Life 
debt issues. 
 Yield Spread, measured in basis points, is computed as offer yield minus the yield on a Treasury 
bond of the same maturity. The overall average yield spread is 535.2 basis points, with spreads being 
higher on debt issues by foreign firms relative to domestic ones. Regardless of issuer domicile, yield 
spreads are also higher in private than public debt placements. The temporal pattern in yield spreads 
by debt placement over the sample period is shown in Figure 4. 





  IV.  Results and Discussion 
 
  A.  Double Selection Model Setup 
 To understand the factors that influence a firm’s lender choice, I model the match of issuers and 
investors as a (nested) double selection probit model. In this framework, I take the decision to issue 
high yield bonds as exogenous and assess whether firms care from whom they borrow. In the model, 
the issuing firm first decides whether to elect a private placement of permanently restricted 144A Life 
debt securities. If not, the decision comes down to a private placement of 144A Non-Life debt with 
registration rights, or a public placement of SEC-registered debt securities. Bear in mind the difference 
between 144A Non-Life and public placement reflects the speed of issuance from a delay in SEC 
registration. All the 144A Non-Life debt issues in the sample are eventually registered post-issue.     
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In (1), 
*
1 0I   (
*
1 0I  ) is the index function that embodies the firm’s decision whether or not to issue 
permanently restricted securities (144A Life). 
*
2 0I   ( 2 0I  ) reflects whether 144A Non-Life securities 
with delayed post-issue SEC registration or at-issue SEC registered securities is used.  In (2), the 
observable and latent factors that influence bond placement choices are reflected in 2( , )1x x  and 1 2( , ) 
, respectively. Observable factors are variables that affect the choice of issuers to self-select into 
restricted or registered debt offers, and if registered offers, with delayed or at-issue registration. Latent 




correlated with each other as well as with outcomes. Following Greene (2003), I identify a subset of 
exclusionary observable factors that affect the bond placement choices by issuers but do not affect 
the outcomes y  from their placement for identification purposes.   
 The log likelihood function for the bivariate probit is: 
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where 1,2, ,i N  denote issue observations. Defining 1 12 1i iq I   and 2 22 1i iq I  , the general 
form of the bivariate log likelihood function is: 
  *1 1 2 2 2log ln , ;   i i i i iiL q q1x γ x γ   (4) 
where
*
1 2 12i i iq q  . When 12 0  , the bivariate probit functions can be estimated independently as 
univariate probit functions. In (3),  1i 1x γ  and  1i  1x γ  are the likelihoods of offering restricted 
and registered securities, respectively. Given the bond is offered with registration rights,  
 2 2 1|i i   1x γ x γ    1 2 2 1,i i i     1 1x γ x γ x γ  reflects the likelihood that the bond is privately placed 
but with delayed registration (Nonlife); and  2 2 1|i i    1x γ x γ    1 2 2 1,i i i      1 1x γ x γ x γ  reflects 
the likelihood that the bond is publicly placed with immediate registration. 
 
B. Double Selection Model Estimation  
 The double selection probit regression results are presented in Table 2. In the first probit 
regression, the limited dependent variable is Life, which equals 1 when the bond is issued as a 
permanently restricted security, and 0, when it is issued with registration rights. In the second probit 
regression, the limited dependent variable is Non-Life, that equals 1 when the bond is issued with 
delayed post-issue registration through Rule 144A (private placement), and 0, when it is registered at-
issue (public placement). Model 2 is the best and most parsimonious specification. Additionally, to 




coefficients. I focus on the standardized coefficients version of Model 2 in subsequent discussion.20 
<Insert Table 2 here.> 
 The double selection model supports the hypothesis that issuer/investor matches are negative 
assortative. Creditworthy but opaque borrowers are more likely to match with specialized lenders 
(QIBs) through private debt placements when the issuing firm is: (i) non-SEC reporting; (ii) poorer 
credit rated; (iii) foreign or first-time issuer; and (iv) smaller in asset size.  
 Additionally, private debt placements with specialized lenders (QIBs) are more likely when issue 
quality is poor. Issues are also less likely to be split investment-speculative grade rated and more likely 
to be senior secured. Collateral pledging is a costly dissipative signal used by high yield debt issuers. 
Its use corroborates findings in prior studies that asset securitization is associated with high quality 
borrowers (e.g. Bester 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Bester, 1987). 
Though statistically insignificant, private debt placements are also more likely to be shorter maturity 
debt.  
 Further, I find that market timing influences debt placement choice. Private placements of 
restricted 144A Life debt are more likely after the February 2008 amendment to Rule 144, which 
allows trading of restricted securities by QIBs without regard to whether the issuing firm is SEC 
reporting. Private placements of 144A Non-Life debt are also more likely when the issuing firm 
experiences a positive 52-week prior stock return. A one standard deviation increase in prior stock 
return leads to a 10.2% increase in the predicted probability of issuing 144A Non-Life debt, all else 
equal.     
 Lastly, probit regression results show the participation of specialized lenders (QIBs) in private 
placements is more likely when lead arrangers are not commercial banks, but rather, more established 
(older) investment banks with extensive experience underwriting large numbers of high yield debt 
issues. In the sample, commercial banks as lead arrangers underwrite 63.3% of public placements, but 
                                                 
20Model 2 is re-estimated with standardized unit variance on all continuous explanatory variables. Results are reported in 




only 43.6% and 54.9% of private placements by foreign and domestic firms, respectively. Moreover, 
when the lead arranger is a commercial bank, the odds are one-in-four that the lead arranger is also 
the issuing firm’s current lender. Private placements with specialized lenders (QIBs) can restrain the 
significant bargaining power of relationship underwriters over issuing firms. 
  
  C. Outcome Equations 
 To examine the pricing impact of placement choice, I estimate seemingly unrelated switching 
regressions (SURs) of yield spreads taking the endogeneity of borrowing firms and lenders into 
account, and controlling for market conditions, issue size, and use of proceeds. Issuer specific Heckit 
correction terms (Inverse Mills Ratios) are used in switching regressions to account for the 
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Estimated switching regressions for the entire sample are reported in Table 3.  
 Entire Sample 
 All else equal, average yield spreads on public and 144A Non-Life placements of 259 bps and 
260 bps respectively, are not different. This finding corroborates a similar observation by Fenn (2000). 
The incremental information provided by securities registration do not seem to be important, 
particularly for sophisticated investors (QIBs). 144A Non-Life placements of high yield debt, which 
are subsequently registered within a year of issue, are used to facilitate speed of issuance. Regardless 
of debt placement choice, yield spreads are lower for SEC reporting firms and larger size issues; and 
higher, for first-time and poorer credit rated issuers.  
<Insert Table 3 here.> 
 Importantly, I show that as specialized lenders, QIBs who conduct extensive due diligence, 
structure the terms and covenants of the debt indenture, as well as renegotiate terms and covenants 
as conditions warrant, carry out a vital certification role for high yield debt issuers. The difference in 
average yield spreads between 144A Life and public placements of 63.7 bps (=323.7-260) compensates 
QIBs not only for the cost of information production and monitoring, which takes the place of public 
disclosures associated with SEC registration, but also for secondary market illiquidity from restrictions 
on trading unregistered securities to QIBs. Relative to public placements, yield spreads in 144A Non-
Life and 144A Life placements, respectively, are 33.1 bps (=33.5+0.4) and 33.2 bps (=33.6+0.4) lower 
for SEC reporting firms; and 12.7 bps (=27.7-15.1) and 9.9 bps (=25-15.1) higher, for first-time 
issuers.  
 The impact on yield spreads from the use of proceeds proxy for potential agency conflicts of 
interest between borrowing firms and their lenders. Compared to public debt placements, yield 
spreads are lowest in private debt placements for the purpose of refinancing that do not involve 
changes in leverage. But highest for recapitalization, consistent with increased default risk when debt 
proceeds are used either to finance share repurchases or to pay cash dividends. Yield spreads are also 




inherently difficult to evaluate.   
 Further, regardless of placement choice, yield spreads are 12 bps to 17 bps higher when credit 
conditions tighten. Lastly, lower yield spreads associated with larger size issues is a multiple of 2.7 
(=22.5/8.2) and 2.7 (=21.9/8.2) greater in 144A Non-Life and 144A Life than public placements. 
  Domestic vs. Foreign Firms 
 Switching regression results for domestic and foreign firms reported in Table 4 address two 
hypotheses. First, if the initial impetus for Rule 144A was to attract foreign issuers to deeper and more 
liquid U.S. securities markets, then certification by QIBs should facilitate the access of foreign firms 
to the U.S. high yield debt market. Creditworthy but opaque foreign firms should have lower yield 
spreads borrowing from specialized lenders (QIBs) than retail investors. Second, if QIBs in 144A Life 
placements substitute specialized lenders for underwriter certification, then QIBs should be especially 
important when the bargaining power of the underwriter is significant; that is, when lead underwriters 
are the issuing firm’s current lenders.  
<Insert Table 4 here.> 
 All else equal, average yield spreads are 280.6 bps (=510.6-230) higher on public placements of 
high yield debt by foreign firms compared to domestic firms. The percentage of high yield debt issues 
by foreign and domestic firms through public placements are similar at 17.5% and 18.2%, respectively. 
Foreign firms are, however, considerably better off with private placements of high yield debt. Relative 
to public debt placements, yield spreads on 144A Non-Life and 144A Life debt placements by foreign 
firms are 344.2 bps (=510.6-176.4) and 161.8 bps (=510.6-348.8) lower, respectively. But for similar 
placements by domestic firms are not meaningfully higher by 21.2 bps (251.1-229.9) and lower by 8.2 
bps (=221.7-229.9).  
 These results are consistent with the “home bias” literature, (French and Poterba, 1991; Tesar 
and Werner, 1995). The lack of familiarity with foreign firms can be a major hurdle for unsophisticated 
retail investors in public debt placements to overcome. Further, private placements of high yield debt 




disclosure (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2004). Foreign firms may be more willing than domestic firms 
to reveal proprietary information to sophisticated QIB investors when the release of confidential 
information has adverse consequences in contestable product markets (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995; 
and Yosha, 1995). 
 Extant literature suggests that underwriters who are inside lenders will exploit their information 
advantage. In Rajan (1992), the information advantage, which allows inside lenders to exercise control 
over project continuation in the future, is more severe when informational asymmetry is high. On 
debt placements by relationship underwriters who are current lenders to issuing firms, yield spreads 
are 21.3 bps and 6.5 bps higher in public placements by foreign and domestic firms, respectively. 
Compared to domestic firms, foreign firms are only 1% less likely to use public placements by 
relationship lenders, but 5.3% and 10.2% less likely to use private placements of 144A Non-Life and 
144A Life debt issues by relationship lenders. 
 In private placements, QIBs take the place of underwriter certification. Whether the issuer is a 
domestic or foreign firm, QIBs moderate the bargaining power of relationship underwriters, and more 
markedly when the issuer is a foreign firm. Relative to public placements, yield spreads on private 
placements of 144A Non-Life and 144A Life debt issues with relationship underwriters are always 
lower for foreign firms by 31.9 bps (=10.6+21.3) and 38 bps (=16.7+21.3), respectively. For domestic 
firms, yield spreads in private relative to public placements by relationship underwriters are not 
meaningfully different; lower by 9.2 bps (=2.7+6.5) on 144A Non-Life debt issues, and higher by 1 
bps (=7.5-6.5) on 144A Life debt issues.   
 In public and private debt placements, a 100% of domestic firms are SEC reporting. In contrast, 
98.6% of foreign firms in public debt placements are SEC reporting, but only 47.4% and 30.9% of 
foreign firms in private 144A Non-Life and 144A Life debt placements respectively, are SEC 
reporting. Foreign firms, who are also first-time issuers, are 2.5% more likely to use public placements; 
but 6.5% and 12.8% more likely, to use 144A Non-Life and 144A Life placements, respectively.   
 The incidence and cost of cross-subsidization is pronounced in public debt placements when a 




creditworthy foreign borrowers (Tirole, 2006). Opaque, but creditworthy, borrowers are always hurt 
by the presence of less-creditworthy borrowers when certification by underwriters is imperfect.  
 Compared to domestic firms, yield spreads are 84.6 bps and 72.7 bps (=85.5-12.8) bps higher 
on public debt placements by foreign firms who are SEC reporting and first-time issuers respectively. 
For the same credit rating, yield spreads in public debt placements are 63% (=5.8/3.6-1) higher for 
foreign firms than domestic firms. The reduction in yield spreads from larger size issues is 29% 
(=5.9/8.4-1) less on public debt placements by foreign firms than domestic firms.  
 Relative to those on public debt placements, the yield spreads of 144A Non-Life and 144A Life 
debt placements are 114.5 bps (=84.7+29.8) and 108.6 bps (84.7+23.9) lower for SEC reporting 
foreign firms, respectively; 52.9 bps (=85.5-32.5) and 60.9 bps (=85.5-24.6) lower, for foreign first-
time issuers. For the same credit rating, yield spreads are 44% (=5.8/3.3-1) and 20% (=5.8/4.6-1) 
lower on 144A Non-Life and 144A Life than public debt placements by foreign firms. The reduction 
in yield spreads from larger size issues is 6.2 times (=37.1/6-1) and 4.5 times (=26.8/6-1) more on 
144A Non-Life and 144A Life than public debt placements by foreign firms.  
 In contrast, domestic firms do not generally benefit from private debt placements because all 
domestic firms that issue high yield debt are SEC reporting. Relative to public debt placements, 144A 
Non-Life and 144A Life debt placements are 11 bps (=23.8+12.8) higher for first-time domestic 
issuing firms. For the same credit rating, yield spreads are 12% (=4/3.6-1) and 35% (=4.8/3.6-1) 
higher on 144A Non-Life and 144A Life than public debt placements by domestic firms. Relative to 
public debt placements, the reduction in yield spreads from larger size issues is 2.2 times (=18.3/8.4-
1) more on 144A Non-Life but not meaningfully different on 144A Life debt placements by domestic 
firms. 
 For foreign firms, private placements with QIBs curb adverse selection and moral hazard 
concomitant with informational asymmetry. As Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Diamond (1991) argue, 
private lenders have a cost advantage in producing information because a public offering to dispersed 
investors leads to either duplication of effort or a free-riding. And as Gomes and Phillips (2012) show, 




 Additionally, yield spreads on private and public placements by foreign and domestic firms are 
affected by the use of proceeds. Unsophisticated retail investors tend to view proceeds used to finance 
acquisitions positively; and negatively when proceeds are used to refinance debt. Moreover, to 
unsophisticated retail investors, foreign firms will appear less familiar and more opaque than domestic 
firms. 
 Acquisitions are more challenging to evaluate. Yield spreads are lower in public than private 
debt placements to finance acquisitions; -80.3 bps for foreign firms, and -14.4 bps for domestic firms. 
Yield spreads are generally lower in refinancing and higher in recapitalization that involve increased 
leverage. Reduced yield spreads on private debt placements for refinancing are larger for domestic 
than foreign firms. But increased yield spreads on private debt placements for recapitalization are 
larger for foreign than domestic firms.  
<Insert Table 5 here.> 
 Market Timing 
 Switching regressions, which take the impact of prior year stock return on placement choice by 
domestic and foreign firms, are reported in Table 5. Regardless of placement choice, yield spreads are 
lower (higher) when the issuing foreign or domestic firm experiences a positive (negative) stock return 
in the year prior. In public debt placements, the decreases in yield spreads associated with a positive 
prior year stock return for foreign and domestic firms are 45.6 bps and 52.1 bps, respectively; the 
increases in yield spreads associated with a prior year negative stock return are 104.1 bps and 18.9 bps 
for foreign and domestic firms, respectively. In 144A Non-Life and 144A Life debt placements by 
foreign firms, the magnitude of the decrease in yield spreads associated with a positive prior year stock 
return are not meaningfully different; but the relative increases in yield spreads for privately placed 
bonds of issuers associated with a negative prior year stock return are lower by 33.6 bps (=104.1-70.5) 
and 80.5 bps (=104.1-23.6).  
 In contrast, the increase in yield spreads associated with a negative prior year stock return are 




However, yield spreads associated with a positive prior year stock return are notably lower by 34.3 bps 
(=52.1-17.8) in 144A Non-Life debt placements. By and large, foreign firms are more opaque than 
domestic firms. Compared to sophisticated QIB investors, unsophisticated retail investors tend to 
overreact (underreact) to “bad” news associated with negative revaluations of equity on foreign 
(domestic) firms; but underreact (overreact) to “good” news associated with positive revaluations of 
equity on foreign (domestic) firms. 
 
 V. Conclusion 
 Using a sample of 4,547 high yield debt issues over the period 2005 to 2015, I find the matches 
between lenders and borrowers are negative assortative on transparency and sophistication, whereby 
less transparent borrowers will match with more sophisticated informed lenders. I find that 
creditworthy borrowers are always hurt by the presence of non-creditworthy borrowers when lenders 
are uninformed. Importantly, by leveraging investor restrictions associated with Rule 144A private 






























    
             







Table 1 – Summary Statistics.  Sample consists of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield debt issued 
domestically over the period 2005 to 2015. Underwriter is Commercial Bank and Lead Underwriter is 
Current Lender are indicator variables. No. of HY Bonds Underwritten is the number of issues 
underwritten by the lead arranger in the calendar year of the issue. Underwriter Age is total number 
of years lead underwriter has been in business at issue date. HY Underwritten ($)/Total Underwritten 
($) is the percentage of total fee income contributed by underwriting high yield debt. SEC reporting 
and 1st Time are indicator variables. Parent Rating is S&P or Moody’s long-term issuer rating in 
numerical scale where AAA/Aaa = 1. Prior Year Stock Return is the change in stock price over the 
52-week period preceding the bond issuance. Firm Age is computed from the year issuing firm was 
founded as reported in the Capital IQ database. Total Assets is the book value of the issuer's assets at 
time of bond issuance. IG/HY Split-Rated indicates issue is split-rated. Issue Rating is S&P or Moody’s 
issue rating in numerical scale where AAA/Aaa = 1 and averaged when the issue is dual rated. Issue 
Size is the dollar amount of the debt offering. Issue Maturity reflects the maturity of the bond. Senior 
Secured is 1 when the issue is collateralized, and 0 otherwise. Yield Spread is offer yield minus yield 
on a Treasury bond of the same maturity.  
 










No. of Observations 4,547 882 178 2,231 433 693 130 
Market Conditions        
   Post Amendment 0.82 0.95 0.94 0.77 0.74 0.88 0.82 
   Prior Year Stock Return 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.36 0.13 0.44 0.22 
Underwriting Characteristics        
   UW is Commercial Bank 0.53 0.48 0.45 0.56 0.42 0.63 0.64 
   Lead UW is Current Lender 0.16 0.95 0.94 0.77 0.74 0.88 0.82 
   No. of HY Bonds UW’d 203.5 237.1 219.8 192.7 179.5 221.4 203.7 
   Underwriter Age (years) 145.9 149.7 137.5 146.4 138.9 154.2 164.1 
   HY UW ($)/Total  UW ($) 0.26 0.23 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.15 
Issuer Characteristics        
   SEC Reporting 0.82 1.00 0.31 1.00 0.47 1.00 0.99 
   1st Time 0.13 0.14 0.27 0.11 0.17 0.02 0.04 
   Parent Rating 12.5 14.1 13.6 12.2 11.8 11.9 10.8 
   Age (years) 37.8 40.7 31.8 38.4 29.9 48.4 26.9 
   Total Assets ($Million) 21,884 5,644 16,125 6,159 80,230 20,095 22,462 
Issue Characteristics        
   IG/HY Split Rated 0.040 0.007 0.005 0.031 0.022 0.119 0.153 
   Issue Rating 14.4 14.8 14.9 14.6 14.7 13.0 12.7 
   Issue Size ($Million) 489.9 500.4 460.7 475.4 468.3 560.3 559.2 
   Issue Maturity (years) 7.8 7.4 7.0 8.0 7.6 8.6 8.2 
   Senior Secured 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.01 




Table 2 - Double Selection Probit Regressions.  Sample consists of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high 
yield debt issued domestically over the period 2005 to 2015. Underwriter is Commercial Bank and 
Lead Underwriter is Current Lender are indicator variables. No. of HY Bonds Underwritten is the 
number of issues underwritten by the lead arranger in the calendar year of the issue. Underwriter Age 
is total number of years lead underwriter has been in business at issue date. HY Underwritten ($)/Total 
Underwritten ($) is the percentage of total fee income contributed by underwriting high yield debt. 
SEC reporting and 1st Time are indicator variables. Parent Rating is S&P or Moody’s long-term issuer 
rating in numerical scale where AAA/Aaa = 1. Prior Year Stock Return is the change in stock price 
over the 52-week period preceding the bond issuance. Firm Age is computed from the year issuing 
firm was founded as reported in the Capital IQ database. Total Assets is the book value of the issuer's 
assets at time of bond issuance. IG/HY Split-Rated indicates issue is split-rated. Issue Rating is S&P 
or Moody’s issue rating in numerical scale where AAA/Aaa = 1 and averaged when the issue is dual 
rated. Issue Size is the dollar amount of the debt offering. Issue Maturity reflects the maturity of the 
bond. Senior Secured is 1 when the issue is collateralized, and 0 otherwise. The limited dependent 
variables on jointly estimated bivariate participation equations are 144A Life and 144A Non-Life. 
Standard errors are clustered on Fama-French 17 industry classification in all models.  p-values are in 
parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.01. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Standardized 
Coefficients   144A 144A 144A 144A 144A 144A 
  Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life 
Market Timing       
 Post Amendment 2.177***  2.112***  2.112***  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Prior Year Stock Return -0.033 -0.003  9.656***  10.159*** 
  (0.315) (0.199)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Underwriting Characteristics       
 Underwriter is Commercial Bank -0.302*** 0.022 -0.309*** 0.081 -0.309*** 0.081 
  (0.002) (0.135) (0.001) (0.164) (0.001) (0.164) 
 Lead Underwriter is Current Lender 0.073 0.014 0.077 0.041 0.077 0.041 
  (0.269) (0.793) (0.238) (0.124) (0.238) (0.124) 
 No. of HY Bonds Underwritten -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.002*** 0.076 -0.048 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.175) (0.118) 
 Ln(Underwriter Age) -0.251*** -0.168*** -0.254*** 0.019 0.176*** 0.021*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.254) (0.002) (0.000) 
 No. HY Bonds Underwritten*Ln(UW Age) 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000** 0.201*** 0.029*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) 
 HY Underwritten ($)/Total Underwritten ($) -0.267 -0.661*** -0.293 0.004 -0.055 -0.004 
  (0.403) (0.000) (0.373) (0.878) (0.380) (0.389) 
Issuer Characteristics       
 Foreign 0.594*** 0.031 0.586*** 0.518*** 0.586*** 0.518*** 
  (0.000) (0.580) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 SEC Reporting -0.426*** 0.553*** -0.424*** -0.062*** -0.424*** -0.062*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) 
 1st Time 0.207*** -0.387*** 0.224*** 0.055*** 0.224*** 0.055*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Parent Rating 0.041* -0.037*** 0.052*** 0.010*** 0.052*** 0.010*** 
  (0.077) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
 Ln(Age) 0.024 -0.061***     
  (0.580) (0.000)     
 Ln(Total Assets) -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.001 -0.046*** -0.005*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.697) (0.000) (0.002) 
       




 Table 2 – Double Selection Probit Regressions (cont.). 
  Model 1 Model 2 Standardized 
  144A 144A 144A 144A 144A 144A 
  Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life 
Issue Characteristics       
 IG/HY Split Rated -0.756*** 0.132*** -0.831*** -0.023 -0.831*** -0.023 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.698) (0.000) (0.698) 
 Issue Rating 0.029 0.020**     
  (0.209) (0.035)     
 Issue Size Meets Index Liquidity Constraint 0.083 0.057*     
  (0.137) (0.075)     
 Ln(Term) -0.174 -0.020 -0.178  -0.052  
  (0.186) (0.745) (0.151)  (0.146)  
 Senior Secured 0.393*** -0.483*** 0.379*** 0.069*** 0.379*** 0.069*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Constant -1.399** -3.895*** -0.865* -3.984*** -1.982*** -4.738*** 
  (0.022) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Model Diagnostics       
 𝜌 -0.98***  -0.99***  -0.98***  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
 Standard Error of Residual 0.174 0.225 0.154 0.651 0.154 0.472 
 Wald Chi-square 4,943.7  15,395.9  12,270.8  
 Log Pseudolikelihood -1,680.4  -1,684.5  -1,684.5  
 McKelvey and Zavoina R2 (1975) 0.543  0.550  0.551  
 Tjur R2 (2009) 0.511  0.556  0.556  
 Percent Correctly Predicted (PCP) 82.4% 78.5% 82.4% 80.1% 82.3% 80.1% 
 expected Percent Correctly Predicted (ePCP) 75.3% 71.3% 75.3% 73.0% 75.4% 72.9% 





Table 3 – Offer Yield Spread Regressions.  Sample consists of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield 
debt issued domestically over the period 2005 to 2015. Dependent variable is at-issue yield spread to 
maturity (STM). Inverse Mills Ratios (IMR) in switching regressions account for endogeneity. 5-1 
Term Premium is the difference in term premium on the 5-year and 1-Year Treasury. SLOOS is the 
percent of domestic banks that report tightened standards on C&I loans to large and middle-market 
firms at issue date. VIX is the implied volatility on S&P 500 index options reported by the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE). CFSI Liquidity is the Cleveland Financial Stress Index Liquidity 
Factor, which computes changes in bid-ask prices on 3-month T-Bills at issue date. Relationship-
Arm’s Length Underwriter is a contrast variable equal to 1 when the lead underwriter is also a lender 
on an existing syndicated loan, and -1 otherwise. 1st Time-Seasoned is a contrast variable that equals 
1 when issuing firm is first-time, and -1 otherwise. SEC-Non-SEC Reporting is a contrast variable that 
equals 1 when the issuing firm is SEC-reporting, and -1 otherwise. Issuer Rating is S&P or Moody’s 
long-term issuer rating in numerical scale where AAA/Aaa = 1. Issue Size is the dollar amount of the 
debt offering. All variables are computed at issue date. Standard errors are clustered on placement 
type. p-values are reported in parentheses.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.01. 
Dependent Variable All Firms 






Market Conditions    
30 day % Change 5-1 Term Premium  0.002*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30 day % Change in SLOOS Outlook 17.359*** 11.564*** 14.267*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30 day % Change in VIX  -0.004*** 0.025*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30 day % Change in CFSI Liquidity  -0.011*** 0.162*** -0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Underwriter, Issuer, and Issue Characteristics   
Relationship – Arm’s Length Underwriter -7.174*** -5.104*** 7.222*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEC – Non-SEC Reporting Issuer -33.569*** -33.518*** -0.356*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1st Time – Seasoned Issuer 25.020*** 27.734*** 15.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issuer Credit Rating, percentile 4.666*** 3.799*** 3.722*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Standardized Issue Proceeds -21.954*** -22.490*** -8.201*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Use of Proceeds    
Acquisition - GCP 12.880*** 1.829*** -15.478*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Recapitalization - GCP 32.937*** 45.013*** 10.104*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Refinancing - GCP -32.714*** -29.946*** 4.357*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMR_144A Life 2.799***   
 (0.000)   
IMR_144A Non-Life  1.182***  
  (0.000)  
IMR_Public   1.858*** 
   (0.000) 
Constant 323.662*** 258.998*** 259.977*** 




Table 3 – Offer Yield Spread Regressions (cont.).    
Dependent Variable All Firms 






Observations 1,060 2,664 823 
Adjusted R2 0.482 0.421 0.528 
Average Variance Inflation Factor 1.14 1.09 1.35 
Standard Error of Residual 25.00 17.84 20.18 




Table 4 – Domestic vs. Foreign Firms. Sample consists of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield 
debt issued domestically over the period 2005 to 2015. Dependent variable is at-issue yield spread to 
maturity (STM). Inverse Mills Ratios (IMR) in switching regressions account for endogeneity. 5-1 
Term Premium is the difference in term premium on the 5-year and 1-Year Treasury. SLOOS is the 
percent of domestic banks that report tightened standards on C&I loans to large and middle-market 
firms at issue date. VIX is the implied volatility on S&P 500 index options reported by the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE). CFSI Liquidity is the Cleveland Financial Stress Index Liquidity 
Factor, which computes changes in bid-ask prices on 3-month T-Bills at issue date. Relationship-
Arm’s Length Underwriter is a contrast variable equal to 1 when the lead underwriter is also a lender 
on an existing syndicated loan, and -1 otherwise. 1st Time-Seasoned is a contrast variable that equals 
1 when issuing firm is first-time, and -1 otherwise. SEC-Non-SEC Reporting is a contrast variable that 
equals 1 when the issuing firm is SEC-reporting, and -1 otherwise. †All domestic issuers are SEC-
reporting firms. Issuer Rating is S&P or Moody’s long-term issuer rating in numerical scale where 
AAA/Aaa = 1. Issue Size is the dollar amount of the debt offering. All variables are computed at issue 
date. All variables are computed at issue date. Standard errors are clustered on placement type. p-
values are reported in parentheses.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.01. 
Dependent Variable Domestic Firms Foreign Firms 











Market Conditions       
30 day % Change 5-1 Term Premium  0.001*** 0.003*** -0.000*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30 day % Change in SLOOS Outlook 15.679*** 11.769*** 14.325*** 19.675*** 11.636*** 14.211*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30 day % Change in VIX  0.004*** 0.018*** 0.002*** -0.009*** 0.044*** -0.054*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30 day % Change in CFSI Liquidity  -0.142*** 0.162*** -0.049*** -0.008*** 0.037*** 0.451*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Underwriter, Issuer, and Issue Characteristics     
Relationship – Arm’s Length Lender 7.532*** -2.748*** 6.460*** -16.681*** -10.618*** 21.299*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEC – Non-SEC Reporting Issuer † † † -23.926*** -29.849*** 84.695*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1st Time – Seasoned Issuer 23.788*** 23.778*** 12.768*** 24.626*** 32.549*** 85.486*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issuer Credit Rating, percentile 4.846*** 4.020*** 3.578*** 4.647*** 3.284*** 5.819*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Standardized Issue Proceeds -8.430*** -18.296*** -8.388*** -26.770*** -37.079*** -5.972*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Use of Proceeds       
Acquisition - GCP 35.874*** 5.538*** -14.392*** 5.880*** -4.099*** -80.307*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Recapitalization - GCP 25.061*** 46.664*** 9.371*** 31.791*** 33.581*** 50.485*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Refinancing - GCP -62.809*** -32.787*** 6.096*** -10.758*** -20.603*** 5.702*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMR_144A Life 6.111***   1.357***   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
IMR_144A Non-Life  1.090***   1.765***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)  
IMR_Public   1.729***   -2.814*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
       




Table 4 – Domestic vs. Foreign Firms (cont.). 
Dependent Variable Domestic Firms Foreign Firms 











Constant 221.725*** 251.111*** 229.941*** 348.838*** 176.374*** 510.592*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 882 2,231 693 178 433 130 
Adjusted R2 0.523 0.428 0.525 0.456 0.382 0.522 
Average Variance Inflation Factor 1.16 1.10 1.37 1.14 1.13 2.01 
Standard Error of Residual 37.92 20.46 20.70 32.19 33.86 77.32 











Table 5 – Market Timing.  Sample consists of 4,547 cash-pay, fixed rate, high yield debt issued 
domestically over the period 2005 to 2015. Dependent variable is at-issue yield spread to maturity 
(STM). Inverse Mills Ratios (IMR) in switching regressions account for endogeneity. 5-1 Term 
Premium is the difference in term premium on the 5-year and 1-Year Treasury. SLOOS is the percent 
of domestic banks that report tightened standards on C&I loans to large and middle-market firms at 
issue date. VIX is the implied volatility on S&P 500 index options reported by the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE). CFSI Liquidity is the Cleveland Financial Stress Index Liquidity Factor, 
which computes changes in bid-ask prices on 3-month T-Bills at issue date. Prior Year Stock Return 
is the change in stock price over the 52-week period preceding the bond issuance. Positive (Negative) 
Prior Yr Stock Return-Not Traded are contrast variables that equal 1 if issuing firm is publicly traded 
and prior year stock return is positive (negative) and 0 otherwise; -1, if issuing firm is private. 
Relationship-Arm’s Length Underwriter is a contrast variable equal to 1 when the lead underwriter is 
also a lender on an existing syndicated loan, and -1 otherwise. 1st Time-Seasoned is a contrast variable 
that equals 1 when issuing firm is first-time, and -1 otherwise. SEC-Non-SEC Reporting is a contrast 
variable that equals 1 when the issuing firm is SEC-reporting, and -1 otherwise. †All domestic issuers 
are SEC-reporting firms. Issuer Rating is S&P or Moody’s long-term issuer rating in numerical scale 
where AAA/Aaa = 1. Issue Size is the dollar amount of the debt offering. All variables are computed 
at issue date. All variables are computed at issue date. Standard errors are clustered on placement type. 
p-values are reported in parentheses.  *p<0.10, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.01. 
Dependent Variable Domestic Firms Foreign Firms 











Market Conditions       
30 day % Change 5-1 Term Premium  0.002*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30 day % Change in SLOOS Outlook 14.902*** 11.249*** 13.075*** 18.937*** 11.655*** 14.373*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30 day % Change in VIX  -0.001*** 0.019*** 0.003*** -0.009*** 0.044*** -0.072*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
30 day % Change in CFSI Liquidity  -0.162*** 0.164*** -0.044*** -0.007*** 0.042*** 0.357*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Timing       
Positive Prior Yr Stock Return – Not Traded -59.309*** -17.834*** -52.115*** -37.358*** -48.528*** -45.579*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Negative Prior Yr Stock Return – Not Traded 24.568*** 25.061*** 18.954*** 23.654*** 70.506*** 104.141**
* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Underwriter, Issuer, and Issue Characteristics     
Relationship – Arm’s Length Lender 2.718*** -3.664*** 4.288*** -16.940*** -11.541*** 18.854*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SEC – Non-SEC Reporting Issuer † † † -11.950*** -27.729*** 113.318**
* 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1st Time – Seasoned Issuer 25.772*** 24.273*** 17.138*** 24.215*** 33.337*** 56.556*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Issuer Credit Rating, percentile 4.964*** 4.055*** 3.681*** 4.617*** 3.327*** 5.895*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Standardized Issue Proceeds -5.990*** -17.687*** -7.756*** -24.624*** -35.691*** -1.166*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Use of Proceeds       
Acquisition - GCP 30.274*** 6.361*** -6.666*** 6.298*** -4.098*** -71.122*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Recapitalization - GCP 26.048*** 48.387*** -3.541*** 29.919*** 38.679*** 100.012**
* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Refinancing - GCP -64.100*** -34.506*** 6.191*** -7.932*** -24.370*** 1.586*** 




       
       
Table 5 – Market Timing (cont.).       
Dependent Variable Domestic Firms Foreign Firms 











IMR_144A Life 5.779***   1.461***   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
IMR_144A Non-Life  0.992***   2.012***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)  
IMR_Public   0.890***   -3.939*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 291.176** 258.980** 273.345** 351.113** 203.538** 597.571** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 882 2,231 693 178 433 130 
Adjusted R2 0.541 0.431 0.552 0.458 0.389 0.567 
Average Variance Inflation Factor 1.19 1.11 1.72 1.49 1.36 2.27 
Adjusted Standard Error of Residual 38.66 21.30 20.85 33.32 35.15 77.38 












 Syndicated loans are commercial credits provided by a group of lenders that are structured, 
arranged, and administered by one or several commercial or investment banks, known as arrangers. 
When lenders are banks, syndicated loan facilities involve a revolving line of credit and amortizing 
term loan issued at LIBOR. Debt covenants imposed on borrowers protect lenders against credit 
default. Covenant breaches stipulate loan amendment fees, “make-whole” compensation, or transfer 
of control rights to lenders22 In syndicated loans, maintenance covenants are tested at regular intervals 
and require ongoing compliance. In contrast, incurrence covenants in bonds are tested only when 
borrowers undertake specific actions, e.g. incur additional debt or repay junior debt, pay dividends, 
make an acquisition, or divest.23 Maintenance covenants provide lenders an early warning signal that 
borrowers are not performing as expected and actions can be taken to improve performance and/or 
adjust loan terms. But for exchange listed borrowers, the reputational damage from a public disclosure 
of covenant violations can prompt financial distress that make corrective actions to address 
underperformance difficult. Moreover, when borrowers are riskier and more leveraged, maintenance 
covenants in syndicated loans rather than incurrence covenants in high yield bonds can be overly 
restrictive. Default is costly when uncertainty about and timing surrounding a liquidation or 
restructuring decision is high. An unexpected adverse change in macroeconomic conditions that 
results in a transitory decline in a borrower’s financial performance gives lenders significant discretion 
on whether to trigger default.  
 The search for yield by non-bank lenders, institutional and private equity investors as well as 
retail investors in specialized debt funds, fueled an evolution in leveraged loans. Leveraged loans are 
                                                 
 22Covenants specifying maximum leverage, minimum interest coverage ratio, and maximum fixed charge coverage ratio 
are common. 
 23For example, a financial covenant can require a minimum interest coverage ratio of 2.5 times prior 12-month EBITDA. 
When maintenance based, interest coverage is tested quarterly and compliance by the borrower is ongoing. When 





defined by S&P as loan facilities that are either speculative grade rated or unrated/investment grade 
rated with facility spreads of LIBOR plus 125 bps or higher and secured by a first or second lien.24 In 
term loans, the liens are on fixed assets, and on inventories and receivables in asset-backed loans.  
 The heightened interest of non-bank lenders in leveraged finance overwhelmed the demand 
for leveraged loans. Borrowers, particularly firms with financial sponsors, sought and received more 
borrower-friendly incurrence covenants akin to those in high yield speculative grade corporate bonds 
as non-bank institutional lenders assumed a more prominent corporate lending role.25 At the end of 
February 2018, U.S. leveraged loans outstanding amounted to $984 billion.26 75.8% are covenant-lite 
loan debt held by institutional investors. Only 17.8% are rated BB or higher, 40.7% are rated B, and 
the remaining 42.6% are either unrated or rated CCC or lower.   
 There is little agreement, however, whether reductions in lender protection, adverse incentives 
to leak assets through tunneling, as well as prolonged life and optionality for shareholders in covenant-
lite leveraged loans comes at the expense of lower recovery rates for lenders and increased systemic 
risk when macroeconomic conditions weaken. For bank lenders, covenant-lite loans allow borrowers 
in syndicated leveraged loans with financial sponsors to negotiate principal-reducing bond exchange 
offers that improve recovery rates. Non-bank lenders, who are not reliant on deposits and short-term 
debt, and funded by a sophisticated and stable base of institutional and private equity investors, may 
contribute to financial stability. In the 2008 financial crisis, the absence of fully-covenanted protection 
on existing debt allowed many companies, particularly those in energy and basic industry sectors, to 
avoid default by pledging assets to secure liquidity that kept them from default. Additionally, the 
reputation and financing capacity of non-bank lenders as well as cuts in the Fed Funds rate and 
injection of liquidity into the banking system enabled rated firms with access to capital to borrow.  
 I find that covenant-lite loans are not associated with greater risks of default and bankruptcy.  
                                                 
 24See http://www.leveragedloan.com/primer/#!whatisaleveragedloan.  
 25Using a sample of leveraged loans spanning the 1997-2007 period, Lim et. Al (2014) also document the increasing role 
of non-bank lenders. 




In Billett et. al (2016), covenant choice is a tradeoff that lenders face between the value of monitoring 
that mitigates agency conflicts with borrowers, and the potential loss in future revenue from enforcing 
covenants and triggering default. Taking the self-selection of borrowers and lenders into covenant-lite 
and fully covenanted loans, I show the episodic nature of default and bankruptcy makes the valuation 
of low probability but high loss events by lenders difficult to forecast with accuracy. The resulting 
higher yields on covenant-lite leverage loans are catastrophic insurance premiums that borrowers pay 
lenders for unexpected losses from default and bankruptcy. Unexpected losses embed the likelihoods 
of default and bankruptcy and recovery rates when default and bankruptcy occur.     
 In covenant-lite loans, financial covenants are tested only when specific events occur, but are 
tested quarterly in non-covenant lite loans. Maintenance based covenant testing is valuable when there 
are strong incentives to monitor. Namely, when in the event of default, state verification – whether 
the borrowing firm should be liquidated or restructured, is costly and strategic intervention to resolve 
default outside bankruptcy through loan workouts avoids potential holdup costs from the option to 
delay by other creditors and shareholders. 
 Because institutions represent a heterogeneous group of lenders, the problems of free-riding 
and lender coordination in the event of default dilute the value of monitoring. Institutions are unlikely 
to offer covenant-lite loans to borrowers who have relatively high likelihoods of default. Moreover, 
the ability of banks to lend against excess risk-capital based reserves on deposits that are insured at 
subsidized premiums confers a cost of capital advantage to banks over institutions. Consistent with 
the inverse relationship between creditor rights and spreads documented by Bae and Goyal (2009), I 
find that all else equal, covenant-lite loans by institutional lenders will have higher yield spreads.  
 Borrowers who receive covenant-lite loans will be more creditworthy, and yield spreads on 
covenant-lite loans to creditworthy borrowers will be lower for banks than institutions. Less 




 II. Sample Construction 
    A.  Data Sources 
 I obtain the sample of leverage loan facilities from the S&P Leveraged Commentary and Data 
(LCD) database over the period 1999 to Q3:2016. Leveraged loans are defined by S&P as loans either 
to speculative grade rated borrowers or unrated/investment grade rated borrowers at LIBOR rate plus 
125 bps and secured either by a first or second lien. Leveraged loan facilities are single or multiple 
tranche. In a single tranche loan facility, the loan is either an amortizing loan with a shorter than six-
year term and the lender is a bank, or a bullet term loan and the lenders are institutional investors in 
debt funds that specialize in collateralized loan obligations (CLO). A multiple tranche loan facility 
typically involves an unfunded revolver with amortizing term loan as well as bullet term loan. 
Amortizing term loans where the lenders are banks are fully covenanted (maintenance based), and 
covenant-lite (incurrence based) on bullet term loans where the lenders are institutional investors. In 
term loans, the liens are on fixed assets, and on inventories and receivables in asset-backed loans.   
 Because the focus is on credit risk associated with covenant-lite and fully covenanted loans, I 
require loan origination dates to manually reconcile borrowers with default and bankruptcy events. 
Borrowers in the sample of leverage loan facilities are private as well as publicly listed firms. 
Additionally, I compile the use of proceeds on all leverage loan facilities. The screening process 
produces a final sample of 14,795 leverage loan facilities involving 5,187 unique borrowers. 2,366 of 
the leverage loan facilities were covenant-lite. A total of 380 borrowers defaulted and filed for 
bankruptcy, of which 253 were covenant-lite leverage loan facilities.   
 Data on leverage loan facility characteristics – identity of the borrower, whether the facility is 
covenant-lite, tranche details (e.g. pricing, term, size, rating, and lender type), use of proceeds, and 
underwriter details, are provided in the S&P LCD database. Additional data on private borrowers is 
supplemented by S&P Capital IQ.  Leverage loan facilities that are traded are flagged and related 
details on dates of first trade and prices are assembled. To classify lead arrangers as commercial or 




codes from S&P Capital IQ.  A lead arranger is a relationship bank when the bank served as a lead 
arranger on a borrower’s prior loans. Loan pricing is the weighted average all-in-drawn spread over 
LIBOR.   
  B. Sample Description 
 Table 1 reports the total number and aggregate supply (billions of dollars) of leverage loans by 
year over the 18-year sample period 1999 to Q3:2016. The rising dominance of non-bank lenders is 
very apparent. The participation of bank lenders in leverage loans declined in the years preceding the 
financial crisis of 2008 – from 43.5% in 1999 to 12% in 2007. The annualized 6% growth in the 
number and 15% increase in aggregate supply of leverage loans prior to 2008 was clearly the result of 
a 15-fold increase in the number of non-bank lenders from 34 in 1999 to 521 in 2007. By 2007, the 
participation of non-bank lenders in leverage loans of 31.7% was almost three times the 12% 
participation of bank lenders. In 2008, the participation of non-bank lenders in leverage loans fell to 
22.7% and rose to 31.4% for bank lenders. Following 2008, the percentage of leverage loans by non-
bank lenders grew but shrunk for bank and mixed lenders. By the end of the sample period in Q3:2016, 
non-bank lenders provided 62.7% of leverage loans. Bank and mixed lenders provided 29.6% and 
7.7% respectively.  
< Insert Table 1 here.> 
 Prior to 2005, less than 1% of leverage loans were covenant-lite and the amounts never 
exceeded $0.5 billion. The supply increased markedly in the years following. In 2007, 19.8% of leverage 
loans were covenant-lite, presaging the financial crisis of 2008. Following a decline to 3.2% in 2008, 
the percentage of leverage loans rose contemporaneously with the rise in participation of non-bank 
lenders in leverage loans. In 2012, 22.9% of leverage loans were covenant-lite eclipsing the previous 
high established in 2007. By the end of the sample period in Q3:2016, of the $334.5 billion in leverage 





 C. Covenant-Lite vs. Fully Covenanted Leverage Loans 
 Table 2 reports on the attributes of borrowers and lenders in covenant-lite and fully covenanted 
leverage loans. Lender specialization, where non-bank lenders serve speculative-grade rated while bank 
lenders serve unrated or investment-grade rated borrowers, is clear.  Non-bank (institutional) lenders 
are predominant in covenant-lite leverage loans. 92.7% of covenant-lite leverage loans are extended 
by non-bank lenders. Bank lenders are principally active in fully covenanted leverage loans – 35.2% 
compared to 1.1% in covenant-lite leverage loans. In fully covenanted leverage loans with bank 
lenders, a bank is most likely to be a lead underwriter but less likely when the bank is also a borrower’s 
current lender. 
< Insert Table 2 here.> 
 Non-bank lenders in covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage loans are essentially single 
tranche. Bank lenders are involved in multi-tranche leverage loans only in fully covenanted loans. 
38.4% of multi-tranche leverage loans in covenant-lite and 93.4 % in fully covenanted leverage loans 
involve mixed lenders.  
 Average loan amounts are larger in covenant-lite than fully covenanted leverage loans – $607.4 
billion by non-bank lenders compared to $366.8 billion by bank lenders. Average loan amounts are 
largest in leverage loans by mixed lenders. Terms are 2, 4, and 7 quarters longer in covenant-lite than 
fully covenanted leverage loans by bank, non-bank, and mixed lenders respectively.  Loan facilities are 
always more likely to be rated in leverage loans by non-bank and mixed lenders than by bank lenders. 
95.9% and 93.2% vs 38.5% in covenant-lite leverage loans and 70.7% and 61.5% vs. 31% in fully 
covenanted leverage loans. This ratings trend is consistent with Faulkender and Petersen (2006) in 
that rated borrowers have better access to debt capital.  When leverage loan facilities are rated, 
covenant-lite leverage loans by non-bank and mixed lenders are speculative grade rated but investment 
grade rated by bank lenders. In fully covenanted leverage loans, loan facilities by non-bank, bank, and 




market is not necessarily tied to ratings themselves, but rather associated with having a rating in 
general.  Asset-back leverage loans, which are collateralized by inventories and receivables, are 
prevalent only for bank lenders particularly in covenant-lite leverage loans. Borrower liquidity is more 
important for bank lenders. Deal proceeds are primarily used for refinancing and secondarily to 
finance acquisitions and leverage buyouts.  
 Fully covenanted leverage loans by bank lenders are essentially never traded. In contrast, 88.2% 
of covenant-lite and 49.9% of fully covenanted leverage loans by non-bank lenders are traded. 
Similarly, on leverage loans by mixed lenders. It appears trading may provide incentives for a diverse 
group of non-bank lenders to produce private information that avoids the free rider problem 
associated with monitoring. 
 Borrowers in covenant-lite leverage loans are more likely to have financial sponsors – 76.5% 
vs. 52.6% and be international firms – 11.8% vs. 5.5%, but less likely to be listed – 23.2% vs. 26.0% 
or first-time borrowers – 36.1% vs. 49.4%. 
 Leverage of borrowers are slightly higher in covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage loans. 
Borrowers are most likely to be rated in covenant-lite than fully covenanted leverage loans particularly 
when lenders are non-banks. When borrowers are rated, the average rating of borrowers in covenant-
lite leverage loans is speculative grade but investment grade in fully covenanted leverage loans. 
 A higher average all-in facility spread of 446.1 bps on covenant-lite leverage loans compared 
to 322.4 bps on fully covenanted leverage loans reflects the specialization of non-bank lenders in 
covenant-lite leverage loans and bank lenders in fully covenanted leverage loans. Facility spreads on 
leverage loans are market risk premiums associated with expected losses to lenders that embed not 
only the likelihoods of default and bankruptcy but also recovery rates when default and bankruptcy 
occur. The average rates of default and bankruptcy on covenant-lite are lower than on fully covenanted 
loans – 1.9% and 2.7% respectively. I will show, however, that implied average recovery rates are 




affect facility spreads. 
 The average rates of default and bankruptcy in covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage 
loans point to the relative value of screening rated borrowers by non-bank lenders and monitoring 
unrated borrowers by bank lenders. In covenant-lite leverage loans, 95.5% of borrowers with non-
bank lenders are rated, but only 76.9% of borrowers with bank lenders are rated. The likelihoods of 
default and bankruptcy are significantly lower (higher) for rated than unrated borrowers in covenant-
lite leverage loans with non-bank (bank) lenders. In fully covenanted leverage loans with bank lenders, 
lower default and bankruptcy rates suggest monitoring associated with maintenance-based covenant 
testing is more important. Unrated borrowers have lower (higher) rates of default and bankruptcy than 
rated borrowers in fully covenanted leverage loans with bank (non-bank) lenders. Moreover, when 
lenders are heterogeneous, lender coordination is more severe. Rates of default and bankruptcy in 
fully covenanted leverage loans by mixed lenders are significantly higher. 
III.   Borrower and Lender Matches 
 Covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage loans reflect the endogenous match of borrowers 
and lenders. In a probit model, I use the insights from the prior section to ascertain how borrowers 
and lenders self-select into covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage loans taking lead arranger and 
facility characteristics into account. The limited dependent variable equals 1 when the leverage loan is 
covenant-lite, and 0, when fully covenanted. Maximum likelihood is used to estimate the probit 
regression. The results are presented in Table 3. 
< Insert Table 3 here.> 
 The unconditional predicted probability that a leverage loan is covenant-lite is 15.8%. A 
leverage loan with a non-bank lender is 4.4% more likely to be covenant-lite and 10.1% more likely to 
fully covenanted when the lender is a bank. When borrowers are rated or have financial sponsors, the 
likelihood of a covenant-lite leverage loan increases by 3.1% and 5.2% respectively. An increase in 
quarterly CLO volume of one standard deviation, roughly $13.7 million, raises the probability of a 
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covenant-lite leverage loan by 1.4%. These findings are consistent with the dominant role of non-
banks in leverage loans and the desire of financial sponsors for flexibility.  
Borrower-lender matches have the largest impact on the likelihood that a leverage loan is 
covenant-lite. When a rated borrower is matched with a non-bank lender, the likelihood of a covenant-
lite leverage loan increases by 7.5%; but decreases by 7.0% when matched with a bank lender. Pairing 
rated borrowers with mixed non-bank and bank lenders also reduces the likelihood of a covenant-lite 
leverage loan by 2.6%. These results are aligned with my expectation that the value of monitoring in 
fully covenanted leverage loans is highest for banks (Fama, 1985; James, 1987; Gande and Saunders, 
2012) than non-banks (institutions) who view leverage loans simply as an alternative asset class 
(Ivashina and Sun, 2011). Similarly, a borrower with a financial sponsor paired with a non-bank lender 
increases the likelihood the leverage loan is covenant-lite by 9.6% but decreases the likelihood by 4.9% 
when paired with a bank lender. 
Because multi-tranche leverage loan facilities involve bank lenders, a multi-tranche leverage 
loan is 12.2% less likely to be covenant-lite. Facility characteristics play an important role. The 
likelihood of a covenant-lite leverage loan increases with facility size and term, and when the leverage 
loan facility is rated either by Moody’s or S&P, asset backed, traded, and priced at LIBOR plus spread. 
A.  Estimating Default and Bankruptcy
Understanding that borrower-lender matches in covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage
loans are endogenous, I examine how covenant structure affects the likelihoods of default and 
bankruptcy given default using a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972). The hazard rates, 
namely the probabilities of default or bankruptcy conditional that default has not yet occurred, are 
estimated parametrically. The survival times, measured in quarters, is the minimum of the time 
between loan origination and either the incidence of default or bankruptcy prior to the maturity of the 
loan or loan maturity. Survival times are right censored when loans have neither matured nor 




is recorded in LCD, I use the Efron (1977) method to calculate the Cox partial likelihood when there 
are tied events.   
 Hazard models are estimated over the pooled sample using two approaches. The first approach 
uses a covenant-lite dummy variable corrected for endogeneity using a Heckman Inverse Mills Ratio 
(IMR).  The second is an instrumental variable approach that uses the estimated probability the 
leverage loan is covenant-lite. The estimated hazard models for default and bankruptcy are presented 
in Table 4. 
< Insert Table 4 here.> 
 The hazard ratios show the likelihood of default is 52.8% to 61.2% lower for covenant-lite than 
fully covenanted leverage loans. Similarly, the likelihood of bankruptcy given default is 34.3% to 27.9% 
lower for covenant-lite than fully covenanted leverage loans. Further, note that the probabilities of 
default and bankruptcy given default increase with time. Fewer than 2.35% of covenant-lite leverage 
loan borrowers default and default will occur by the end of 30 quarters. Given default, less than 1.02% 
of covenant-lite leverage loan borrowers file for bankruptcy and bankruptcy will occur by the end of 
40 quarters following default. For fully covenanted leverage loan borrowers, fewer than 5.66% default 
and default will occur by the end of 40 quarters. Given default, less than 2.29% of fully covenanted 
leverage loan borrowers file for bankruptcy. Not only are the likelihoods of default and bankruptcy 
clearly lower for covenant-lite leverage loan borrowers, the times to default and bankruptcy are 
shorter. Uncertainty about credit default risk is resolved sooner for covenant-lite leverage loan 
borrowers.    
  B.  Recovery Rates in Facility Spreads 
 Table 5 shows how lender specialization in covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage loans 
affects default and bankruptcy rates. Differences in facility spreads imply differences in rates of default 
and recovery. The estimated probabilities of default and bankruptcy given default are lower in 
covenant-lite leverage loans for non-bank lenders, but lower in fully covenanted leverage loans for 
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bank lenders. For mixed lenders, the estimated probabilities of default and bankruptcy given default 
are similar for mixed lenders in covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage loans. Further, the 
estimated probabilities of default for non-bank lenders in covenant-lite and bank lenders in fully 
covenanted leverage loans are not meaningfully different.  
 < Insert Table 5 here.> 
To determine the recovery rates implied in facility spreads, I take default in any quarter to be 
an independent binomial process. The probability of default, 𝑝, is estimated from Cox proportional 
hazard models. Loss rate, 𝑥, and recovery rate, 𝑟, are defined as percentages of the loan at origination. 
Taking the recovery rate as the minimum bound on loan value post origination, the loss rate is 
(1 − 𝑟) ≥ 𝑥 ≥ 0 when default occurs. I assume 𝑥∗ = 𝑙𝑛(𝑥) is a normal distributed random variable 
with mean 𝛼 = 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝑟 2⁄ ) where 𝑟 2⁄  is the average recovery rate, and a variance 𝜎2𝑇 = 𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝑇 
in loan recovery rates directly proportional to the uncertainty of default 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) where 𝑇 is the 
maturity of the loan in quarters.27 Recovery rates are correlated with the likelihoods of default (Altman, 
Resti, and Sironi 2003); i.e. are higher for firms with medium and high EBITDA and lower risks of 
default than firms with low EBITDA and higher risks of default. The facility spread compensates 
lenders for the expected loss, 𝐸(𝑥∗|𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝑟) ≥ 𝑥∗ ≥ −∞), when default occurs.  
𝐸(𝑥∗|𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝑟) ≥ 𝑥∗ ≥ −∞)=(𝜎√𝑇 ∙ √2𝜋)
−1







= 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼 + 1
2
𝜎2𝑇)𝑁(𝑑) (1) 
where 𝑑 = (𝜎√𝑇)
−1
[𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝑟) − (𝛼 + 𝜎2𝑇)] . To compute implied recovery rates, I assume 𝑇 = 40
quarters.  
Higher average all-in facility spread of 434.7 bps on covenant-lite leverage loans compared to 
322.4 bps on fully covenanted leverage loans reflects lower rates of default on covenant-lite than fully 
covenanted leverage loans of 2.2% and 4.7% respectively, but higher recovery rates on fully 




covenanted than covenant-lite leverage loans of 81.3% and 71.6% respectively.  
 Facility spread is lowest for non-bank lenders in covenant-lite leverage loans, and for bank 
lenders in fully covenanted leverage loans. For non-bank lenders, a lower facility spread of 446.1 bps 
on covenant-lite and 489.1 bps on fully covenanted suggests that screening for the propensity to 
default is more important. Default probability is markedly lower on covenant-lite than fully 
covenanted leverage loans of 2% and 8.3% respectively. Recovery rates of 67.5% and 66.8% are not 
significantly different.  
 In contrast, monitoring for default is more important than recovery for bank lenders. Facility 
spread on fully covenanted loans of 192.4 bps for bank lenders compared to 489.1 bps for non-bank 
lenders results primarily from a default probability of 1.9% for bank lenders that is more than 4 times 
lower than 8.3% for non-bank lenders. Recovery rate is higher for bank than non-bank lenders in fully 
covenanted leverage loans of 77.5% and 67.5% respectively. 
 In fully covenanted leverage loans, facility spread of 325.990 bps for mixed lenders is lower 
than 489.142 bps for non-bank lenders. Estimated likelihoods of default of 6.3% and 8.3% are lower 
for mixed lenders than non-bank lenders. Recovery rates of 75.5% and 66.8% are also higher for 
mixed lenders than non-bank lenders. 
 IV.   Impact of Borrower-Lender Matches in Facility Spreads 
  In Panel A of Table 6, the default and bankruptcy hazard ratios show how borrower-lender 
matches affect the relative rates of default and bankruptcy in covenant-lite and fully covenanted 
leverage loans. How facility spreads reflect the expected rates of default and recovery are shown in 
Panel B of Table 6. In the analysis, I focus on the impact of borrower rating, financial sponsors, and 
trading. 
 In Panel A, differences in the default and bankruptcy hazard ratios are most important for non-
bank lenders where the predicted probability that the leverage loan is covenant-lite is also the highest. 
In this subsample of leverage loans, the predicted probability of a covenant-lite leverage loan is highest 
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(0.632) when the leverage loan is traded, and the borrower is rated and affiliated with a financial 
sponsor. In this subsample, the default and bankruptcy hazard ratios are 31% and 7% lower for 
covenant-lite than fully covenanted leverage loans.  
For non-bank lenders, the predicted probability that the leverage loan is covenant-lite is most 
sensitive to trading, followed by whether the borrower is rated and has a financial sponsor. Eighty-
eight percent of covenant-lite leverage loans by non-bank lenders are traded, but only half of fully 
covenanted loans by non-bank lenders are traded. This suggests that non-bank lenders value trading 
over monitoring in covenant-lite leverage loans. Trading imposes a market discipline on private and 
publicly-listed borrowers that reduces the need for traditional bank monitoring. Leveraged loans by 
bank lenders are predominantly fully covenanted and rarely traded. Only 4 of the 4,372 fully 
covenanted loans by bank lenders are traded. If covenants create monitoring incentives (Rajan and 
Winton, 1995; Park, 2000) and banks are particularly adept at monitoring (Diamond, 1984; 1991), then 
trading of loans by bank lenders should be less prevalent.28      
I estimate default and implied recovery rates for the different borrower-lender matches. From 
Panel B, the estimated default rates of covenant-lite loans by non-bank lenders and fully covenanted 
loans by bank lenders are, on average, similar. But leverage loans by non-bank lenders have a lower 
bankruptcy hazard ratio than leverage loans by bank lenders. Given default, the likelihood of 
bankruptcy is lower for covenant-lite leverage loans by non-bank lenders than fully covenanted 
leverage loans by bank lenders. But recovery rates implicit in facility spreads are lower for covenant-
lite leverage loans by non-bank lenders than for fully covenanted loans by bank lenders. This suggests 
that covenant-lite loans exhibit a ‘peso’ problem – lenders expect leverage loans with looser covenant 
packages to have lower rates of default and bankruptcy than leverage loans with tighter bank 
monitoring. But losses from lower recovery rates given default and bankruptcy will be higher for 
28 Cantillo and Wright (2000) document that publicly traded obligations should be most closely associated with firms that 




covenant-lite than fully covenanted leverage loans and lenders care more about losses. Despite no 
significant difference in the average rates of default and bankruptcy on covenant-lite leverage loans, a 
250 bps higher yield spread on covenant-lite leverage loans suggests lenders give substantial weight to 
a 6% (0.701 vs. 0.759) lower recovery rate on covenant-lite leverage loans.   
 To examine how lenders view differences in default and recovery rates, Panel B details the 
recovery rates implied by facility spreads and estimated default rates for the different borrower-lender 
matches. Differences in expected loss given default between covenant-lite leverage loans by non-bank 
lenders and fully covenanted leverage loans by banks are largest in subsample 8 relative to subsample 
10, where both subsamples have rated borrowers and relatively similar loan sizes ($585 million and 
$630 million, respectively). The estimated default rate of subsample 8 is 1.4% with a recovery rate of 
60%. In contrast, the estimated default rate of 7% for subsample 10 is five times higher but with a higher 
recovery rate of 94.2%. Subsample 8, however, represents 60% of all covenant-lite loans and 
subsample 10 represents less than 10% of fully covenanted loans. Loan pricing suggests the default of 
traded covenant-lite leverage loans by non-bank lenders to speculative grade rated borrowers with 
financial sponsors will be more severe than a default by non-traded fully covenanted leverage loans 
by bank lenders to investment grade rated borrowers with no financial sponsors. 
 A.  Impact of Rated Borrowers 
 For non-bank lenders, rated borrowers are speculative grade but investment grade for bank 
and mixed lenders. Screening rated borrowers is more important for non-bank and mixed lenders 
when borrowers have financial sponsors and leverage loans are traded. Monitoring rated borrowers is 
more important for bank lenders in which leverage loans largely do not involve borrowers with 
financial sponsors and are not traded.  
 Results in fully covenanted leverage loans subsamples 7 and 8 show that monitoring speculative 
grade rated borrowers decreases the likelihood of default from 3% to 1.8% but worsens recovery rate 
from 76.5% to 65.3% for non-bank lenders. But conversely when borrowers are investment grade 
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rated in fully covenanted leverage loans subsamples 9 and 10 with bank lenders; a marked rise from 
0.3% to 7% in the probability of default. Similarly, for mixed lenders in fully covenanted leverage 
loans subsamples 23 and 24, the probability of default increased from 5.2% to 38.2% but recovery 
rate improved from 87.9% to 93.9%. The changes in facility spreads are insignificantly higher by 4.9 
bps and 13.8 bps for non-bank and mixed lenders respectively, but significantly lower by 31.7 bps for 
bank lenders. For non-bank and mixed lenders, monitoring of rated borrowers in fully covenanted 
leverage loans produces worse outcomes. A notable decline in facility spread of 33.6 bps from fully 
covenanted to covenant-lite leverage loans with non-bank lenders in subsamples 6 and 7 substantiates 
this finding.  
B. Impact of Financial Sponsors
Borrowers with financial sponsors are more likely in leverage loans by non-bank lenders.29
Their involvement has an adverse effect on expected outcomes in leverage loans by bank lenders. 
Yield spreads of fully covenanted loans are higher.  
Non-bank (bank) lenders participate in 42.9% (18.7%) of all leverage loans to borrowers with 
financial sponsors. Overall, facility spreads when borrowers have financial sponsors are higher by 69.5 
bps in fully covenanted leverage loans, but only 8.5 bps higher in covenant-lite leverage loans. Non-
bank lenders extend 92.3% of all covenant-lite loans to borrowers with financial sponsors; less than 
1% are extended by bank lenders. But 29.2% (23.7%) of fully covenanted loans to borrowers with 
financial sponsors are from non-bank (bank) lenders. In the subsample of leverage loans by non-bank 
lenders, borrowers with financial sponsors are evenly divided across covenant-lite and fully 
covenanted leverage loans.   
Default and recovery rates in leverage loans by non-bank lenders are relatively similar across 
covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage loans; the lowest default and worst recovery rates occur 
in subsample 8.  For bank and mixed lenders, however, borrowers with financial sponsors are more 
29 Demiroglu and James (2010), using a sample of leveraged buyouts over the January 1997 to August 2007 period, also 




prevalent in fully covenanted loans. The recovery rate implied by yield spreads in fully covenanted 
loans by bank lenders is remarkably low when borrowers have financial sponsors; 40.1% in subsample 
11. In contrast, the impact of borrowers with financial sponsor on recovery rates in fully covenanted 
leverage loans by mixed lenders is moderate. For non-bank lenders, expected outcomes are poorer in 
leverage loans that are traded when borrowers have financial sponsors. In traded leverage loans with 
non-bank lenders, speculative rated borrowers with financial sponsors reduce the probability of 
default but also lower the rate of recovery regardless of covenant structure. In the covenant-lite 
subsamples 6 and 8, default rates drop from 2.5% to 1.4% while recovery rates drop from 76.9% to 
60%. In the fully covenanted subsamples 6 and 8, the corresponding declines are from 6.2% to 1.8% 
for probability of default, and from 88.2% to 65.3% in recovery rates.  
 C.  Impact of Trading 
  Secondary market trading of leverage loans moderates the impact of default and recovery rates.  
When borrowers have financial sponsors, trading diminishes expected outcomes in leverage loans with 
non-bank and mixed lenders. For example, comparing subsamples 5 and 8, where speculative grade 
borrowers with financial sponsors are paired with non-bank lenders, trading decreases the rate of 
default but also the rate of recovery. In fully covenanted leverage loans, the probability of default 
declines from 4.5% to 1.8% while the recovery rate declines from 83.7% to 65.3%.  The trading effect 
on the outcomes of covenant-lite leverage loans are similar, with default rates declining from 6.3% to 
2.5% and recovery rates falling from 87.1% to 73.7%.  Facility spreads are not meaningfully higher by 
9.8 bps in covenant-lite leverage loans but markedly higher by 67.5 bps in fully covenanted leverage 
loans. 
 In the fully covenanted leverage loans subsamples 3 and 7 where unrated borrowers with 
financial sponsors are paired with non-bank lenders, trading decreases the probability of default from 
19.3% to 3% and recovery rate from 89% to 76.5%. Facility spreads are significantly higher by 36.5 
bps in fully covenanted leverage loans and practically identical in covenant-lite leverage loans. In 
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subsamples 21 and 24, where investment grade borrowers with financial sponsors are paired with 
mixed lenders, trading increases the rate of default, but the rate of recovery improves. In fully 
covenanted leverage loans, expected default rates increase from 7.2% to 38.2% but yield spreads rise 
in response to a modest increase in implied recovery rate from 90.7% to 93.9%. In subsamples 19 and 
23, where unrated borrowers with financial sponsors are paired with mixed lenders, trading also 
increases the rate of default and rate of recovery. In fully covenanted leverage loans, a rise in default 
from 1.9% to 5.2% and from 71.7% to 87.9% in the rate of recovery. Facility spreads are insignificantly 
lower by 6.4 bps. 
V. Conclusion
In this paper I examine borrower-lender matches into covenant-lite and fully covenanted
leverage loans and show how the resulting rates of default and bankruptcy as well as losses from 
recovery are priced. The results corroborate prior findings of lender specialization in leveraged capital 
markets (Denis and Mihov, 2003; Huang and Ramirez, 2010) and present new evidence of the 
segmentation of borrowers by non-bank and bank lenders. Non-bank lenders match with speculative 
grade rated borrowers with financial sponsors. Bank lenders focus on fully covenanted loans to 
unrated and investment grade rated borrowers. For non-bank lenders, the secondary trading of loans 
imposes a market discipline on borrowers that mitigates agency conflicts. For bank lenders, 
monitoring is more important. Almost all loans by non-bank lenders are traded; loans by bank lenders 
are rarely traded.  
Since the inception of covenant-lite leverage loans, financial markets forecast larger losses given 
default for covenant-lite leverage loans despite lower expected default. I show that leverage loan prices 
assign more weight to potentially high losses from low probability events. Higher risk premiums on 
covenant-lite leverage loans represent catastrophic insurance premiums that borrowers pay to lenders 
to compensate them for low probability but high loss events. From the borrower’s perspective, the 




triggering default. In this regard, the paper adds to a sparse empirical literature that document ‘peso’ 
phenomena (Evans, 1996). 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics on Leverage Loans.  The table reports the number and average size of leverage loans by year over the 
period 1999 - Q3:2016. Average size is measured in billions of dollars. 
All Loan Facilities Covenant-Lite 
Non-Bank 




































1999 791 272.2 256.7 5 0.4 0.1% 350.2 34 1.7% 413.9 386 43.5% 206.8 371 54.7% 294.3 
2000 720 231.0 257.1 2 0.3 0.1% 281.3 26 2.5% 389.9 375 45.7% 206.6 319 51.8% 305.6 
2001 463 173.7 264.2 2 0.4 0.2% 75.0 17 1.6% 385.7 262 46.6% 224.3 184 51.8% 309.9 
2002 466 163.5 276.2 1 0.1 0.1% 901.0 47 9.4% 355.2 216 33.8% 216.1 203 56.8% 321.9 
2003 585 215.9 324.8 3 0.5 0.2% 433.3 149 21.5% 397.8 143 19.6% 259.8 293 58.9% 319.4 
2004 913 351.8 326.8 2 0.2 0.0% 287.5 327 22.7% 430.0 133 17.8% 224.2 453 59.5% 282.4 
2005 1,017 385.6 313.4 7 3.9 1.0% 403.6 338 18.4% 466.6 192 17.9% 186.2 487 63.7% 257.2 
2006 1,158 555.9 311.9 54 32.5 5.8% 289.7 395 20.8% 456.8 184 12.6% 170.0 579 66.6% 258.2 
2007 1,221 717.4 301.8 209 142.3 19.8% 301.5 521 31.7% 389.5 224 12.0% 183.7 476 56.3% 261.3 
2008 413 257.0 315.2 3 8.3 3.2% 206.3 86 22.7% 494.9 209 31.4% 214.6 118 45.9% 362.4 
2009 281 102.8 445.2 10 6.6 6.4% 482.0 81 27.1% 620.1 125 37.0% 335.2 75 36.0% 439.7 
2010 557 243.8 441.1 15 8.1 3.3% 508.2 153 23.8% 581.8 144 20.2% 278.6 260 55.9% 448.3 
2011 769 399.4 412.3 87 62.4 15.6% 444.4 297 36.1% 524.2 212 27.4% 233.5 260 36.5% 430.3 
2012 1,064 506.3 409.4 218 115.7 22.9% 514.8 512 43.0% 536.8 311 28.2% 159.3 241 28.8% 461.7 
2013 1,516 829.4 369.5 550 375.1 45.2% 422.8 892 63.8% 457.6 358 15.4% 145.3 266 20.8% 375.7 
2014 1,356 585.6 359.7 575 313.8 53.6% 467.5 781 64.9% 493.0 423 20.7% 102.1 152 14.4% 392.1 
2015 974 491.7 381.6 406 246.8 50.2% 453.0 541 59.1% 491.2 330 31.1% 185.0 103 9.8% 435.4 
Q3: 2016 531 334.5 351.2 217 174.2 52.1% 426.6 305 62.7% 449.2 171 29.6% 147.0 55 7.7% 442.7 






Table 2 – Covenant-Lite vs. Fully Covenanted Leverage Loans.  This table reports the mean 
attributes of covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage loan facilities over the period 1999-Q3:2016. 
In a covenant-lite loan facility compliance is tested when a specific event occurs, e.g. when borrowers 
take on additional debt. In a fully covenanted loan facility, compliance is tested on a quarterly basis. 
Superscript a,b,c denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% of differences between 
covenant-lite and fully covenanted group means. 
 
 Covenant-Lite Fully Covenanted 


















Number of Loans   2,366   2,194       26      146  12,429    3,308    4,372    4,749 
% of Total 0.160 0.927 0.011 0.062 0.840 0.266 0.352 0.382 
         
% Commercial Bank Arranger 0.556 c 0.561 0.462 0.493 0.660 0.555 0.797 0.607 
% Relationship Bank Arranger 0.432 c 0.431 0.192 0.500 0.306 0.457 0.226 0.273 
         
% Multi-tranche 0.029 c 0.005 0.000 0.384 0.461 0.007 0.290 0.934 
Deal Size, $mil. 630.325 c 607.425 263.912  1039.71 428.535 348.296 366.849 541.217 
Facility Term, qtrs. 25.735 c 25.863 20.592 24.718 21.160 22.077 17.587 23.812 
% Facility is Rated 0.951 c 0.959 0.385 0.932 0.550 0.707 0.361 0.615 
Facility Rating if Rated 13.678 c 13.823 4.962 13.062 7.433 9.978 4.579 8.287 
% Asset-backed 0.008 c 0.000 0.654 0.014 0.067 0.008 0.160 0.021 
         
% Acquisition 0.228 0.233 0.038 0.185 0.230 0.205 0.221 0.256 
% Leveraged Buyout 0.247 c 0.246 0.423 0.240 0.175 0.124 0.129 0.253 
% Capital Expenditure 0.005 c 0.004 0.038 0.014 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.023 
% General Corporate Purpose 0.023 c 0.021 0.115 0.041 0.041 0.030 0.078 0.014 
% Recapitalization 0.165 0.162 0.192 0.199 0.173 0.199 0.146 0.180 
% Refinancing 0.332 c 0.334 0.192 0.322 0.355 0.416 0.397 0.274 
         
% Traded 0.872 c 0.882 0.000 0.877 0.304 0.499 0.001 0.447 
         
% Sponsored 0.765 c 0.762 0.654 0.842 0.526 0.578 0.354 0.648 
% International 0.118 c 0.117 0.154 0.123 0.055 0.079 0.051 0.042 
% Listed 0.232 c 0.232 0.192 0.226 0.260 0.238 0.341 0.201 
% 1st Time 0.361 c 0.365 0.346 0.301 0.494 0.368 0.554 0.526 
         
Debt/Assets 0.229 0.229 0.213 0.224 0.220 0.251 0.217 0.201 
% Borrower is Rated 0.952 c 0.955 0.769 0.938 0.600 0.695 0.525 0.602 
Borrower Rating if Rated 13.820 c 13.868 11.192 13.575 8.375 9.944 7.123 8.436 
         
Facility Spread, bps 434.698 c 446.053 158.627 313.236 322.413 489.142 192.375 325.990 
Default Rate 0.019 c 0.020 0.077 0.000 0.027 0.036 0.009 0.037 
Bankruptcy Rate 0.009 c 0.010 0.038 0.000 0.019 0.026 0.006 0.025 
Time to Default|Default (Qtr) 12.522 c 12.318 17.000 0.000 10.644 9.992 9.875 11.270 
         
% Rated Borrower 0.952 0.955 0.769 0.938 0.600 0.695 0.525 0.602 
   Default Rate 0.019 c 0.019 0.100 0.000 0.032 0.036 0.014 0.043 
   Bankruptcy Rate 0.008 c 0.009 0.050 0.000 0.021 0.024 0.009 0.028 
% Unrated Borrower 0.048 0.045 0.231 0.062 0.400 0.305 0.475 0.398 
   Default Rate 0.035 c 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.038 0.004 0.027 
   Bankruptcy Rate 0.026 c 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.029 0.003 0.021 
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Table 3 – Borrower-Lender Match.  Table report probit regressions that capture the self-selection 
of borrowers and lenders in leverage loans. Limited dependent variable is a binary variable that equals 
1 when the leveraged loan facility is covenant-lite, and 0 when fully-covenanted. ‡ Standardized 
variable. Average marginal effects are computed from Model (5). 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Change From To p value 
Borrower and Lender Characteristics 
Non-Bank Lender Only 1.320*** 0.401*** 0.044 0.158 0.203 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Lender Only -1.112*** -1.122*** -0.101 0.158 0.058 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000)
Bank Loan Share -1.056***
(0.000)
CLO Volume ‡ 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.014 0.158 0.172 0.005 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Debt/Assets 0.068 -0.136* -0.134* -0.004 0.158 0.154 0.086 
(0.307) (0.085) (0.092)
Borrower is Rated 0.924*** 0.257* 0.279** 0.031 0.158 0.189 0.029 
(0.000) (0.051) (0.029)
Sponsored 0.461*** 0.474*** 0.466*** 0.052 0.158 0.210 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
International 0.225*** 0.033 0.038 0.004 0.158 0.162 0.693 
(0.000) (0.743) (0.692)
Listed -0.074* -0.073 -0.063 -0.007 0.158 0.151 0.276 
(0.099) (0.192) (0.278)
First Time Borrower -0.089*** 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.158 0.158 0.989 
(0.004) (0.926) (0.989)
Lead Underwriter and Facility Characteristics 
 Commercial Bank -0.029 -0.061 -0.055 -0.006 0.158 0.152 0.494 
(0.631) (0.447) (0.493)
Relationship Bank -0.042 0.049 0.002 0.000 0.158 0.158 0.972 
(0.180) (0.349) (0.972)
Multi-Tranche Facility -1.750*** -1.661*** -1.480*** -0.122 0.158 0.037 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Facility Size 0.162*** 0.263*** 0.247*** 0.030 0.158 0.189 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Facility Term - quarters 0.068*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.040 0.158 0.198 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Facility is Rated 0.586*** 0.325** 0.302** 0.033 0.158 0.191 0.031 
(0.000) (0.018) (0.025)
Asset-Backed Loan -0.167* 0.326*** 0.608*** 0.069 0.158 0.227 0.000 
(0.078) (0.001) (0.000)
Traded 0.766*** 0.501*** 0.442*** 0.049 0.158 0.207 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LIBOR plus Spread 1.132*** 0.638*** 0.430*** 0.048 0.158 0.206 0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant -2.700*** -3.139*** -5.614*** -4.930*** -5.102***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 14,795 14,795 14,795 14,795 14,795 
McFadden R2 0.476 0.323 0.535 0.562 0.566 
Tjur's R2 0.448 0.275 0.521 0.549 0.552 
% Correctly Pred (PCP) 89.6% 85.1% 91.4% 91.5% 91.8% 
Expected PCP 85.4% 80.8% 87.3% 88.0% 88.1% 
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4 - Default and Bankruptcy Hazard.  This table presents the Cox estimated proportional hazard model for default on leveraged 
loans. The Efron (1977) method is used to address tied failure times. The dependent variable equals 1 when the loan defaulted over the 
sample period and 0 otherwise. The survival periods are measured in quarters beginning with the loan issuance date. The hazard ratios are 
odds ratios of covenant-lite to fully covenanted rates for default and bankruptcy given default. General corporate purpose is the reference 











Covenant-Lite -0.528** 0.590** -1.071*** 0.343*** 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.008) (0.008) 
Estimated Prob(Cov-Lite) -0.612** 0.542** -1.276*** 0.279*** 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.002) (0.002) 
Borrowed Prior to Crisis 0.851*** 2.341*** 0.840*** 2.316*** 0.809*** 2.246*** 0.795*** 2.214*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IMR 0.123*** 0.212*** 1.236*** 
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Harrell’s C 0.594 0.565 0.619 0.590 
Somers D 0.187 0.131 0.237 0.179 
Number of Observations 14,795 14,795 14,795 14,795 
Hazard Rates 

















0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0.0093 0.0157 0.0106 0.0155 0.0038 0.0118 0.0039 0.0119 
20 0.0171 0.0276 0.0165 0.0279 0.0073 0.0193 0.0063 0.0198 
30 0.0235 0.0344 0.0213 0.0354 0.0102 0.0217 0.0074 0.0229 
40 0.0235 0.0554 0.0213 0.0566 0.0102 0.0217 0.0074 0.0229 






Table 5 – Facility Spread and Hazard Rates.  Table reports the estimated rates of default and 
bankruptcy given default using a Cox proportional hazard model for covenant-lite and fully 
covenanted leverage loans by lender types. Implied recovery rates are computed from facility spreads 
that reflect the expected loss from default. 
 
 Covenant-Lite Fully Covenanted 


















Number of Loans 2,366 2,194 26 146 12,429 3,308 4,372 4,749 
Number of Defaults 46 44 2 0 334 120 40 174 
Number of Bankruptcies 22 21 1 0 221 85 26 120 
         
% of Total 0.160 0.927 0.011 0.062 0.840 0.266 0.352 0.382 
Default Rate 0.019 c 0.020 0.077 0.000 0.027 0.036 0.009 0.037 
Bankruptcy Rate 0.009 c 0.010 0.038 0.000 0.019 0.026 0.006 0.025 
         
Facility Spread, bps 434.698 c 446.053 158.627 313.236 322.413 489.142 192.375 325.990 
         
Estimated Default Rate 0.022 0.020 0.000 0.064 0.047 0.083 0.019 0.063 
Estimated Bankruptcy Rate 0.008 0.007 0.000 0.027 0.023 0.033 0.015 0.020 
         




Table 6 – Facility Spread Regressions.  Columns 1-4 in the table report regression results from a 
joint estimation of facility spreads across lender types and covenant structures. using maximum 
likelihood. Estimated rates of default use a Cox proportional hazard model for covenant-lite and fully 
covenanted leverage loans by lender types. Implied recovery rates are computed from facility spreads 
adjusted for the effects of lead arrangers, issuer/issue characteristics, and use of proceeds as well as 
expected losses from default. †Demeaned by covenant-lite and fully covenanted averages. Columns 5-
































Bank is Lead Arranger -33.715*** -76.537*** -17.392* -25.190*** 0.561 0.555 0.797 0.607 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.077) (0.000)     
Relationship Bank -47.016*** -81.488*** -2.957 -3.718 0.431 0.457 0.226 0.273 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.422) (0.267)     
Institutional Loan Share    95.947***    0.641 
    (0.000)     
Traded -188.368*** -54.978***  -19.013*** 0.882 0.499  0.447 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001)     
Borrower is Rated -189.815*** -45.038*** -28.590*** -12.717 0.955 0.695 0.525 0.602 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.171)     
Traded*Rated Borrower 171.884*** 49.044***  -8.677 0.850 0.416  0.364 
 (0.000) (0.003)  (0.186)     
Sponsored 49.350*** 60.467*** 36.398*** 26.648*** 0.762 0.578 0.354 0.648 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Listed -8.687 -11.361 -12.714** -11.795** 0.232 0.238 0.341 0.201 
 (0.596) (0.340) (0.024) (0.028)     
Listed*Sponsored -57.848*** -52.076*** -0.652 -10.383 0.107 0.086 0.056 0.078 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.950) (0.190)     
International 5.041 -57.233*** -12.495** -11.566** 0.117 0.079 0.051 0.042 
 (0.744) (0.001) (0.036) (0.049)     
First Time Borrower 7.285 21.059*** -0.689 10.419*** 0.365 0.368 0.554 0.526 
 (0.216) (0.001) (0.834) (0.003)     
Issue Size† -0.049*** -0.093*** -0.011** -0.007*** -23.191 -80.119 -61.567 112.801 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.003)     
Acquisition-GCP 2.100 -40.173*** -11.196*** -6.970* 0.458 0.300 0.272 0.496 
 (0.811) (0.004) (0.001) (0.081)     
LBO-GCP 39.466*** 98.981*** 28.415*** 7.420** 0.225 0.095 0.051 0.240 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019)     
Capex-GCP -55.444* 49.907*** 8.450 22.848** -0.017 -0.003 -0.050 0.010 
 (0.077) (0.004) (0.308) (0.015)     
Dividend Recap-GCP 61.273*** 35.124* 20.268** -0.371 0.103 0.086 -0.034 0.077 
 (0.000) (0.053) (0.041) (0.907)     
Refi-GCP -29.507*** -70.507*** -7.970** -15.925*** 0.313 0.386 0.318 0.260 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000)     
Constant 383.434** 448.759*** 232.912*** 261.205***     
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Adjusted R2 0.2467 0.2295 0.1543 0.4416     
Observations 14,795        
Wald Chi-square 3,443.8        
Log Pseudolikelihood -92,141.4        
Estimated Default Rate 0.0200 0.0830 0.0190 0.0630     
Implied Recovery Rate 0.6980 0.6887 0.7558 0.7877     
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Table 7 – Lender-Borrower Match and Facility Spreads.  Table reports facility spreads, default 
rates, and implied recovery rates across different lender-borrower matches as well as trading in 
covenant-lite and fully covenanted leverage loans. Default is estimated using a Cox proportional 















































































































































Non-Bank Lenders Only 2,194 446.053 3,308 489.142 
1 336 0 0 0 14 507.371 – – 322 491.881 0.073 0.671 
2 400 1 0 0 38 346.816 – – 362 390.143 0.060 0.723 
3 423 0 1 0 14 507.214 – – 409 611.816 0.193 0.535 
4 135 0 0 1 22 382.341 0.143 0.706 113 499.290 0.056 0.673 
5 755 1 1 0 192 460.096 0.063 0.690 563 473.280 0.045 0.686 
6 1,049 1 0 1 449 366.358 0.025 0.716 600 397.233 0.062 0.720 
7 213 0 1 1 49 503.507 0.025 0.663 164 535.845 0.030 0.656 
8 2,191 1 1 1 1,416 469.873 0.014 0.646 775 540.821 0.018 0.637 
Bank Lenders Only 26 158.627 4,372 192.375 
9 1,516 0 0 0 4 71.983 – – 1,512 192.888 0.003 0.608 
10 1315 1 0 0 5 190.000 – – 1,310 161.209 0.070 0.845 
11 565 0 1 0 2 168.750 – – 563 276.446 0.006 0.640 
12 0 0 0 1 0 0 
13 998 1 1 0 15 169.924 – – 983 184.642 0.027 0.799 
14 3 1 0 1 0 3 288.514 – – 
15 0 0 1 1 0 0 
16 1 1 1 1 0 1 225.000 – – 
Mixed Lenders 146 313.236 4,749 325.990 
17 427 0 0 0 1 225.000 0.333 0.785 426 299.301 0.046 0.764 
18 466 1 0 0 3 290.263 – – 463 273.175 0.056 0.780 
19 1,077 0 1 0 3 414.312 – – 1,074 350.042 0.019 0.709 
20 111 0 0 1 0 111 314.236 0.034 0.746 
21 675 1 1 0 11 272.791 0.333 0.746 664 324.129 0.072 0.756 
22 692 1 0 1 19 308.522 0.143 0.752 673 287.902 0.027 0.752 
23 285 0 1 1 5 311.608 – – 280 343.632 0.052 0.745 
24 1,162 1 1 1 104 317.048 – – 1,058 357.391 0.382 0.672 




Table A1 - Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definitions 
Covenant-lite indicator Dummy variable equal to one if loan facility has incurrence-based covenants and zero otherwise 
Bank Share Percent of loan facility contributed by bank investors 
Commercial Bank Arranger Dummy variable equal to one if loan facility has a commercial bank as the lead arranger and zero 
otherwise Relationship Bank Arranger Dummy variable equal to one if loan facility is arranged by a bank that has arranged a prior leveraged loan 
for the borrower and zero otherwise Borrower is Rated Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower has a corporate credit rating from either Moody's or S&P 
and zero otherwise Sponsored Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower is affiliated with a financial sponsor, or private equity firm, 
and zero otherwise International Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower is domiciled outside of the United States and zero 
otherwise Listed Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower has stock publicly traded and zero otherwise 
1st Time Dummy variable equal to one if the borrower is taking out its first leveraged loan and zero otherwise 
Financial Leverage Borrower debt to assets ratio at loan issuance 
Facility is Rated Dummy variable equal to one if the loan facility is rated by either Moody's or S&P and zero otherwise 
Facility Spread, bps. The weighted average basis point (bps) spread over LIBOR of the loan facility 
Deal Size, $mil. Size of the loan facility measured in millions of USD 
Facility Term, qtrs. The weighted average maturity of the loan facility measured in quarters 
Asset-backed Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is secured by current assets and 0 otherwise 
Multi-tranche Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is comprised of more than one loan type and 0 otherwise 
Traded Dummy variable equal to 1 if any loan within the facility is traded and 0 otherwise 
Acquisition 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is used to make strategic acquisitions by non-private-equity-
related borrowers and 0 otherwise 
Leveraged Buyout Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is used to complete a leveraged buyout and 0 otherwise 
Capital Expenditure Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is used to support the build-out of a project and 0 otherwise 
General Corporate Purpose 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is used to support working capital, general operations, and 
other business-as-usual purposes and 0 otherwise 
Recapitalization 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is used to change the composition of the borrower's balance 
sheet mix between debt and equity and 0 otherwise 
Refinancing Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is used to refinance existing debt and 0 otherwise 
Default Rate Dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower misses either an interest or principal payment and 0 otherwise 






Table A1 – Variable Definitions (cont.) 
Variable         Definitions 
Time to Default|Default, 
qtrs.
Number of quarters elapsed between loan issuance and default 
Institutional Only Dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan facility is funded only by institutional investors 
Bank Only Dummy variable equal to one if the loan facility is funded only by bank investors 
CLO Volume 
Dollar volume, measured in millions, of the funds by collateralized loan obligation funds during the 
quarter in which the loan was issued 
Debt-to-Assets Financial leverage 





IV. Conclusion to Essays in Leveraged Capital Markets
Syndicate form impacts the pricing of initial and seasoned public offerings of high yield and has
a concomitant effect on shareholder wealth. Utilizing a nested bivariate (double selection) probit 
model that characterizes syndicate form, I document a positive assortative matching of high (low) 
quality issuers with more (less) reputable lead underwriters. The matches between issuers and lead 
arrangers in underwriting syndicates involve self-selection.  In sole led syndicates, issuers are older 
established firms and higher credit rated, but issue ratings are lower, maturities are shorter, secondary 
market liquidity is impaired, and senior securitization is needed. When higher underwriting risk 
requires intensive and specialized due diligence and pricing accuracy is important, a more concentrated 
syndicate is necessary, and certification by reputable lead underwriters is essential. I find that in 
contrast to joint led syndicates, lead underwriters in sole led syndicates are more likely to be 
investment banks, underwrite fewer high yield debt issues, and a higher percentage of total fee income 
stems from underwriting high yield debt.  When moral hazard is more severe and rents from collective 
reputation are low, syndicate size is smaller, and the number of lead underwriters are fewer. Joint 
above median syndicates have the least reputable lead underwriters. In joint above median led 
syndicates, issuing firms are lower rated, and more likely to be unlisted and first-time issuers. 
Additionally, issues are lower rated, less likely to be investment/speculative split-rated, and smaller in 
size with poorer secondary market liquidity. Issue quality is highest for joint below median led 
syndicates. 
Debt issuances in joint above median led syndicates have the highest average yield spreads. As 
expected, marginal yield spreads are higher for first-time and unlisted issuers across all syndicates. For 
uninformed investors, the risk of “winners curse” is considerable in joint above median led syndicate 
issuances. The solicitation of reservation prices from informed investors has a significant effect on 
marginal yield spreads of debt issued by sole led and joint below median led syndicates, 
but an insignificant effect on the marginal yield spreads of debt issued by joint above median led 
syndicates. Institutional investors seem to find it more advantageous to withhold participation in price 
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discovery associated with disclosures of private information when the quality of the issuer and 
reputation of lead underwriter are poor.  Seasoned issues have significantly lower average yields. The 
reduction in yields is highest in debt issuances by joint above median led syndicates where lead 
underwriters are least reputable, issuers are worst quality, and the resulting certification process is less 
robust. The retention or change in lead underwriters reduces marginal yield spreads only when debt 
issues by joint led syndicates are traded. Weighted average yield spreads on traded and non-traded 
debt issuances are not significantly different, which suggests that higher offer yield spreads are meant 
to compensate investors for illiquidity rather than to stimulate post-offer market trading. Informed 
investors are better rewarded when debt issues offered are expected to be illiquid.  The data presents 
little evidence of underpricing. Debt issuances in sole led syndicates by first-time issuers are weakly 
underpriced, as are debt issuances by first-time and unlisted issuers in joint above median led 
syndicates. There are, however, no significant cross-sectional differences in underpricing across 
syndicates. Further, I find no significant changes in shareholder wealth from high yield debt 
issuances.  
In essay 2, I show that the matches between lenders and borrowers are negative assortative on 
transparency and sophistication, whereby less transparent borrowers will match with more 
sophisticated informed lenders. I find that creditworthy borrowers are always hurt by the presence of 
non-creditworthy borrowers when lenders are uninformed. Importantly, by leveraging investor 
restrictions associated with Rule 144A private placements, the data shows that QIBs as specialized 
lenders play an important role in certifying creditworthiness.   
In my final essay, I examine borrower-lender matches into covenant-lite and fully covenanted 
leverage loans and show how the resulting rates of default and bankruptcy as well as losses from 
recovery are priced. The results present new evidence of the segmentation of borrowers by non-bank 
and bank lenders. Non-bank lenders match with speculative grade rated borrowers with financial 
sponsors. Bank lenders focus on fully covenanted loans to unrated and investment grade rated 
borrowers. For non-bank lenders, the secondary trading of loans imposes a market discipline on 
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borrowers that mitigates agency conflicts. For bank lenders, monitoring is more important. Almost all 
loans by non-bank lenders are traded; loans by bank lenders are rarely traded.  
Since the inception of covenant-lite leverage loans, financial markets forecast larger losses given 
default for covenant-lite leverage loans despite lower expected default. I show that leverage loan prices 
assign more weight to potentially high losses from low probability events. Higher risk premiums on 
covenant-lite leverage loans represent catastrophic insurance premiums that borrowers pay to lenders 
to compensate them for low probability but high loss events. From the borrower’s perspective, the 




Akerlof, George A., 1970, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488-500. 
Aldrich, John H., and Forrest D. Nelson, 1984, Linear probability, logit, and probit models (Sage). 
Allen, Franklin, and Gerald R. Faulhaber, 1989, Signalling by underpricing in the IPO market, Journal 
of Financial Economics 23, 303-323. 
Bae, Kee-Hong, and Vidhan K. Goyal, 2009, Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Bank Loans, The 
Journal of Finance 64, 823-860. 
Baron, David P., 1982, A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution 
Services for New Issues, The Journal of Finance 37, 955-976. 
Benveniste, LM, and PA Spindt, 1989, How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer Price and 
Allocation of New Issues, Journal of Financial Economics 24, 343; 343-361; 361. 
Benveniste, Lawrence M., Alexander Ljungqvist, William J. Wilhelm, and Xiaoyun Yu, 2003, 
Evidence of Information Spillovers in the Production of Investment Banking Services, The 
Journal of Finance 58, 577-608.  
Benveniste, Lawrence M., and William J. Wilhelm, 1990, A comparative analysis of IPO proceeds 
under alternative regulatory environments, Journal of Financial Economics 28, 173-207. 
Besanko, David, and Anjan V. Thakor, 1987, Collateral and rationing: sorting equilibria in 
monopolistic and competitive credit markets, International Economic Review , 671-689. 
Bester, Helmut, 1987, The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information, European 
Economic Review 31, 887-899. 
Bhattacharya, Sudipto, and Gabriella Chiesa, 1995, Proprietary Information, Financial 
Intermediation, and Research Incentives, Journal of Financial Intermediation 4, 328-357. 
Billett, Matthew T., Redouane Elkamhi, Latchezar Popov, and Raunaq S. Pungaliya, 2016, Bank Skin 
in the Game and Loan Contract Design: Evidence from Covenant-Lite Loans, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51, 839-873.  
Booth, James R., and Richard L. Smith, 1986, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certification 
Hypothesis, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 261-281. 
Boyd, John H., and Edward C. Prescott, 1986, Financial intermediary-coalitions, Journal of Economic 
Theory 38, 211-232. 
108 
Cai, Nianyun Kelly, Jean Helwege, and Arthur Warga, 2007, Underpricing in the Corporate Bond 
Market, The Review of Financial Studies 20, 2021-2046. 
Cantillo, Miguel, and Julian Wright, 2000, How Do Firms Choose Their Lenders? An Empirical 
Investigation, The Review of Financial Studies 13, 155-189. 
Carhart, Mark M., 1997, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, Journal of Finance 52, 57-82. 
Chan, Yuk-Shee, and George Kanatas, 1985, Asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan 
agreements, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 17, 84-95. 
Chaplinsky, Susan, and Latha Ramchand, 2004, The Impact of SEC Rule 144A on Corporate Debt 
Issuance by International Firms, Journal of Business 77, 1073-1097. 
Chemmanur, T. J., and P. Fulghieri, 1994, Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice between bank 
loans and publicly traded debt, Review of Financial Studies 7, 475-506. 
Corwin, Shane A., and Paul Schultz, 2005, The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing, 
Information Production, and Underwriter Competition, Journal of Finance 60, 443-486. 
Cox, D. R., 1972, Regression Models and Life-Tables, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.Series B 
(Methodological) 34, 187-220. 
Datta, Sudip, Mai Iskandar-Datta, and Ajay Patel, 1997, The Pricing of Initial Public Offers of 
Corporate Straight Debt, The Journal of Finance 52, 379-396. 
DeLong, J. B., 1991, Did J. P. Morgan’s Men Add Value? An Economist's Perspective on Financial 
Capitalism, in Anonymous (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc). 
Demiroglu, Cem, and Christopher M. James, 2010, The role of private equity group reputation in 
LBO financing, Journal of Financial Economics 96, 306-330. 
Denis, David J., and Vassil T. Mihov, 2003, The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, 
and public debt: evidence from new corporate borrowings, Journal of Financial Economics 70, 3-28. 
Diamond, Douglas W., 1993, Bank loan maturity and priority when borrowers can refinance, Capital 
Markets and Financial Intermediation, 46-68. 
---. 1991, Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 709-737. 
Diamond, Douglas W., 1984, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, Review of Economic 
Studies 51, 393. 
109 
Drucker, Steven, and Manju Puri, 2005, On the Benefits of Concurrent Lending and Underwriting, 
The Journal of Finance 60, 2763-2799. 
Eckbo, B. E., 1986, Valuation effects of corporate debt offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 
119-151.
Efron, Bradley, 1977, The Efficiency of Cox's Likelihood Function for Censored Data, Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 72, 557-565. 
Evans, Martin D. D., 1996, Peso problems: Their theoretical and empirical implications, in 
Anonymous Handbook of Statistics (Elsevier Science & Technology). 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1993, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and 
bonds, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56. 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1997, Industry costs of equity, Journal of Financial 
Economics 43, 153-193. 
Fama, Eugene F., 1985, What's Different about Banks? Journal of Monetary Economics 15, 29-39. 
Fang, Lily H., 2005, Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of Underwriting 
Services, The Journal of Finance 60, 2729-2761. 
Faulkender, Michael, and Mitchell A. Petersen, 2006, Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital 
Structure? The Review of Financial Studies 19, 45-79. 
Fenn, George W., 2000, Speed of issuance and the adequacy of disclosure in the 144A high-yield 
debt market, Journal of Financial Economics 56, 383-405. 
Fernando, Chitru S., Vladimir A. Gatchev, and Paul A. Spindt, 2005, Wanna Dance? How Firms and 
Underwriters Choose Each Other, The Journal of Finance 60, 2437-2469. 
Fox, Jeremy T., 2007, Semiparametric estimation of multinomial discrete‐choice models using a 
subset of choices, The Rand journal of economics 38, 1002-1019. 
French, Kenneth R., and James M. Poterba, 1991, Investor Diversification and International Equity 
Markets, The American Economic Review 81, 222-226. 
Fulghieri, Paolo, and Dmitry Lukin, 2001, Information production, dilution costs, and optimal 
security design, Journal of Financial Economics 61, 3-42. 
Fung, W. K. H., and Andrew Rudd, 1986, Pricing New Corporate Bond Issues: An Analysis of Issue 
Cost and Seasoning Effects, The Journal of Finance 41, 633-643. 
110 
Gande, Amar, Manju Puri, Anthony Saunders, and Ingo Walter, 1997, Bank Underwriting of Debt 
Securities: Modern Evidence, The Review of Financial Studies 10, 1175-1202. 
Gande, Amar, Manju Puri, and Anthony Saunders, 1999, Bank entry, competition, and the market 
for corporate securities underwriting, Journal of Financial Economics 54, 165-195. 
Gande, Amar, and Anthony Saunders, 2012, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary 
Market for Loans? The Journal of Finance 67, 1649-1684. 
Gomes, Armando, and Gordon Phillips, 2012, Why do public firms issue private and public 
securities? Journal of Financial Intermediation 21, 619-658. 
Green, Richard C., 2007, Presidential Address: Issuers, Underwriter Syndicates, and Aftermarket 
Transparency, The Journal of Finance 62, 1529-1550. 
Greene, William H., 2003, Econometric Analysis (Prentice Hall). 
Heckman, James J., 1979, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, Econometrica 47, 153-161. 
Helwege, Jean, and Paul Kleiman, 1998, The Pricing of High-Yield Debt IPOs, The Journal of Fixed 
Income 8, 61; 61-68; 68. 
Herron, Michael C., 1999, Postestimation uncertainty in limited dependent variable models, Political 
Analysis 8, 83-98. 
Hosmer, David W., and Stanley Lemeshow, 2000, Applied logistic regression (Wiley, New York). 
Huang, Rongbing, and Gabriel G. Ramírez, 2010, Speed of Issuance, Lender Specialization, and the 
Rise of the 144A Debt Market, Financial Management (Wiley-Blackwell) 39, 643-673. 
Ivashina, Victoria, and Zheng Sun, 2011, Institutional demand pressure and the cost of corporate 
loans, Journal of Financial Economics 99, 500-522. 
James, Christopher, 1992, Relationship-Specific Assets and the Pricing of Underwriter Services, The 
Journal of Finance 47, 1865-1885. 
---. 1987, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, Journal of Financial Economics 19, 217-
235. 
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, Mark Weinstein, and Ivo Welch, 1993, An empirical investigation of IPO 
returns and subsequent equity offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 34, 153-175. 
111 
Lim, Jongha, Bernadette A. Minton, and Michael S. Weisbach, 2014, Syndicated loan spreads and the 
composition of the syndicate, Journal of Financial Economics 111, 45-69. 
McFadden, Daniel, 1977, Quantitative methods for analyzing travel behavior of individuals: some recent 
developments (Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California). 
McFadden, Daniel, 2009, Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior, in Howard R. 
Vane and Chris Mulhearn, eds.: (Elgar Reference Collection. Pioneering Papers of the Nobel 
Memorial Laureates in Economics, vol. 3. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar). 
Menard, Scott, 2002, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis (Sage). 
Mikkelson, Wayne H., and M. M. Partch, 1986, Valuation effects of security offerings and the 
issuance process, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 31-60. 
Park, Cheol, 2000, Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts, The Journal of Finance 55, 2157-2195. 
Phelan, Gregory, 2017, Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation, The Journal of Finance 72, 
1253-1284. 
Puri, M., 1996, Commercial banks in investment banking - Conflict of interest or certification role? 
Journal of Financial Economics 40, 373-401. 
Rajan, Raghuram G., 1992, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-
Length Debt, The Journal of Finance 47, 1367-1400. 
Rajan, Raghuram, and Andrew Winton, 1995, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor, 
The Journal of Finance 50, 1113-1146. 
Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole, 1996, Controlling Risk in Payment Systems, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 28, 832-862. 
---. 1996, Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28, 733-762. 
Rock, Kevin, 1986, Why new issues are underpriced, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 187-212. 
Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph Stiglitz, 1976, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An 
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 629-
649.  
Sherman, Ann E., and Sheridan Titman, 2002, Building the IPO order book: underpricing and 
participation limits with costly information, Journal of Financial Economics 65, 3-29. 
112 
Shivdasani, Anil, and Wei-Ling Song, 2011, Breaking down the barriers: Competition, syndicate 
structure, and underwriting incentives, Journal of Financial Economics 99, 581-600. 
Sorensen, Eric H., 1980, An Analysis of the Relationship Between Underwriter Spread and the 
Pricing of Municipal Bonds, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 15, 435-447. 
Spence, Michael, 1974, Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and 
distribution, Journal of Economic Theory 7, 296-332. 
Tabachnick, Barbara G., Linda S. Fidell, and Steven J. Osterlind, 2001, Using multivariate statistics. 
Tesar, Linda L., and Ingrid M. Werner, 1995, Home bias and high turnover, Journal of International 
Money and Finance 14, 467-492. 
Tirole, Jean, 1996, A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of 
Corruption and to Firm Quality), The Review of Economic Studies 63, 1-22. 
---. 2006, The Theory of Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J). 
Tjur, Tue, 2009, Coefficients of determination in logistic regression models—A new proposal: The 
coefficient of discrimination, The American Statistician 63, 366-372. 
Wasserfallen, Walter, and Daniel Wydler, 1988, Underpricing of Newly Issued Bonds: Evidence 
from the Swiss Capital Market, The Journal of Finance 43, 1177-1191. 
Welch, Ivo, 1992, Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades, The Journal of Finance 47, 695-732. 
Yasuda, Ayako, 2005, Do Bank Relationships Affect the Firm's Underwriter Choice in the 
Corporate-Bond Underwriting Market? The Journal of Finance 60, 1259-1292. 
Yosha, Oved, 1995, Information Disclosure Costs and the Choice of Financing Source, Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 4, 3-20. 
